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CONSIDERATIONS ON THE BRITISH CONSTITUTION

"THE British constitution is the best that ever was, since the beginning of the world, and it is not possible to make it better." So said Mr. Justice Braxfield, in 1783, perhaps rather in the affective language of what Bentham called "evocation", or indeed of prescription, than in that of description. However, the most remarkable and Lewis Carroll quality of this eminent Constitution was that it did not exist; and this remains its quality. Professor A. V. Dicey, in *The Law of the Constitution*, can indeed point out that this unwritten Constitution in its more famous clauses can be found written out in statutes, such as that of 31 Charles II, ii, otherwise called *Habeas Corpus*. It yet remains true that all these statutes, even the most fundamental or sacred, are, in theory and fact, subject to the unlimited sovereignty of the Queen-in-Parliament. What this last phrase practically means we shall here examine.

There may indeed be in Britain, as Jellineck argued was true in Germany, an auto-limitation of sovereignty by reason of what is not so much a constitutional law as a constitutional morality, shaped in part by social principle and in part by that political prudence which is instinctively aware of the limits beyond which even the legislature cannot safely go without encountering risk of the breakdown of law. What at least is clear is that such a constitution, not reduced to writing nor determined by the precise decisions of any judiciary on argued cases, is in its province very much a matter of interpretation. Indeed, although Queen Anne was already dead, it is contended by Sir Ernest Barker, in his *Traditions of Civility*, that the main divergence of the American colonial lawyers of the eighteenth century from those of their

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fraternity in Britain was that they failed to recognize this fact, and continued their constitutional interpretations in a pre-Anne sense while living in the eighteenth, and not in the seventeenth, century. The Constitution had "grown"—or, as others would say, citing Locke, had "been deformed". The ambiguity of contemporary interpretation appears clear in the uncoördinated pages of Blackstone himself. It was America which was the true heir of British constitutionalism.

Recently we have had the good fortune to be given two new surveys or interpretations of the actual working of the political system of government in Britain within the limits of this Constitution, the one by a distinguished Canadian scholar resident in London, Dr. R. T. McKenzie, in his *British Political Parties*,[1] and the other by one of the most eminent of British practical politicians, sometime Lord President of the Council, a Robert Walpole turned Walter Bagehot, the Right Hon. Herbert Morrison, in his *Government and Parliament*.[2] Dr. McKenzie can perhaps meet one of the keenest criticisms of his survey, that he omits all discussion of the Communist party, by pointing out that he is concerned with constitutional British parties. This, of course, assumes that it is known what the Constitution is.

The generally received opinion would seem to be that the Constitution is that which "the best authorities" hold to be the Constitution, just as Roman law in its earlier stages under the Empire was determined by the *responsa juris prudentium*. For these purposes "the best authorities" would seem to be senior statesmen of experience and, specifically, sometime prime ministers and occasionally sometime lord chancellors. However, the opinion of Lord Oxford and Asquith, an eminent lawyer who had been Prime Minister, that, if the two leading parties have both been in office and their leaders have resigned, the King should rather call on the leaders of smaller parties to form a government, if they can, than immediately accede to the outgoing

[1] R. T. McKenzie, *British Political Parties: The Distribution of Power Within the Conservative and Labour Parties*. New York, St. Martin's Press Inc., 1955. xv, 623 pp. $7.50.

[2] Herbert Morrison, *Government and Parliament: A Survey from the Inside*. London and New York, Oxford University Press, 1954. xiii, 363 pp. $3.40.

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Premier's request for a dissolution, is probably a minority opinion about constitutional propriety. Similarly Sir Arthur Berriedale Keith's view that the Crown, while always acting on the advice of ministers, is not obligated to act on the advice in crisis of the resigning Premier if there are obvious ministerial alternatives (and, conversely, that the King can insist upon a dissolution and election, despite the advice of such a Premier to authorize the reconstitution of the government or cabinet), although probably majority doctrine, has been vigorously challenged by exponents, such as Laski, of what may be called "the rubber-stamp" view of the monarchy. Mr. Morrison, however, says decisively that, on the occasion of a resignation, "the sovereign is free to seek or not to seek the advice of the out-going Prime Minister": that is, Laski's thesis is wrong. The advice of privy councillors is also admissible. Indeed, Mr. Morrison's view clearly is that, in 1931, George V should have consulted them more and *dis*regarded the view of his Chief Minister, Ramsay MacDonald, who had become, in his view, unrepresentative of his party.

What we can say with assurance is that, under the British Constitution, there is no difference in law, as touching change and repeal, between "ordinary" and "constitutional" laws, even in so delicate a case, possessing something of a treaty or fetial quality, as the Acts of Union with Ireland and Scotland; but that the same process of legislation which can change the one can (if the requisite consents can be got) change the other. As Sir Ernest Barker says, "in the English view, as there was no such thing as a natural that could be pitted against positive law, so there was no such thing as a fundamental law which was separate from, and superior to, the rest of the law." Perhaps "the English view", of the late eighteenth century and of Austin and the nineteenth century, was merely wrong-headed; but that is another issue. The monarchy can, in fact, be abolished by ordinary statute if the King can be pressed into consent; and the House of Lords has actually been restricted under threat of the use of the royal prerogative (on ministerial advice) of creation, on a large scale, of new peers. From this some people have rather rashly concluded that "the House of Commons is really sovereign."

That parliamentary sovereignty is much emphasized, although

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technically we should refer to "the King- (or Queen-) in-Parliament", and that especially the House of Commons is exceedingly jealous of its privileges, are indeed matters beyond argument. Before reporting to the nation after the Geneva Conference, as did President Eisenhower, Sir Anthony Eden reported to the Commons. Parliament took precedence of, and in truth was jealous of, the nation. The Postmaster General, Charles Hill, has recently issued an instruction to the broadcasting companies, B.B.C. and Independent Television, that no subject may be debated on the air (least of all by a Member of Parliament) within two weeks of the time when it is expected to be discussed in Parliament. The increased withdrawal of official documents from the inspection of historians or public is all part of the same process. This decision, indeed, of the Postmaster General has been a matter of keen criticism on the ground of freedom of speech and the vital need for vigor in "the great debate"; but the probable reply will be that the British constitutional system is one of parliamentary or representative democracy. The question which may be posed here is whether such a democracy is indeed a democracy at all, and not rather a species of fiduciary oligarchy. Moreover, it may be added that the only substantial question is: not whether, but which, is the oligarchy actually enjoying substantial power—the Commons, the Cabinet or (as in Russia) the Party?

Mr. Morrison is a devout Parliamentarian, whose experience of the workings of Parliament is second to none. Perhaps for this reason, a reformer in so many other things, he sees little need for reform of the Commons. He is satisfied. That his book will for many decades be imperative reading for every student of the system I do not doubt. There is a shrewd discussion of such certainly important issues as the appropriate size of the Cabinet, also discussed from the background of long experience by the late Leo Amery in his Autobiography, and of the proper function of ministers. But Mr. Morrison's concern is with actual legislative practice (in a legislature which includes the executive in its chamber), and not with asking fundamental or revolutionary questions in philosophy or political science. Indeed, he is at

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perhaps his best, not when most sincerely attempting to be "objective", but when raising a fold of the official curtain and letting us in upon what actually happened "behind the scenes". The lower house, therefore, comes off well since it has, in practice, never chosen to ask such "basic" questions itself (although the old Independent Labor party[3] and the Webbs, for example in their *Constitution for the Socialist Commonwealth of Great Britain*, 1920, at one time did). Beyond the readjustment of constituencies, to get more or less equal electorates, and the abolition of the university constituencies and other plural voting, a program now achieved, there is no demand for House of Commons reform, although some for more pay. Admittedly, with demands for attendance at the Strasbourg Assembly, the new Atlantic Assembly, the United Nations, NATO, UNESCO and the like, there are scarcely enough legislators to go round, unless the House of Lords is brought into fuller use, by the enlargement there of the Opposition, the possible introduction of life-Lords of Council, and pay checks for pedigree peers; but these are minor matters capable, it is felt, of fairly easy adjustment. The searching questions of Rousseau—"Are the British free except at Election time?" and "Are not the only genuine democracies those which are traditionally called Pure Democracies, as among the free-men of ancient Greece and later in Switzerland?"—are questions felt to be too absurd to take time on their discussion. After all, even the system in Eastern Europe of what is pleonastically called the People's Democracies, that is, "the People's People's Power", that "fuller democracy", does not raise them. Emphatically it does not.

Mr. Morrison says:

> Some people think that British practice puts too much power into the hands of the Government and its Whips . . . . It must take a firm line on essential matters of public interest, but a Government cannot hold its majority together unless it takes trouble to do so . . . . The duly elected majority must rule; but the Opposition has its rights and duties.[4]

[3] *Cf.* Mr. Morrison's reference to the work of F. W. Jowett, *op. cit.*, pp. 256 *et seq.*

[4] *Op. cit.*, pp. 94–95.

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This process "educates the nation". It is not the nation, it will be noted, that instructs Parliament—and indeed the doctrine that Members of Parliament are instructed delegates, although it grows in power, is one, denounced by Burke, that has never been accepted in Britain—unlike the position in America from the earliest days, when settlements sent delegates to the colonial assemblies, and where the Representative (significant word) in Congress has to reside in his constituency. Parliament is still to some extent a *Witan* of supposedly wise and weighty men, an aristocracy of judgment. The objection throughout the centuries to a pure democracy is that, whether (as Rousseau thought) desirable or not, it is quite impracticable. Both the Mills regarded, therefore, the representative system as a gift from heaven rendering, even in large countries, that democracy practicable which hitherto had not been viable.

Incidentally they and the theorists of liberalism thought that the more educated middle class would instruct the electors, who would rejoice to accept this guidance of their betters. In the words of Mr. Gladstone, at Chester, "the principle of Liberalism is trust in the people, qualified by prudence." This principle of the last century forms an interesting contrast to the frequently accepted democratic view of today that it is the people who will decide what is prudence, and indeed what are the ends of education and the pattern of mores. Moreover (although this is as yet not equally recognized) there are today no longer the technical difficulties in the way of working pure democracy which at one time caused people to think it to be quite impracticable, except in the very small state or Swiss canton. In a famous passage, indeed, Aristotle explains that so essential is it for democracy to be in the pure form that the area of the state must be ruthlessly cut so as to make this practicable—for, in the alternative, a politician "would require the voice of Stentor" to address all the multitude who would be gathered in town meeting.[5] That the democrat must trust the judgment of the common man, even in principle about particulars, although not necessarily his information about routes of execution, Aristotle did not doubt.

[5] *Politics*, Bk. IV, ch. iv.

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However, the interesting thing is that today it is possible for the statesman to address and be seen by the entire nation through the media of radio and television, and indeed to chat by their firesides; and that, by means of a simple voting machine and an "electronic brain", it would be fully practicable, in a few hours, to ascertain the precise mind of democracy, with statistical precision, on any political issue whatsoever that might arise. Mr. Robert Montgomery, adviser to President Eisenhower, assures us that television, far from making demagogues, destroys them. If, therefore, today we do not work pure democracy, leaving the executive task as in Switzerland to a coalition of experts as ministers, it is because we distrust it. Why we distrust it no contemporary political scientist has troubled to explore. For myself, in lighter moments, occasionally I think there is much to be said for what Renan called a perpetual plebiscite, coupled with multipartisan administration by nonparty experts; and Dr. George Gallup has recently pointed out that, in recent great issues of policy, the polled public was well ahead of its representatives in prescience. One might indeed abolish Parliament and Congress, or limit them to the function of subsidiary watchdog agencies. It would perhaps save much trouble and undemocratic self-importance. It is not for political scientists to shy from asking fundamental, curious questions because they are unusual or inconvenient: the science lives thereby. It could even be suggested that, as in industry, the fact that a system, essentially oligarchic, has obtained for a very long time is an excellent reason for suggesting its radical overhaul as a mechanism or its relegation to a museum.

The jealousy, however, of the ruling Sovereign Parliament against the Sovereign People is fully on the record—nor is the American Constitution in its origins, on the explicit statements of the Founding Fathers, less distrustful. In Britain the system of democratic plebiscite has been regarded with marked disfavor, not least on the Left. Harold J. Laski condemned it as unconstitutional, but peculiarly so on "emotional issues" such as a royal abdication. The Conservative party, and specifically its erstwhile leader Arthur Balfour, has been known to play with it as a method of settling constitutional issues such as the new control

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of the Lords and, in 1910, of tariff reform and protection; but only very tentatively. The instinctive tendency was probably rather to promote the conservative approach by other means, such as the final extensions of the franchise to women, once so bitterly opposed by Asquith.

It is interesting to recall, on the theme of parliamentary exclusiveness and dignity, the remark of a Member of Parliament two centuries ago, Sir William Yonge in 1737, who was alarmed about the disastrous possibilities in the reporting, for the eyes of the vulgar, of the privileged debates in Parliament, such as are now carried by all newspapers. This innovation, Sir William argued, must be stopped, "otherwise you will have the speeches of the House every day printed, and we shall be looked upon as the most contemptible assembly on the face of the earth." Familiarity may have bred in many members a not inconsiderable contempt for the politics of their constituents, and the last thing they want is to be counseled from week to week by them. Politicians, in charge of a party machine designed for victory, prefer to be free even to "look for issues", if they do not obviously present themselves for contest, rather than to be told ahead of time to a decimal point what the public thinks, and the master's voice (if it be the master) says. However this may be, public discussion on the radio is watched with alarm. It may, of course, be felt that this discussion means exposing the public to counsel chiefly by "lively" and "amusing" fellows, who may also be irresponsible fellows; and that indeed a danger here exists in thoroughgoing democracy itself, as Plato alleged. Instead of such separation of detached issues for discussion, Parliamentarians prefer that full power should be put into their hands after a general election at which the electorate is offered a package of mixed items, to choose between two parties simply "yes" or "no". The electorate finds itself committed, because it has chosen one item, to accept all the others, on the basis of an implicit mandate, which the parties have tied up with it but of which the public may be scarcely aware, unless it has meticulously scrutinized the parties' programs. In America, even this will scarcely help. That today radio and television, even more than the less effective

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press, are the major instruments of living democracy is not accepted doctrine, even if it be true.

Reference has been made to the sovereignty in Britain of the Queen-in-Parliament. In practice, if not in law, this reduces itself to the sovereignty of the Commons. Or does it? Even if it be conceded that the function of the party whips is to counsel and to warn, rather than to tyrannize and to threaten with the withdrawal of party support or worse at the elections, it is yet the case that the decisions of the Cabinet (or of the Opposition Parliamentary Party's Executive Committee), communicated to party members in the House, will be usually obeyed. Hence, decision lies with the leaders of the majority party (or Coalition) and, briefly, sovereignty in practice would seem to lie, under the British Constitution, with the executive. Indeed we can say that, parliamentarily, the power of the Cabinet has grown, is growing, and perhaps needs to be reduced. This conclusion, however, is hotly contested by many constitutional writers.

On this issue there is, in Mr. Morrison's own book, a very interesting ambiguity. In one place he writes, "it is important to maintain the doctrine that the Government is responsible to the House of Commons as a *whole* [and, therefore, including the Opposition] and, *through* Parliament, to the nation" (italics mine). However, only a few pages later, he says, "administrative control must rest with the Minister, because he is responsible to Parliament, and through Parliament to the Crown." The collectivity of ministers yet is the government. What does such a democrat as Mr. Morrison mean by this emphasis on the legal doctrine that the ministers are Her Majesty's Ministers (not the people's)? According to such a theorist and historian as Ferrero only popular approval gives legitimacy. I presume that the implication is that the work of the executive has to be carried on by the responsible ministers (uninterfered with, as the context shows, by bureaus or committees of legislators such as F. W. Jowett had suggested) whose collective responsibility was, in consort with Parliament, to the long-range public interests or "reason of state", symbolized by "the Crown". And these can be put into contrast with the actual whims and wishes of a momentary majority of the adult populace, as revealed by a plebiscite. If this interpretation is

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correct, it raises one of the most fundamental issues in politics and indeed in ethics and one which has preoccupied the mind of Walter Lippmann, in his *Public Philosophy*.

The recurrent theme of argument of Mr. McKenzie's book, *British Political Parties*, is that (despite a certain period of immature and anarchic uncertainty in the early days of the minority Labor governments) in fact the will of the parliamentary leaders prevails, especially when they are in office as the Cabinet, whatever rumblings there may be in the party memberships. It may be that Mr. McKenzie slightly overemphasizes this, in part owing to a perhaps slightly excessive formality or academic quality of treatment, which those who have themselves engaged in the strife (and here is their advantage) will wish to qualify. Is the practical sovereignty of Parliament that of the Cabinet or indeed rather of the party? If so, the jealousy of privilege would not be so much between Parliament and people as between party and people. Mr. McKenzie shows that in the Conservative party usually, and in the Labor party recently, the parliamentary leaders have been able to keep a control over the party machines, whose constituency members have indeed been able to suggest but not to command. Of course the leadership adopts at its peril a policy which does not command support, first, in Parliament and, secondly, in the country.

Once the counsels of the Conservative party (titularly parliamentary, rather than popular) were largely those of the Carlton Club and, as late as 1922, the deposition of Austen Chamberlain had actually taken place there. Here I persist in my view, to which Mr. McKenzie does me the honor of reference. Yet the voice of the constituency's Conservative and Unionist Association is today heard in the annual meeting, although not as loud as that of the local constituency in the Labor party, where it seeks to shape the broad outlines of policy as in general mandatory. Indeed it is Mr. McKenzie who writes, of Austen Chamberlain's deposition (reënforced by Neville Chamberlain's), that "there could be no more vivid proof that a Conservative Leader is no autocrat; in the last analysis, he can neither force nor lead his party in a direction it does not want to go." Within the Labor party the control by the leadership of the Parliamen-

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tary Labour Party Executive Committee, itself elective, is not at all the same thing as the control of the Labour Party (popular) National Executive; but this latter admittedly, through agenda and standing orders committee, can do much to bring the annual party conference to order. It yet seems demonstrable that a resolution coming up from a remote East Anglican constituency party, thanks to the enterprise of a secretary pedaling about at nights on his cycle to get a little support, put "into the works" at party conference and meeting no opposition, although apparently remote from practical probability, was directly responsible for a Labour Party Executive delegation going out, in 1954, to meet Mao and Chou in Peking. It is a fact to which consideration must be given by those who suggest that the local party officials have no weight.

Perhaps more important is a consideration which Mr. McKenzie, with his eyes directed toward the mechanism of party central offices and conferences, does not develop, but which will occur to those who have direct experience. Even if the resolutions of local parties tend to be swamped or subdued in party conference, especially on the Conservative side, when the matter arises of the selection of a prospective party candidate for a general election the local constituency party organization reigns, if not supreme, then powerful. It can take suggestions, but it does not have to accept them. Here the local group is free, if not to impose the kind of political outlook popular at the moment, for example, "Bevanism", upon the national organization, which can approve and endorse candidates, at least to repudiate those, for example, "non-Bevanites", whom the leadership or central office might prefer. Here well-organized extremism can come into its own. And in many a constituency the selection by forty men, ward representatives and the like, is in effect the election by forty thousand electors, since no one else will stand a chance at the polls. Their choice will go up to change the complexion of the parliamentary party. It is important here to note that it does not by any means follow that the dominant color of those in the selection committee is at all of the same shade as the average political color of the electorate. To be an active party member is itself to make one something very other than the

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common man. He is either a singularly responsible and public-spirited citizen or a man filled with abnormal personal ambition or a partisan fanatic. Happy is the country in which the first type numbers more than one third. Anyhow the ardent party man may be the embryo politician, but he is not the normal, representative fellow. And the contours of practical party sovereignty and of popular sovereignty, as displayed in "the voice of the people" through nonparty-organized polls, are likely to be very different, although kept within hailing distance by a constitutional party's desire (as distinct from a conspiratorial party's) not to lose popular power—except in those cases where it deliberately desires to do so and "to pass the buck".

As Walter Lippmann has emphasized, there is yet a very definite distinction, deep in its fundamental ideas, between the Anglo-Saxon political tradition—which is indeed, with its stress on natural rights and law, rather "constitutional" (that is, elevating entrenched legal rights, judicially defended, above majority decisions) than "democratic" in the classic (and what Aristotle called harmful) sense—and its alternative. However, this alternative is not so much one, as Mr. Lippmann suggests, as twofold. We can follow the Girondin-Menshevik principle that the rule of the immediate majority prevails, "opinion" if largely enough accepted being "knowledge". Or we can follow the essentially aristocratic Jacobin-Bolshevik principle that a vanguard or minority of the dedicated and truly inspired will guide by doctrine, and anticipate, the not yet politically fully conscious majority. However, as Sir Ernest Barker points out, the authentic Anglo-Saxon tradition of Locke and the Whigs was taken over by the young American Colonies in good faith, but was increasingly discarded in Britain under Blackstone's adaptation of Hobbes and elevation of parliamentary sovereignty as constitutionally basic. There is here no fundamental law as distinct from statute law, despite all the praises of the common lawyers. Many of A. V. Dicey's old boasts about freedom from *droit administratif* no longer hold. There is no Bill of Rights entrenched in some fashion other than ordinary law and fortified by a co-equal judiciary. Authorities on constitution-making, such as Sir Ivor Jennings, following this school, prefer their constitutions

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to be brief, and some prefer them obscure. At least the maximum latitude is to be left to the legislatures of the future; and the concern of the Constitution is held to be with the mechanism of government, not with the folk philosophy. Bills of Rights, in the American sense, are likely to be cut out. Mr. Strijdom, in South Africa, interprets the constitution according to the strict principle of sovereignty of Parliament and that what Parliament has declared to be legal is thereby more than just permissible and is *a fortiori* constitutional.

The word "British" is itself ambiguous, just as the word "constitution" would sometimes appear to be meaningless. The Canadians and Australians are "British", although only the inhabitants of Great Britain and one part (but not the other) of the smaller British isle and appendages is "a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies." A Zulu is one and a Bugandan is both. It is the inveterate tendency of writers on the British Constitution to discuss solely the customs of England, with perhaps a glance at the special law of Scotland and the restrictive sumptuary legislation of Wales. They are silent about the rigorous restrictions on freedom of the press in, for example, Cyprus or on assembly elsewhere. They do not even note that in another part of the United Kingdom itself, to wit Ulster, civil liberties which will be regarded as normal in England have sometimes not applied.[6] Nowhere, of course, in law do guarantees equivalent to those of the Fifth Amendment (about which much is heard in the British press) apply. A defendant may decline to go into the witness box, but certainly one can be subpoenaed to give evidence that could incriminate oneself. It is perhaps a defect of the books by constitutional lawyers on "the British Constitution" that they so seldom made clear that it is not the fundamental political system of the British Commonwealth, if there be such, which is under discussion, but only that of the larger British Isle, with or without Ulster.

The Queen is, however, advised by other Cabinets than that of the United Kingdom. Some, moreover, may be more "democratic" than others. Indeed, so respectable a journal as the

[6] *Cf.* the White Paper, *Civil Authorities, Special Powers, Acts, Northern Ireland, 1922 and 1933.*

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Manchester Guardian has raised the suggestion that (as so often in the past, so now) there is a new officer rising to high constitutional importance, the Queen's personal or private secretary. His duty could be to advise Her Majesty when she is physically in transit between, for example, the United Kingdom and South Africa and, let us say, about her suitable place of residence when in dispute (as, during the illness of George VI, it could well have been) between the two Cabinets. Who tells the Queen when to visit a Dominion? Indeed, Edward VIII abdicated at a different time in one Dominion (Eire, on behalf of whose government his successor's ambassador condoled with Hitler) from the rest.

The "British" doctine of the sovereignty of Parliament, as obtaining in the United Kingdom, it may be suggested is either misleading or pernicious. It is misleading if what is really meant is that this legal sovereignty always politically operates within the penumbra of the same constitutional habit or morality, which puts limits to the obligations due to it. The Constitution then is a habit. The core of this position is admirably put by Herbert Morrison when he writes: "What on paper appear to be the same institutions can work differently in different countries. Most of ours work as they do because that is how we feel they ought to work." The doctrine is pernicious when it is exported without such safeguards, and is used to override the natural rights of man and the healthy position of the judiciary, thereby displaying its original post-Hobbesian implications (for Hobbes did not limit sovereigns to monarchs, and Blackstone here followed suit).

I am not at all maintaining that political institutions cannot be exported, however popular this relativist view may be today. Jefferson and Mill did not so maintain and neither do I. Democratic institutions may (or may not) be suitable human political forms at a given social stage, even if the relevance of, for example, proportional representation may be more limited. What, however, may be true is that the so-called British Constitution is so heavily conditioned by local habits and morals, within the context of which alone parliamentary sovereignty satisfactorily operates, that when its practices are exported the most startling conclusions may be drawn. It may be a desirable thing that when a publisher, Raymond Fitzpatrick, and his editor are, by a

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libelous article in their journal, guilty of breach of privilege of a Member of the Federal Australian Parliament, they should be sentenced before the Bar of the House at Canberra to three months imprisonment, the Premier, Mr. Menzies, remarking that this was a remedy "adopted repeatedly" by British Parliaments. It is a very different matter when Dr. Malan and Mr. Strijdom, in South Africa, checking the Senate, not only reduce Negroes and mulattoes or "Cape-Colored" to the level of second-class citizens but, in the process, asserting the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament, override the Supreme Court and void the constitutional provisions of the Union of South Africa Act.

In conclusion, it may be suggested that, if perhaps the new Indian Constitution (which has a quasi-treaty foundation) may be too long, some new constitutions are too short and too exclusively concerned with the mechanics of government. It may be that, for export, the American Constitution is a safer model than the British, which is so largely a matter of habit, morals and *responsa juris prudentium*. The possible defects of the American Constitution (which this writer had the professional opportunity of inspecting in connection with the Eighteenth Amendment) cannot be discussed here. We can remark its system of checks; its underlying minimalist theory of legislation and political action; its Whig conservatism, with distrust alike of legislature and executive (just as the Colonies fought first Parliament and then King); and its ill-accord with the mood of most modern political movements, which demand as quick change in politics (of which the power is held to be limitless) as is usual today in technology. But, if human values are to be protected by the wisdom of generations against the arrogance of momentary governments, then there is everything to be said for enlarging constitutions by a written Bill of Rights, supported by an entrenched Supreme Court competent to vindicate them. What matters here rather is, not to omit such a Bill (as is the contemporary trend in some quarters), but to give far closer scrutiny to the natural rights affirmed, about which Walter Lippmann talks, and to make them consonant with empirical natural law, formulated in accordance with human psychology and social health. These are indeed vast issues of which it can only be said that we need perhaps more

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of the advice of the sociologist and philosopher (as in the greatest days of Roman law) and less of the attorney, who is unconcerned to examine fundamentals.

As to the working of the British Constitution at home, the intense jealousy of Parliament against the continuation of the grand debate about politics with the people (except through the quite antiquated channels of unattended public meetings—eighteen persons to hear a Chancellor of the Exchequer—at election time) is nothing novel. Elected persons do not like pure democracy. From the point of view of expert government they are right. But they do not like experts either. (The trouble with experts of a certain kind is that too often, as Gladstone implied, they are so obsessively concerned, even in the medical profession, with their own techniques that they have rather less horse sense and common judgment than ordinary folk.) However, the Gallup Poll, in one sense the most significant constitutional change of this generation (howbeit not yet recognized in law, any more than are the parties), has come to stay; and its calculations do in fact dictate to reluctant politicians, who follow their master's voice with tingling ears. The growth of the practical sovereignty of party, through Cabinet and Parliament, as against people—popular sovereignty in Britain being nowhere explicitly affirmed, even if Austen Chamberlain did call the electorate "the masters of us all"—is something more novel and ambiguous. Guidance by the voice of the entire adult population, statistically recorded, and direction (as with the Communists) or indirect control by what Sir Winston Churchill has called "the ardent partizans" of party, are sharply different things, readily confused.

Mr. McKenzie chooses to concern himself with only the constitutional parties and indeed, of these, with only two extensively. It is sincerely to be hoped that he will explain the conspiratorial ones later, which claim to be "on the wave of the future". As touching the major parties we can agree that the process of extra-parliamentary-party control of politics has not gone far and may perchance, despite the growth of the notion of the member as delegate, not go further—although Mr. Morrison stresses the considerable rôle played in the working of the British Constitu-

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tion by party organization. Party animosity, at the expense of all bipartisan use of expertism, is probably greater in the United States, despite the allegedly doctrinal bases of party in Britain, although action by the nonparliamentary experts is unfortunately far less used in Britain.

The virtue of the British Constitution at home lies, not in its peculiar legality, but precisely in a constitutional morality which declines to sacrifice the fundamentals, beyond the limits of a shrewd common sense, to the pleasures of tactics, and which can lead Mr. Morrison to write that "it is in accordance with the spirit of our parliamentary democracy that the Government should be prepared to listen to and to consider Opposition arguments." It is the core of constitutionalism, as understood under British habits, that there should be loyalty, judgment, humor and accommodation. These virtues, matters of morality rather than of constitutional mechanics, may not be far from the core in politics of practical wisdom.

GEORGE CATLIN

ST. PAUL, MINN.

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L'AFFAIRE ROSENBERG IN FRANCE

MORE than two years ago, one of the most successful anti-American propaganda campaigns ever launched in Europe reached its climax. On June 19, 1953, crowds demonstrated before United States Embassies in Western European capitals as the news came of the execution of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg. The reaction, however, was not of the same intensity in each country. In England, all journals right of the *London Daily Worker*, from the *New Statesman and Nation* through the *Manchester Guardian* to the *Times*, had been unquestioning as to the merits of the verdict, though strongly in favor of executive clemency for reasons of "mercy and political sagacity".[1] A belief in the fundamental fairness of the trial and in the culpability of the Rosenbergs had combined with reluctance to being party to a Communist propaganda stunt to restrain pro-Rosenberg sentiment.

Across the Channel, however, the Rosenberg defenders gained their most passionate and overwhelming victory. On the Rosenbergs France was united as on no other issue since the war. A mystique swept the country capturing members of every political party, intellectuals of every political persuasion, educators, lawyers, even the clergy. All vocal elements lent themselves to the movement's cry of, "Mr. President, we beseech you, do not commit the irreparable. Listen to the unanimous cry of agonized France—spare Ethel and Julius Rosenberg." How and why was this success achieved? What, if any, were the American moves to counter it?

Arrest and Trial

On July 17, 1950, Julius Rosenberg, a New York engineer, was arrested by the F.B.I. A month later, his wife, Ethel, was taken into custody. They were brought to trial on March 6, 1951, in the United States Court for the Southern District of New York, Federal Judge Irving R. Kaufman presiding. The

[1] *Manchester Guardian*, June 17, 1953.

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indictment listed twelve overt acts committed in furtherance of a conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by communicating secret information to Russia. (Along with the Rosenbergs, the Grand Jury had indicted David Greenglass, Anatoli A. Yakovlev and Morton Sobell. Greenglass pleaded guilty before the opening of the trial, and Yakovlev, Soviet Vice-Consul, had left the United States in 1946. Sobell was tried with the Rosenbergs and sentenced to thirty years.)

Before the trial opened, two days were spent selecting the jury of 12 from a panel of over 200. Two years later French brochures sought support for their charge that the Rosenbergs had been victims of anti-Semitism by attacking the choice of this jury. "Not a sole Jew on the jury, and this in the city of New York whose Jewish population approaches a third of the total population: strange and, even more, sinister."[2]

It is impossible to determine from their names whether the jurors were or were not Jewish, though certain names might well be Jewish. Neither judge, nor prosecution, nor defense questioned them concerning religion. At any rate, Louis Friedlander, with a more identifiably Jewish name, had been chosen Juror Number 11 when Emanuel Bloch, the defense counsel, used one of the defense's peremptory challenges (a challenge without cause) to dismiss him from the jury.

At the trial, the government presented its case as follows. Julius Rosenberg, after several years in Communist organizations, dropped all overt Communist activities and entered into an espionage ring. Personally, Rosenberg stole a proximity fuse from an Army Signal Corps project on which he was working. He also obtained secret Navy information from Morton Sobell which he passed on to Soviet Vice-Consul Yakovlev.

In August 1944, David Greenglass, Ethel Rosenberg's brother, was assigned to the Los Alamos Atomic Experimental Station in New Mexico as a technician. Upon learning of this, Rosenberg persuaded Ruth Greenglass to obtain from her husband, David, information concerning the personnel, security measures and experiments at Los Alamos. She performed her task and relayed the intelligence to the Rosenbergs.

[2] *Une Nouvelle "Affaire Dreyfus"—l'Affaire Rosenberg.*

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When Greenglass returned to New York on leave in January 1945, he made a fuller report, dictating twelve pages of notes to Ethel Rosenberg, and also drawing a sketch of the explosive lens used to detonate the bomb. All this was microfilmed and passed on to Yakovlev. Before Greenglass left, Rosenberg gave him half of a Jello box top, telling him that an agent would present the matching half sometime in the future as a means of identification.

It was Harry Gold who obtained the Rosenberg half from Yakovlev later that year. Before the trial Gold had confessed to being a Russian courier. After receiving information from the British physicist contact, Klaus Fuchs, who had also confessed, Gold used the box top, together with the phrase "I come from Julius", to establish contact with Greenglass. (It was conceded by the prosecution that Gold had never personally met Rosenberg.)

In February 1950, Fuchs was arrested. Gold was taken into custody in May, whereupon Rosenberg counseled Sobell and the Greenglasses to escape to Mexico, giving Greenglass $5,000 for the flight. Sobell was apprehended in Mexico City, but Greenglass never left New York. Just before their arrest, the Rosenbergs themselves had had passport photographs made in preparation for their departure.

So stood the government's case. To support it, twenty-three witnesses for the prosecution were called. Among them were Gold, David and Ruth Greenglass, Dr. Walter Koski, a physicist, John Derry, a member of the Atomic Energy Commission, and Ben Schneider, the photographer whom the Rosenbergs had visited for the passport pictures. Another witness was Max Elitcher, who said that the Rosenbergs had attempted to recruit him as a spy. Derry and Koski testified that sketches reproduced by Greenglass, while in custody, revealed the detonation principles of the atomic bomb.

The Rosenbergs categorically denied the testimony of the prosecution witnesses. They had never solicited the Greenglasses for atomic information. They had never participated in any kind of espionage for the Soviet Union. They had never known Gold, though they did not dispute the fact that he and the Greenglasses were spies. They denied, in particular, that

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they had planned to flee and had obtained passport photographs for this purpose.

Julius Rosenberg admitted that he and Greenglass had started business together after the war, but said that they did not enjoy amicable relations. Ruth Greenglass had once told him that David had stolen Army property. In 1950, according to Rosenberg, David Greenglass asked Julius to discover what inoculations were necessary for entry into Mexico (supposedly to avoid arrest for these thefts) and had demanded money from him for this escape. When Rosenberg refused, Greenglass had sworn revenge. In cross-examination, the Rosenbergs invoked their constitutional rights when asked about Communist affiliations and refused to answer such questions. "I warmly approve", said Julius Rosenberg, "of the system of justice practised in this country, Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence. I am a supporter, a sincere supporter of our Constitution and of the Bill of Rights and owe my allegiance at all times to my country."

On March 29, the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Upon hearing it, Emanuel Bloch, counsel for the Rosenbergs, told the Court:

> I want to extend my appreciation to the Court for its courtesies, and again I repeat I want to extend my appreciation for the courtesies extended to me and my staff by Mr. Saypol and the members of his staff, as well as the members of the FBI, and I would like to say to the jury that a lawyer does not always win a case; all that a lawyer expects is a jury to decide a case on the evidence with mature deliberation. I feel satisfied by reason of the length of time that you took for your deliberations, as well as the questions asked during the course of your deliberations, that you examined very carefully the evidence and came to a certain conclusion.

It is interesting to compare this statement with the accusation shouted by Mr. Bloch two years later after the execution of the Rosenbergs and after the intensive propaganda campaign: "This was the face of Nazism that killed the Rosenbergs. I place the murder at the door of President Eisenhower, Attorney General Brownell and J. Edgar Hoover. This is not American justice. America today is living under the heel of a military dictator garbed in civilian attire."

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Penalties for violation of the Espionage Act in time of war were death or prison for not more than thirty years. Life imprisonment was not permitted. In pronouncing sentence on April 5, Judge Kaufman said that the heavy responsibility of choice must be borne by the Court alone. The Judge condemned the Rosenbergs to death.

The Campaign Commences

From this time on, the air was full of appeals, motions for rehearings, petitions for writs of habeas corpus, and applications for reduction of sentence. Twenty-five different points of law were raised by the Rosenberg attorneys in seeking to overturn the verdict. The sentence was reviewed and upheld seven times by the United States Court of Appeals. The case was brought before the Supreme Court seven times. Four stays of execution were granted and twice bids for clemency were made to the President.

Such judicial and executive review takes time, especially when the defense is not loathe to postpone action till the last minute. (While notice of appeal was filed on April 6, for example, appellants' brief was not submitted until November 6.) All in all, the exhaustion of legal remedy by the Rosenbergs occupied twenty-seven months "of moral torture" that French Communists accused the United States of having inflicted on the Rosenbergs. Lengthy review of criminal proceedings is customary to American law. It is not in France or in the rest of Western Europe. Even in the sister common-law nation of Great Britain, where four months is the average interval between a death sentence and execution, the Rosenberg contention, that once the law grants a convict the benefit of repeated appeal that same law must cease to operate, seemed persuasive. The *Manchester Guardian* (June 17, 1953) cites those two years as the "moral ground for reprieve."

The virulent pro-Rosenberg campaign did not begin for some time either in the United States or in France.[3] It was the *National Guardian*, a cryto-Communist weekly published in

[3] The New York *Daily Worker*, perhaps out of embarrassment, did not trouble its readers with news of the trial while it was under way.

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New York, which inaugurated the propaganda campaign in August 1951 with a series of articles voicing grave doubts as to the Rosenberg "complicity in any alleged atom-spy conspiracy whatsoever." But as late as January 1952, when the first Rosenberg appeal was argued in the United States Court of Appeals, there was small public interest in the Rosenbergs, despite the formation in November 1951 of a "Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case".

By the end of 1951, it had become fairly evident that the Rosenbergs were not going to betray the party as had Gold and Greenglass. They were willing to serve as martyrs to the cause of exposing American reaction—to contribute once more in making the world, as Ethel wrote shortly before her execution, quoting the famous phrase of Marx, "one of bread and roses". With the passage of time, people forgot details of proof; only the death sentence stood out. An active campaign directed largely to humanitarian sympathies seemed a safe bet.

During the spring and summer of 1952, the Committee organized local groups and held meetings in forty American cities. *The New York Times*' first mention of its activity is a report that on April 15, 1952 a petition for the Rosenbergs was circulated at a White Plains, New York, meeting of the "National Association for the Advancement of Colored People". There were no signers. While, thereafter, the Rosenberg forces did attract public notice, the American campaign, as a whole, was a failure.

The Affair Crosses the Atlantic

It is paradoxical that had America kept the Rosenbergs in "agonized suspense" for only eighteen months—in other words, had the Rosenbergs been executed in October of 1952—scarcely any impression would have been made on European public opinion. Paul Villard, Secretary of *Le Comité Français pour la Défense des Rosenberg*, has written the author: "It is true that it is from the months of October and November, 1952, that (France) began to be interested in the Rosenberg affair. At the time of the sentencing, French newspapers published the news and then spoke no more of the subject."

In a summary of world reaction to the Rosenberg case, the

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New York *Daily Worker*, on August 7, 1952, announced: "The Rosenberg case is Front Page News from Scotland to China." Yet, the only front pages in French the *Worker* could cite were those of the Swiss *Voix Ouvrière* (a Geneva publication which has accused visiting Smith College girls of being American spies and of running a brothel on the fourth floor of the Hotel de la Russie), *l'Humanité* (the official newspaper of the French Communist party), and *Droit et Liberté* (the monthly journal of the *Mouvement Contre le Racisme et l'Anti-Semitisme et pour la Paix*, a completely Communist-controlled organization). Six months later, the *Worker* could have listed any number of French publications as having remonstrated for Rosenberg clemency, including such eminently respectable ones as *Le Monde* and *Le Figaro*. How had this come about?

During October and November 1952, the Rosenberg campaign in America suddenly flared up again after a spell of comparative quiet. The vigor of its rejuvenation carried it across the Atlantic this time. Let M. Villard present his account of its arrival in France:

> In the month of October, two stenographic records of the trial came to France, and I personally received one of them. A single study of this record provoked lively emotion among jurists, for it showed that the prosecution's entire case rested on the testimony of David Greenglass, who had been given a relatively light sentence and whose wife had never been subject to any legal action.
>
> With the aid of the "Mouvement Contre le Racisme et l'Anti-Semitisme," we circulated the record among the various Paris newspapers. *Le Monde* published a complete study by M. Henri Pierre, *l'Humanité* and *Ce Soir* equally had articles, and I wrote two for *Combat*. There was then created a "Comité Français pour la Défense des Rosenberg," which distributed brochures on the affair.[4]

The American Committee, added M. Villard, had chosen two people in France and had sent an edited transcript from which M. Villard composed a two-page summary of the case. Mr. Bloch, the Rosenberg counsel, helped by writing letters to various French lawyers. Then, it appears that an efficient organization

[4] Letter to author from Paul Villard.

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in defense of the Rosenbergs suddenly blossomed---germinated, one might say, by the heat of legal indignation.

The French campaign was directed through three agencies. First, there was the French Communist party. The drive to save the Rosenbergs was launched in France by the November *l'Humanité*, which urged all Frenchmen to write President Truman demanding a pardon. Later Maurice Thorez proclaimed June 18 as national "Save the Rosenbergs Day". Next there was the *Mouvement Contre le Racisme* (address: 10 rue de Chateaudun, Paris 9^{e}), a front for the party, which "helped" distribute the record. And, finally, there was the *Comité Français pour la Défense des Rosenberg*, which was founded on December 3, 1952 and whose address was, curiously, 10 rue de Chateaudun, Paris 9^{e}.

This troika, in which the *Mouvement* lost its significance once the *Comité* arose, parallels the American arrangement of party and committee exactly. The party could do the dirty work and preach the extreme line; the committee could be respectable, claiming that the Communists were not their responsibility, but simply a separate force working for the same general goal. Between them, they could lick the French platter clean.

Thus, M. Villard and many sincere followers of the committee could "emphasize that we never wanted to make the Rosenberg affair into an anti-American war machine." When, toward June, a caricature of President Eisenhower with electric chairs for teeth appeared on the walls of Paris, the Committee was able to disclaim any participation in the printing and distribution of the poster. The demarcation between party and committee carried over into meetings. There was only one rally officially organized by the Communists. That was in the Velodrome d'Hiver in January 1953. All the others were under the sponsorship of the Committee. From December through June, there were more than eighty of these in Paris alone.

Where did the money come from for this activity? Contributions were solicited at the meetings, but they were not sufficient. It is possible that, once emotion had been aroused, contributions might cover expenditures. But what of the opening phase? Assuming that the office space was generously donated by the

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Mouvement, there remain the costs of salaries, meeting halls, the first Committee brochure, *Une Nouvelle "Affaire Dreyfus"—l'affaire Rosenberg*, and the 30,000 copies of Ethel Rosenberg's petition for executive clemency which were printed in January.

However the Committee obtained its funds, it was the center around which the campaign was organized. The Communists deliberately stayed in the background in the solicitation of support for the Rosenbergs. In this noncompetitive recruitment, the French Committee was much more successful than its American counterpart (with whom it worked in close harmony, distributing information from the United States to the entire Parisian and provincial press). The American group could claim membership of only 37 obscure fellow travellers. The French one was able to enlist over 200 well-known persons, a great portion of whom were not Communist sympathizers.

The French Line

The French Communist party lost nothing in leaving the major propaganda diffusion to the Committee. Membership of non-Communists had no effect; the orthodox Communist version prevailed. The best summary of this line can be found in *Les Amants de la Liberté*, the 68-page illustrated pamphlet of which 150,000 copies were published by the Committee after the execution.

Les Amants begins on the common denominator of French attitude toward the Rosenbergs: sympathy for a man and wife facing death in the electric chair. (Throughout the campaign, the chair was constantly kept in French minds by words and pictures.) The first page of the brochure is a description of the execution.

Who was this couple which "the crazy logic of history made into the heroes of one of the most atrocious tragedies of our time"?

> Knickerbocker Village. The heart of New York: a low rent housing development. The Rosenbergs live there in a three room apartment. Julius works. Ethel busies herself with her two sons. Before her marriage in 1938, Ethel was a stenographer. Julius is an engineer. . . . The Rosenbergs were music lovers, interested in problems of edu-

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> cating children, concerned with foreign affairs. They applauded Roosevelt, thrilled over Stalingrad, thought that the Soviet Union sustained the heavier burden of the war and that the second front was late in coming. They were Jews and were grateful to the U.S.S.R. for having revenged, on the battle field, six million dead Jews.

That the Rosenbergs were Communists was never once mentioned. They were always characterized as progressive. What was emphasized was that the Rosenbergs were like millions of French families of modest income. At demonstrations it was always Ethel Rosenberg who was featured, together with her soon to be orphaned sons. Huge photographs of mother and children were displayed while a "letter from the Death House" was read:

> We are not martyrs or heroes and we don't want to become them. We are young, too young for death. We ardently want to see our two sons, Michael and Robert, grow and become men. We desire, in every fiber of our being, to be able one day to return to our two children and resume the harmonious family life we led before this nightmare. . . .

The warm Latin spirit responded to this pathos. This was the great triumph of the Communists. Everyone, whatever his opinion on the guilt of the Rosenbergs, could demand commutation of the death sentence. When it was not forthcoming, the United States could be branded a cruel and barbaric nation.

Once the emotion had been enlisted, the Committee appealed to the intellect and "proved" that the Rosenbergs were innocent. Their task was not easy. To begin with, they could not deny that Soviet atomic espionage had existed in the United States. Naturally the Committee did not emphasize this admission, but it was faced with the arrest, confession and conviction of Fuchs—under British law, not American.

Furthermore, Fuchs had implicated Gold, "the adventurer Gold", as he is called, who had also confessed. So, Fuchs and Gold were conceded spies. Gold was the link to the all-important Greenglass. But Gold had never met the Rosenbergs. The strategy was to close the espionage triangle and to deny the contention that the Rosenbergs had joined to make a quadri-

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lateral. To accomplish this, the Committee had ingeniously revealed that Fuchs's full name was Klaus Emil *Julius* Fuchs. The "I come from Julius" testimony was thereby rendered harmless.

In an opinion handed down by the Court of Appeals, Judge Frank said that "without the testimony of Greenglass, the convictions could not be upheld." Greenglass, the Committee realized, must be shown to be a liar. Neglecting the admission that Greenglass had been a spy, *Les Amants* now maintained that it was impossible for an ignorant mechanic, unable to finish his university training, to comprehend any of the principles necessary for atomic espionage.

Why would Greenglass perjure himself? There were two reasons. First, he had sworn revenge on Julius when their business failed. Second, he had stolen uranium from the Army and was caught. By falsely implicating the Rosenbergs, he was able both to satisfy his base feelings toward his brother-in-law and to escape with light punishment for his crime. (His revenge cost his sister's life, too, while his light sentence was fifteen years in federal prison.)

Obviously, this monster could not have worked his evil alone. Upon his arrest, Greenglass hired for his attorney "John Rogge, former U. S. Assistant Attorney General, [who] had abandoned the World Peace Movement several years previously. He was counsel for the Titoist embassy in Washington." "Four conferences" with the F.B.I. later, a "bargain" was struck.

The F.B.I. had Greenglass. But "Greenglass did not have any demonstrative value, no propaganda worth. . . . He had no link with the progressive movement in the United States, nor did his wife. But his sister was married to an engineer, Rosenberg, who professed liberal opinions, and did not conceal them. The F.B.I., when this name was suggested to them, understood very quickly that they had there a 'perfect target.'"

The Rosenbergs were produced just when the government needed them most, "for it had become urgent to fire . . . at some scapegoat. The Korean War had just broken out and the United States was suffering its first military reverses. The preceding year, the average American had learned that he no

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longer had his atomic bomb monopoly." Internal disruption threatened unless some Reds could be tried and put to death in "a ritual murder". Besides, the Rosenbergs' fate could serve to "terrorize ordinary people . . . who were inclined to be partisans of peace."

The ritual-murder charge led easily into one of the most effective of anti-American slanders. "The Rosenbergs were, first of all, Jews. What tyranny has not had the temptation to search for its scapegoats among its ethnic or national minorities?" "The trial and the verdict were used to spread the virus of anti-Semitism."[5] Thus, a Jewish judge is accused of coöperating with a Jewish prosecutor and his Jewish assistants to murder innocent Jews, instead of shooting at the "perfect target" of two *confessed* Jewish spies.

Large black and yellow posters appeared in Paris asserting that the Rosenbergs were being sent to death because of anti-Semitism. From the very beginning, Rosenberg was equated with Dreyfus in all propaganda. Here, the Committee contrived the brilliant stunt of persuading descendants of Captain Dreyfus to write a separate, and well-publicized, appeal to President Eisenhower.

The urgency with which the Rosenberg strategists sought to stigmatize the conviction as an outgrowth of American anti-Semitism, when considered with the date of the commencement of the French campaign, reveals a good deal of the motivation for the frenzy of propaganda. *L'Humanité* inaugurated the drive on November 18, 1952. November was the month of the Slansky trials in Prague. As Western revulsion grew over this open display of Communist anti-Semitism, a distraction, an antidote, was needed. The Rosenberg case was chosen. In fact, the Communist press claimed that the Western world was charging anti-Semitism with regard to the Slansky trials to detract attention from the Rosenberg affair. On December 9, Jacques Duclos, the Secretary of the French Communist party, asserted: "The conviction of U. S. atom spies Julius and Ethel Rosenberg was an example of anti-Semitism but the execution of eight Jews in Czechoslovakia last week was not." Again,

[5] *Une Nouvelle "Affaire Dreyfus"—l'Affaire Rosenberg.*

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on February 17, Duclos announced: "All those who accuse the Soviet Union of anti-Semitism should watch their words. We Communists defend Ethel and Julius Rosenberg—and they are Jews."

Corroborating evidence that the Communists were the moving force in raising the accusation of American anti-Semitism can be found by examining the Rosenberg campaign in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe. Before November, as in France, the name of "Rosenberg" was totally unfamiliar there. By late December, however, the government-controlled propaganda media of press, radio and theatre were mobilized. In East Berlin, a play, *In God's Own Country*, dealing with the Rosenbergs and Wall Street hangmen, had been produced, and, by February, a correspondent estimated that posters of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg were more numerous than those of Stalin. All these activities were coördinated by the "Committee for the Defense of Victims of American Reaction".

The pattern was followed in the other satellite states. "The Rosenbergs", said the Polish *Trybuna Ludu*, "were ordinary American citizens who, like millions of their countrymen, did not want war and desired peace. That is why American justice picked them out as a lesson to the ordinary American that he too may be sent to the electric chair if he protests against the criminal policy of aggressions." In June, the Polish government, "acting at the request of the Polish Red Cross," made the insulting gesture of offering political asylum to the Rosenbergs.

Yet, interestingly enough, in Russia itself, the Rosenberg affair received little attention. The first time that the case was mentioned in the Soviet press was on June 16 in the week of the execution, when a Tass Agency dispatch referred to the "so-called atomic espionage". The *New Times*, after the execution, simply stated that the Rosenbergs were deliberately murdered since "it was proved irrefutably that the charges were faked and based on false evidence." Not a word was said of anti-Semitism. Apparently the Soviet government felt that an attack on anti-Semitism was unwise during a period when the Soviet Union was accusing Jewish doctors of murdering high officials.

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The French Campaign

To return to France. From mid-November, the campaign's immediate recruits, besides announced Communists, were intellectuals of the far Left, men who were ready to believe that the United States, in the midst of a semi-Fascist McCarthyite hysteria, could cheerfully send innocent progressives to their death. "Watch out!" wrote Jean-Paul Sartre in *Libération*. "America has the rabies. Cut all ties which bind us to her, otherwise we in turn will be bitten and run mad!" By December, *Les Temps Modernes* announced: "When one has read the transcript's 1715 pages of the exchanges, of the pleadings of the prosecutor and of the lawyers . . . doubt is no longer possible! Julius and Ethel Rosenberg are innocent."

The enlistment of this group, however, was no spectacular victory. In America, their numerically smaller counterparts had also declared themselves for the Rosenbergs—with little significant effect. Yet, it was from this circle that the proselyters sprang who successfully, and rapidly, won the ear of the much more important and influential French neutralists. These men, whose opinions are respected and often followed, see both America and the Soviet Union as menaces to world peace, although they admit to differences of degree in the danger emanating from the two. The arguments which persuaded them were not the raw and unsophisticated ones of *Les Amants de la Liberté*. The Committee's approach to them is better illustrated in "Notes sur l'Affaire Rosenberg" by André Haas, a jurist and organizer of the *Comité Chrétien pour la Défense des Rosenberg*. The "Notes", which were mimeographed rather than printed and which had a limited distribution, emphasize, in more or less reasoned language, doubts as to the legal sufficiency of the American government's case.

The successive positions of *Le Monde*, one of the great national newspapers of France, demonstrate the wooing and winning of neutralist France. On November 19, the day after *l'Humanité's* appeal, a small item appeared in *Le Monde* from Maurice Farro, its American correspondent, noting the Supreme Court's refusal to intervene: "One knows that the affair has provoked strong emotion in New York Communist circles where they

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compare the trial to the Dreyfus case." Three weeks later, on December 11, the first full coverage of the Rosenberg case in a responsible French journal was written in Paris for *Le Monde* by Henri Pierre. It was impossible, from reading the record, said M. Pierre, to say whether the Rosenbergs were innocent or guilty. Still, one must ask if anti-Semitism did not play a large part in the affair which is comparable to the Slansky trials in Prague.

No single article profited the Rosenberg forces more than this one. It persuaded many French publications to equate the United States with Eastern Europe as being equally virulent centers of anti-Semitism. The January 1953 issue of *Esprit*, a left Catholic magazine, declared: "Anti-Semitism remains logical. In New York the Rosenbergs are condemned for espionage to the electric chair; in Prague . . . Jews are condemned for espionage to the gallows. Between the two trials there is more than just surface similarities. No more in New York than in Prague were proofs produced."

From mid-December *Le Monde* can be said to have joined the Rosenberg camp. Its Washington correspondent, who disapproved, was replaced. Still, despite individual articles, the official editorial position demonstrates certain discomfort in sleeping with its unsavory bedfellows. An editorial of January 2 admits that the trial was regular, and that the Rosenbergs benefited from all the protection of the law and that the noise of the Communists who were directing the campaign was difficult to tolerate, yet the character of the evidence (especially that of Greenglass) is doubtful. "A sentence of death in such circumstances seems contrary to equity."

The campaign rolled on. In January the *Comité Chrétien* was organized. François Mauriac and M. Coutet, legal counsellor to the the Archbishop of Paris, were among its members. Thirty thousand copies of Ethel Rosenberg's first appeal for clemency were distributed and on January 13 the first "National Day to Save Ethel and Julius Rosenberg" was celebrated. By February, segments of all French groups were involved in some pro-Rosenberg action. When President Truman was considering executive clemency most of the Paris press, from the pro-Atlantic

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Pact, leftist *Franc-Tireur* through the moderate *Le Figaro* to the rightist *l'Aurore*, urged mercy, noting that other atomic spies had escaped the death penalty. The position of anti-Communist, anti-neutralist France can be found in the article, "Une Erreur", by Remy Roure in *Le Figaro*, of February 13, after President Eisenhower refused to commute the sentence. "President Eisenhower thought to defend the cause of liberty . . . but wouldn't liberty be better defended by more generosity?"

Agitation died down temporarily with President Eisenhower's refusal and the indefinite stay of execution granted by the Court of Appeal on February 17. But on April 18, *Combat*, a left, anti-Atlantic Pact newspaper, published photocopies of two documents stolen from the files of O. John Rogge, the defense counsel for David Greenglass. The first was a statement made by Greenglass in June of 1950 saying that he was not sure of some of the details he told the F.B.I. The second was a memorandum of an interview with Ruth Greenglass in which she claimed that her husband had a "tendency of hysteria" and "that he would say things were so even if they were not."

These revelations were to be used in France and America as proof that the Rosenbergs had been framed. They also afford an interesting illustration of the relation between the American and French Rosenberg Committees. Though the papers were stolen in New York, *Combat* was the first newspaper in the world to print them. *L'Humanité* waited two days, until April 20, before using the information, and it was not until three weeks later (May 11) that the documents recrossed the Atlantic. On that day, the American "Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case" announced that it had received "evidence of perjury" from its French colleagues. Evidently, the American Committee had sent the memoranda to France, probably to avoid charges of larceny by later describing the document as reprints from the French sources. It is typical that a sympathetic, non-Communist newspaper should be chosen for the plant, rather than *l'Humanité*.

The Supreme Court's denial of certiorari and the fixing of a new date for execution was the signal for the campaign's supreme effort, commencing in the last days of May. As *Le Monde*

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resumed its articles on the case, its February words of warning about the profit the Communist party was deriving from the agitation were forgotten. Forgotten also were the Prague trials. (Slansky and ten co-defendants had been hanged on December 3.) The Rosenberg affair was now the only current example of anti-Semitism.

Under the title "Le Marchandage sur la Mort" (a phrase the Communists immediately appropriated) *Le Monde* of June 5 called for a new trial on the basis of the newly discovered evidence and fiercely condemned the barbarous "test of nerves, not of truth", which the United States was inflicting on the Rosenbergs. *Figaro Littéraire* published the Rosenberg letters of 1951 and *Le Monde* commented on the "dignity, the depth of love" which they demonstrated. "Sincerity has its own language, which is impossible to imitate." The moderate *Figaro* reasoned that the emotion sweeping the entire world was proof of the doubt which existed concerning their guilt.[6]

In June, the campaign became even more impressive in character when prominent churchmen took up the case publicly. (The Pope had privately asked for grace during the winter.) Cardinal Feltin, Archbishop of Paris, asked for clemency on June 12. *La Réforme*, the official French Protestant publication, reported that the "Synode National de l'Eglise Reformée de France unanimously desires to express . . . how much French Protestants are agonized by the Rosenbergs' death sentence." It could not understand how "on such unbelievably weak proof, a jury could send a man to death."

Many of the French clergy apparently had responded to humanitarian pleas to spare the lives of the mother and father who had waited two years without giving away their comrades. Others shared the view that capital punishment was in itself wrong. Evidently bishops, like the rest, were influenced by the petition and intercession mania which swept France. Perhaps, too, the Church felt that it could not afford to leave the leadership of so strong a movement to the Communists.

Other late passengers for the Rosenberg bandwagon were French political personalities. To be sure, there had been

[6] June 16, 1953.

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lesser lights associated with the movement from the very beginning. M. R. P. Deputies Denis and Bouret were members of the Committee. Another 150 non-Communist deputies and 48 of the 64 members of the Conseil Municipal of Paris had signed appeals. Until June, however, their leaders remained aloof. Then, in rapid succession, Edouard Herriot, President of the National Assembly, and four former premiers, including Edgar Faure, then Minister of Finance, took part in appeals in favor of the Rosenbergs. Even Vincent Auriol, President of the Republic, was moved to communicate his sympathies to the American Ambassador through a letter to Bidault. By June 12, the American Embassy in Paris reported 7,598 petitions on the Rosenberg case.

Counter-Propaganda Attempts

In all the French pro-Rosenberg wilderness, was there no pro-American voice to be heard? Discounting *Evidences*, a French-language monthly printed in Paris by the American Jewish Committee, only one publication paralleled American views on the Rosenberg case. *Paris Match*, the widely read illustrated weekly, published an article on December 13, 1952, entitled "Julius et Ethel Rosenberg, Espions Atomiques". The article quoted the opinion of the American Civil Liberties Union that the case had raised no valid civil liberty issues. "For an American democratic judge," continued this unique report, "having so high a conscience as Kaufman's, the death penalty lies heavy." This, however, was *Paris Match's* sole written coverage of the Rosenberg case. In June the magazine featured only photographs, but its silence, perhaps, dictated by public sentiment, can be termed sympathetic to America.

If there was no other positive American support, there was, during the winter at least, a substantial amount of moderately phrased protest, a thing conspicuous by its absence in June. This variance in intensity, a direct correlation with Communist success, can also be correlated with the adequacy, and inadequacy, of American counter-propaganda in France.

The Rosenberg case hit Paris like a bombshell. This suddenness, and the advantage gained by the Communists in being

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the only source of information available to French newspapers, cannot be fairly blamed on the American Embassy and its information affiliates. When the campaign started, the Embassy was unable to get a full report on the Rosenbergs from the State Department. An attaché was sent to New York to get the facts and, upon his return, a 7,000-word summary was written. Five hundred copies of this excellent, 33-page report, "La Cas Rosenberg", which objectively summed up the prosecution and defense, and effectively answered specific Communist arguments, were circulated. Part of this was sent to the various branch offices of the United States Information Service—Cherbourg, Bordeaux, Lyons, Strasbourg, Lille and Marseilles, and through the Press Attaché's office of the Embassy to individuals requesting copies.

Nearly every French newspaper received a copy. The effect was salutary. Under its impact the January Paris press, with the exception of the Socialist *Le Populaire* and Henri Pierre in *Le Monde*, acknowledged, at least indirectly, the guilt of the Rosenbergs, though they continued to urge clemency.[7]

The benefits of this booklet were soon dissipated. It is almost as if the American agencies were so startled by the success of its energetic and original start, which was tailored to the needs of counter-propaganda in France, that they resolved never to risk such a surprise again. In this same period there was one effort to influence French public opinion directly. This was through the January issue of *Rapports France-Etats Unis*, an E.C.A. publication with a circulation of 1,250,000. A summary of "Le Cas Rosenberg" was run under the title "Un Dossier judiciare". Besides this, the only other Rosenberg information distributed was eight so-called "news" bulletins, "USA, Bulletin Quotidien des Services Américains d'Information", with a circulation of approximately 4,000.

The bulletin of January 6 was a declaration of six representatives of religious groups that no racial or religious prejudice entered the case. Another bulletin on the same day carried the complete eight-page decision of Judge Kaufman refusing to

[7] *Le Figaro, l'Aurore, Le Parisien Libéré*, and *Franc-Tireur* are newspapers known to have employed "Le Cas Rosenberg".

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commute the death penalty. The release of February 12 was President Eisenhower's statement declining executive clemency.

A paragraph announced the Court of Appeal's stay of execution on February 16. During the June agitation, the total American propaganda output consisted of the text of three judicial decisions (Kaufman's refusing a new trial, Douglas' granting a new stay, the Supreme Court's vacating the stay), the text of Attorney General Brownell's request for a special court session, and the text of President Eisenhower's final denial of clemency!

The major share of the blame for the ineffectuality of the American counter-campaign must be attributed to Washington rather than to Paris. To begin with, 1952 and 1953 were years in which American information agencies were a political football. In 1952, $157 million had been asked to finance the program; $87,325,000 was granted. Two directors came and went during the French Rosenberg campaign. Dr. Wilson Compton, appointed in January 1952, left under drastic Senate criticism in February 1953 (after announcing in December an unimplemented plan to tailor programs to the independent needs of countries). Robert L. Johnson's tenure lasted from February to July, during which an 830 job cut was announced, Senator McCarthy threatened a new investigation, and the divorce of the Information Service from the State Department was debated.

At some time in December or January, a policy decision was made in Washington which was to determine the pattern of American propaganda for the future. This decision was to conduct the counter-campaign in a dignified and objective manner. The United States would not sink to the level of the Communists and indulge in street corner debates; truth would out. Judicial opinions and simple statements of the President were the most dignified and objective releases possible. Therefore they became the only releases. In other words, a lofty disdain was chosen as America's official reaction to the pro-Rosenberg campaign. When a vigorous, day-by-day program was demanded to fight each Communist lie and half-truth and to reëstablish French belief in American justice, a program was adopted which gave the victory in the propaganda battle to the Communists by default.

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It is impossible to say to what degree the Paris Embassy acquiesced to this decision. Seeing the impact the Rosenberg line was making, it certainly must have realized that Communist propaganda could not be wished away by ignoring it. Field officers in provincial cities wrote, begging Paris for effective material. How often or how strong were the protests, which should have been sent back to Washington, is an unanswered question. Reluctance to contradict superiors in a policy-centralized bureaucratic organization is difficult to surmont. Signs inculpating Paris, moreover, can be found in the Embassy's files which contain argumentative material, such as articles and editorials, transmitted to Paris but never distributed in France.

This criticism of American counter-propaganda is not meant to imply that an adaptable, locally directed program would have vanquished the French Rosenberg agitators. At all times, they commanded the tactical advantage of being on the offensive, with better-organized agencies of propaganda, more resources to work with, and a more receptive audience to influence. Yet an efficient information service could have neutralized a great deal of the anti-American distortions which moderate France accepted concerning the Rosenberg affair.

Execution and Post-Mortem

June 19, the day the Rosenbergs were executed, was a day of violence in Paris. In demonstrations on the Place de la Concorde, one man was killed, four hundred were arrested. In the days following, the range of French reaction was exhibited through the press. "The death of the Rosenbergs is shattering", wrote *Franc-Tireur*. "It is without excuse . . . a blow delivered by America against herself, against the common cause of liberty." *Le Parisien Libéré* wrote "with sadness" that the Republic of Jefferson, of Lincoln and of Roosevelt had departed from its traditional way, while *Le Figaro* condemned the "torture by hope" inflicted on the Rosenbergs throughout the long affair.

The most bitter comments in the non-Communist press again appeared in *Le Monde*. "The Rosenbergs met the end with courage and dignity, refusing the sordid deal offered them to save their lives," wrote Henri Pierre under the title "Ritual

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Murder". "That attitude is in singular contrast with their accusers. There is a difference between European and American ethics. Europe hates stool-pigeons; America prizes them." In an official editorial, "Force or Feebleness", *Le Monde* prophesied that the day was approaching when the only choice lay between executioner or martyr. Eisenhower was in the hands of McCarthy.

Gradually the non-Communist press lost interest in the Rosenberg case. The Communists, however, would not abandon the issue. In July they arranged for the reconstitution of the Rosenberg committee as the *Comité Français pour la Réhabilitation des Rosenberg*, and called for an amalgamation of all the groups, especially the rank-and-file Catholic committees operating in the factories. All municipalities of France were urged to name a street in honor of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg, while the collection of Rosenberg *Letters from the Death House* was reproduced on records and in books. By October, the French version was in its third edition.

The new focal point to which the Communists attempted to direct public interest was the fate of the Rosenberg children. By April 1954, $45,000 had been collected in France for a trust fund in their name. When the question of the legal guardianship arose in the winter of 1953–54, rallies were again called to repeat the old charges and to urge that letters be written to American judges insisting that Michael and Robert be given to Mrs. Sophie Rosenberg, the mother of Julius, rather than to Mrs. Tessie Greenglass, the mother of the traitor. Numerically and emotionally, the rallies were not a success.

The Rosenberg campaign, before it ran its course, had evoked some sort of sympathetic response from every social and political group in France. It started with the Communists and those intellectuals of a deep anti-American bias, and it snowballed. Next was enlisted the neutralist element, those who, once convinced (and they were easily convinced) that America was perpetrating an injustice, did not hesitate in allying themselves with the Communists. Justice must be done no matter who benefited from the process.

This accomplished, people more or less convinced of the Rosenberg guilt, people friendly toward the Atlantic alliance,

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gave way to their doubts and emotions and joined, often, they said, to save America's name and reputation by urging clemency. This group tried, in vain, generally, to disassociate themselves from the more radical protests, as did the Church when it lent its prestige to the campaign in June. Swept along by rising waves of popular opinion, political figures found it impossible to stay out.

Yet, from this generalization of Rosenberg success, objectivity demands that something be subtracted. In a nation possessing the group animosities that France does, a not insignificant number of individuals will automatically form judgments by characteristic reactions. It was through this process that the Rosenberg partisans could count on a substantial anti-American base. It is also through the same reasoning that we may assume an anti-Rosenberg group, largely of the upper middle class. Few manifestations of this group can be found. Its members are not articulate, as are the intellectuals. Its natural political leaders, when they did speak, advocated clemency, as did its journals, for example *l'Aurore*.[8] Representative of this group was a Frenchwoman who said to the author, "When we saw which elements were supporting the Rosenbergs, we knew they were guilty and naturally ignored the commotion."

Still, with all such allowance, the generalization stands. As Robert Barrat, a French Catholic, wrote in *Commonweal* (August 14, 1953): "Most of us still believe—on the basis of the facts we have—that the Rosenbergs were innocent—if not wholly so, at least innocent of the exact crime of which they were accused. We believe they were expiatory victims who were handed over to satisfy a public impatient to be rid of its own anti-Communist fears and bad conscience." What accounts for the success of the campaign implicit in M. Barrat's article?

There are the factors mentioned before: the brilliant propaganda techniques of the Communists, the late presentation of the case to France, in fully developed and hence more convincing version, the absence of effective American counter-propaganda.

[8] It should be remembered that writers of newspapers are not of the same class as their readers. In June, the entire staff of *l'Aurore* signed petitions of much stronger language than the paper officially employed.

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But, these same factors were present in England and the same success did not arise. French ground was particularly fertile for an anti-American campaign.

The French Communists ably capitalized on the deep French impulse to protest loudly against apparent injustice anywhere. They were aided by the fact that this alleged injustice was American. Many Frenchmen are quick to find something wrong with the United States, from which has come so much criticism of France. If France was unstable and decadent, she would show America that she was also devoted to human rights.

Just below the surface in France there is a smoldering mass of hurt national pride at being pushed around by foreigners, and being "occupied", at the threat of being involved in what they feel are other people's wars. The Rosenbergs were a focus for this angry frustration.

An analysis of post-war French psychological atmosphere may suggest that a similar pro-Rosenberg reaction might have occurred even if the Communists had not assumed their major rôle in the campaign. Perhaps, but it is doubtful. Without the Communists, a vague, amorphous sentiment might have appeared, but without Communist leadership, France probably would never have heard about the Rosenbergs, even after November 1952. The Communists did introduce the issue. The Communists did provide the finances and leadership. The Communists do command 30 per cent of the French vote. Out of a mixture of Communist propaganda, pretension to superior morality, anti-Americanism and real concern for justice, the Rosenberg victory sprang.

Observers have said that if elections had been held within forty-eight hours after the execution, popular indignation would have brought an increase of 10 per cent in the Communist vote. On the day after the Rosenberg's death, *l'Humanité* asked: "How does what we have done for them compare with what they have done for us?"

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TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE, IDEOLOGY AND PRODUCTIVITY*

In saying there is a connection between science and capitalism, we do not need to say that scientific progress is altogether impossible in other systems. What we do mean to say is that special factors exist which make scientific progress particularly easy under capitalism.—David M. Wright, *Democracy and Progress.*

Technology is the most subtle and the most effective engineer of enduring social change. Its apparent neutrality is deceptive and often disarming.—Robert M. MacIver, *Democracy and the Economic Challenge.*

INCREASING productivity has come to be regarded as a necessity in business organizations, a hallmark of a successful economic system, and a weapon in waging the cold war. Modern labor contracts often include automatic periodic wage increases based on expected increases in output per employee. Reports of the Council of Economic Advisers evaluate proposed policies in terms of their effect on per capita output as well as on employment. American foreign policy includes technical assistance and economic aid programs designed to raise productivity in foreign areas, presumably as a method of creating greater resistance to the wiles of communism.

Since technological advance is one of the means used to increase productivity, this paper will examine certain consequences of technique choices, raising the question whether some, among alternative techniques, may produce effects which defeat further improvement. In our technical aid program, this aspect of technological change must be kept in mind if the assistance is not to be self-defeating.

IDEOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS

Technique choices may lead to centralization of decision-making. This may, in turn, slow further growth in productivity.

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One of the cardinal differences between rapidly progressing and relatively static regions seems to be the number of sources of initiative. Where many persons exercise initiative, economic advance is rapid (when other things are substantially equal).

Advantages of Decentralization

The reasons for this advance are many and complex. They revolve around certain poles which may be described briefly. First, whenever individuals select their own goals and means of pursuing these goals, their motivation is more compelling. They more whole-heartedly pursue self-selected ends. Also, they choose means which they understand and use them more efficiently than the often less well-understood (or less-accepted) means imposed on them.

Secondly, where individuals at the location of action make the necessary decisions controlling activities, quicker and better decisions can be made. People on the spot can take account rapidly of changing factors. Decisions emanating from a central headquarters are usually late, lagging behind the occurrence of changes requiring adaptation. Vital decisions in producing units are a day-to-day affair.[1]

Also, decisions from a central headquarters are more likely to be poorly adapted to a local problem. This follows from the fact that the nature of a problem cannot be fully communicated to distant persons. Only paramount features can be noted. Distant persons cannot know the shadings differentiating the problem from apparently similar circumstances with which they may be familiar. As a consequence, the central decision-maker usually gives orders that are not as well adapted to needs as directives given by those who have local knowledge.[2]

Thirdly, where initiative is not diffused, the sheer fact that only a few people make ultimate decisions narrows the number

[1] The inflexibility and inertia resulting from centralized planning and excessive supervision are described in Alexander Vucinich's chapter on "The Factory" in his *Soviet Economic Institutions* (Stanford, 1952).

[2] Friedrich A. Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society", *American Economic Review*, September 1945, reprinted in *Individualism and Economic Order* (Chicago, 1948).

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of decisions that can be made. This slows the rate of change. Also, where there are few decision-makers, a mistake by any one is unlikely to be rectified by the action of another.[3]

However, this is not the place to discuss the advantages of decentralization to a society which wants to increase productivity rapidly. In this paper, the virtues of decentralization are accepted as a premise. Our task will be the examination of one aspect of the problem of erecting the type of structure in which initiative will be widespread. That aspect is the effect of choices among different techniques of administration and production. We will analyze these choices in terms of their effect (1) on attitudes toward political structures and (2) on the number of people capable of exercising initiative.

Requisites for Widespread Initiative

Attitudes toward political structure influence the choice of governmental organization. This choice is one of the factors which determine the number of sources of initiative allowed to operate. Of course, even though political structure is such as to allow a large number of independent centers to operate if they exist, this will not assure their existence. There must also be a large number of people in the society who are self-reliant, willing to make decisions, and in possession of the necessary skills for making decisions.

A third condition necessary for the widespread exercise of initiative is a well-organized incentive system (that is, one which is functionally specific and in which objective and subjective

[3] An example of the advantage of having more than one decision-maker, in these terms, is provided by the experience of the United States armed forces in the 1920's and 1930's. The Army Air Force decided that the liquid-cooled, in-line engine was the only suitable motive power for its aircraft of the future. It discontinued all work on air-cooled engines. If the United States had entered World War II with only engines of this type, its equipment would have been greatly outclassed. Fortunately, the Navy and private engine builders had continued their financing of the development of air-cooled engines. At the time of our entry into World War II, the air-cooled engine had surpassed the liquid-cooled engine in performance and output. It became the dominant aircraft prime mover. For a further discussion of the necessity for many centers of initiative in order to get efficient, rapid, technological change, see Yale Brozen, "Research, Technology and Productivity", *Industrial Productivity* (Madison, Industrial Relations Research Association, 1951).

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ends are united, to use the language of Talcott Parsons and Marion Levy).[4] We will not concern ourselves with this aspect of the problem, however, since it is little affected by choices among techniques of production. Techniques of administration will, of course, influence incentives. Our attention will be focused primarily on the influence of technological change on ideology, and consequently on political structure, and on the number of persons capable of exercising initiative.

Political Structure and the Diffusion of Initiative

Political structure is related in a fairly obvious fashion to the number of sources of initiative permitted. Totalitarian structures centralize power and decision-making (and perquisites) in the hands of a few. Obviously, initiative—or, at least, effectively functioning initiative—cannot be widespread under these circumstances since decisions can be made only with the permission of the few possessing power. Any attempt to diffuse the making of decisions also diffuses power. This is not permitted in a totalitarian structure or it soon ceases to be totalitarian.

In a democratic structure—which we define as one in which power is diffused throughout the society with no group possessing sufficient power to gather enough more to erect itself into an absolute authority[5]—decision-making is decentralized because power is decentralized. A democratic structure not only influences the amount of initiative exercised by permitting a larger number of sources to operate; it also influences the number of people willing and capable of exercising initiative. (A large number of such people is a necessary condition for the maintenance of a democratic structure as well as a consequence of it.)

[4] See Yale Brozen, "Determinants of Entrepreneurial Ability", *Social Research*, Autumn 1954.

[5] The use of elections with wide diffusion of franchise is frequently taken as the identifying mark of democracy. This, however, is simply a *means* of maintaining a diffusion of power. It serves as a check on the power of those who administer the apparatus of the state. The primary function of the apparatus of the state is the maintenance of the diffusion of power, preventing any one individual or group from coercing others. The paradox of permitting a focus of power in state hands in order to maintain diffusion is resolved by diffusing the power to choose those who man the apparatus.

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The foregoing statements will not be argued here. They have been established in other studies and are accepted as premises in this discussion.[6] A few observations will be offered, however, concerning a case which seems to lead to contrary conclusions. Russia is sometimes cited as an instance of rapid economic progress under a totalitarian régime. Two points should be made in connection with this experience. The first is that there has been a very high rate of saving and capital formation in Russia. This is the key to the progress that has been made since World War I. *With the same rate of saving* (measured as a percentage of national income), there would have been less waste and a greater amount of capital formation (because of avoidance of loss of capital through waste) and economic progress under a democratic structure. On the other hand, we must realize that the *rate* of saving probably would not have been as high under the latter political form.[7] The reduced rate of saving would not have been as conducive to economic advance (as the term is ordinarily understood), although the economy would have better served people's needs as they saw their own needs. Whether or not this would be regarded as a greater economic advance than the larger amount of capital formation is a judgment which can be made only on ethical grounds. Since we cannot arrive at a scientific answer as to what ethical system is best, there is no answer in these terms as to whether the Russian system has achieved greater economic advance than a democratic system would have.

The second point is that the Russian authorities themselves realize the necessity for diffusing the power to make decisions in order to progress more rapidly in raising productivity. After

[6] See, for example, F. H. Knight, *Freedom and Reform* (New York, 1947); Walter Lippmann, *The Good Society* (Boston, 1937); Ernest Barker, *Reflections on Government* (New York, 1942); F. A. Hayek, *Individualism and Economic Order* (Chicago, 1948); H. C. Simons, *Economic Policy for a Free Society* (Chicago, 1948); T. W. Nelson, *Modern Capitalism and Economic Progress* (London, 1950); David M. Wright, *Democracy and Progress* (New York, 1948).

[7] The use of the coercive powers of government to force a high rate of saving and capital formation is an old Russian habit. Tzarist governments did this as well as the modern Russian government. See Alexander Gerschenkron, "Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective", *The Progress of Underdeveloped Areas*, edited by B. J. Hoselitz (Chicago, 1952).

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the collapse of the economy under total state planning, in the early 1920's, the Soviet Republic instituted the New Economic Policy which permitted the reëmergence of private enterprises. A remarkable economic recovery ensued in the following seven years. Once a going economy came into being, the authorities again began squeezing out the possessors of private economic power since they were a threat to the ability of the ruling clique to hold its dictatorial power and to perpetuate itself in control. By cutting the flow of materials to independent enterprises, their owners were forced to sell to the state at distress prices. The government took over going economic units which had been brought to relatively high levels of productivity.

After the take-over, the rate of rise in productivity slowed. Soviet authorities again began looking for ways of getting decentralized initiative into operation without, this time, decentralizing power. A system of bonuses for exceeding production goals was instituted to provide an *incentive* for the exercise of initiative. Limited powers were put into the hands of factory managers to provide *scope* for the exercise of initiative.

The system does not work as well as the decentralized decision-making practiced in private-enterprise economies checked by competitive markets, however. This is partly because the amount of latitude permitted to factory managers cannot be as great if the state is to retain its authoritarian powers. Also, the bookkeeping method for determining incentive payments does not calculate as closely, particularly for marginal decisions, as a price mechanism operating under private-property, competitive-market rules.[8] The power to set quotas and the size

[8] If incentive payments in state-owned enterprises are to function as effectively as in a private-property, competitive society, bookkeeping would have to duplicate the results. There would then be no difference in results and little point to substituting state calculations for free-market determinations. ". . . any activity directed to change involves uncertainty as to its results and is inherently a gamble. It is in connection with initiative that management has meaning. An obvious consequence of the uncertainty of results is that managerial activities cannot be evaluated until after they are performed—and often a very long time afterward, and most vaguely and doubtfully even then. This is the fundamental reason for the specialization of entrepreneurship or risk-taking, which is the central principle of the enterprise economy and the real meaning of the profit motive or principle. The socialistic state would have no objective or rational basis for fixing the remuneration of managers, the indeterminacy of their value being proportional to the

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of bonuses is retained by the state. As a consequence, factory managers devote as great effort to getting more favorable quotas and bonuses and to arranging the books to achieve their objectives as to productive operations.[9] This restricts the rate of advance to a lower level than might be achieved by the greater decentralization which could occur in a less authoritarian economy.

TECHNIQUE CHOICES AND POLITICAL ATTITUDES

Political structure intimately affects the diffusion of initiative and, therefore, the rate of technological advance. (This should be distinguished from capital accumulation which may equip a society with more machines but does not necessarily carry a corollary of technical improvements.) Techniques of production and administration influence attitudes. Through their effect on attitudes, techniques influence the type of political structure which will prevail. Since such structures react on the rate of technological advance, programs for advancing productivity, such as those of the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration and the United States Technical Cooperation Administration, must take this into account. Otherwise, techniques may be introduced which result in the eventual frustration of the objectives of their programs, although temporarily forwarding their ends.

Techniques of production not only affect political attitudes and structures; they also influence the type of person produced. A technology may produce robotal personalities (that is, a type of person who waits for decisions to be made by others). Initiative, then, will not be widespread even though the political structure permits decentralization. One of the tasks undertaken in this paper will be an examination of technique choices in terms of their effect on personality types.

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degree in which they exercised initiative. To secure a moderate degree of efficiency, along with adaptive flexibility, the socialistic state might well find itself compelled to revert to the enterprise principle of leaving the remuneration of all final management—i.e., of innovators—to be determined by results actually realized. If so, the last important economic difference between socialism and capitalism would disappear." F. H. Knight, "Socialism: The Nature of the Problem", *Ethics*, July 1940, p. 283.

[9] "How Business Gets Done in Russia", *Fortune*, February 1953.

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Our first task is the examination of technique choices in terms of their influence on ideology. In order to lay some groundwork for understanding their effect, a difference in voting behavior observed in the recent elections in India will first be analyzed.

Two neighboring electoral districts in southern India present a great contrast in voting behavior in the recent elections. One gave a majority of its votes to the Communist candidate; the other gave him very few. In trying to understand this voting behavior, the levels of living and occupations in the two districts were first examined. In both districts, most people were agricultural workers who depended on wages for the larger part of their income. Incomes were abysmally low in both districts. If anything, they were slightly lower in the district which voted non-Communist. (Those who believe Point Four will stop communism simply by raising levels of living should meditate on this fact.) The only real difference which could be found in the two districts was the amount of land owned by voters. In the district which voted Communist, the voters owned no land. They worked on land owned by others. In the non-Communist district, the voters obtained most of their income working on land owned by others, but a very large number owned tiny plots of their own. Evidently, even a minute stake in the property system influenced their ideology.[10]

Technique Choices and the Diffusion of Property

When we examine technological changes of the past, we find some which led to a disappearance of a widespread property stake in the existing system while others promoted it. Such changes, for example, as the development of methods of using coke instead of charcoal in converting pig iron into bar iron led to reduced property holdings by workers in nineteenth-century England. After Henry Cort developed the method in 1783, forge masters moved from scattered locations near woodlands into central locations on the coal fields. Land in these heavily

[10] M. Jannovitz and Dwaine Marvick found, in surveys in the United States, that the lower class and lower middle class (i.e., classes receiving lower incomes and owning less property) are significantly more authoritarian in their attitudes than the upper middle class and the upper class. "Authoritarianism and Political Behavior", *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Summer 1953, p. 192.

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populated areas was more expensive than that in rural areas. The workers who sold their huts and land to move to the job opportunities in the towns on the coal fields found housing and land too expensive to buy. They became tenants and lost their property stake.

Other developments had the opposite effect. James Hargreave devised a simple hand machine, around 1765, called the "jenny". With the aid of the jenny, a woman could spin at first six or seven, later as many as eighty, threads at once. The jenny was small enough to be housed in a cottage; it was cheap; and no great strength was needed to operate it. Hence, it fitted well into the existing framework of domestic industry; and since the spinner was now able to keep pace with the weaver the effect was to strengthen, rather than weaken, the family economy.

On balance, however, the technical changes of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were centralizing rather than decentralizing in their effect. The development of the steam engine made it economic to put up large factories in towns instead of at waterpower locations in the country. Heavy machinery was developed which depended upon the steam engine for power and was unsuited for dispersed use in the countryside with animal power. These changes diminished the diffused property stake in tools[11] as well as in land and led to changes in ideology. The new ideology was much less opposed to concentration of political power with the result that collectivism began gaining ground. Since about the middle of the nineteenth century, it seems to have begun winning the minds of men away from individualism.[12]

It is ironic that in England, where the accidents of history led to diffusion of power and, consequently, of initiative, conditions favorable to technological advance gave rise to a type of change which removed those conditions. With the protection

[11] Another effect of the separation of the ownership of tools from those operating the tools, according to Robert K. Morton in his *Social Theory and Social Structure* (Glencoe, 1949), p. 152, is the growth of bureaucracy. Because of the "unusual degree of conformity with prescribed patterns of action" (p. 154) found in bureaucracies which "develops into rigidities and an inability to adjust readily" (p. 155), technological advance is hampered.

[12] C. W. Eliot, *The Conflict Between Individualism and Collectivism in a Democracy* (New York, 1910).

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afforded by its isolation, England could afford the luxury of struggles for power between the monarch and the nobility. Each side made concessions to commoners to enlist their aid. The over-all consequence was the breakdown of autocratic authoritarianism and the growth of freedom which made England the birthplace of the industrial revolution as well as of modern democratic ideas.[18] The further growth in power in the hands of middle-class industrialists outside its old centers among the land-holding nobility led, for a time, to a further diffusion. But the technological changes embodied in the industrial revolution brought into being new concentrations of power and initiative. Following this came a resulting tendency toward a slower rate of advance in productivity and, also, a tendency toward a collectivist ideology.

The growth of collectivist ideology did not begin at once with the introduction of techniques which led to re-centralization of property and concentration of initiative. Although the techniques leading to the situation were introduced in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, it took some time for them to produce changes in property holding and population locale. Also, the generations which moved from the countryside to the city retained their old attitudes. It was their children and grandchildren who took on new sentiments and saw authoritarian forms in a more favorable light. A description of causes of differences in employee attitudes in the United States illustrates the point.

> In certain cities of the south, a high percentage of employees grew up in small towns or in the country. Often their first job, after migrating to the "big city," is with our company. A great many of these young people have had religious upbringing which, together with parental admonitions, emphasized the rightness of hard work for its own sake and the moral obligation of the employee to give his employer a full day's work for a fair day's pay.

[18] It is particularly notable that the great advances which brought about the industrial revolution in England occurred "in the unincorporated towns, [not] in those where corporate and gild restrictions tended to maintain monopoly and prevent change. It was this condition of municipal and industrial freedom which, in the view of many contemporaries, gave rise to the unparalleled ingenuity and enterprise of the north of England." Witt Bowden, *Industrial Society in England Toward the End of the Eighteenth Century* (New York, 1925).

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> . . . Where the rank and file members of an organization have been drawn largely from working class homes in which factory employment has been the chief means of family support for two or three generations, their patterns of thinking and systems of value will be those of the urban working class. One characteristic of their way of life . . . is often a latent or overt distrust of the employer and a strong tendency to identify their security and well-being with their fellow-workers and not with the employer.[14]

Technological Change and Wage Income

Techniques which require large quantities of capital for single enterprises and which urbanize a people create attitudes which are propitious for the creation of a politically centralized society. If, at the same time, these or other techniques work in the direction of decreasing wage income, the society will be driven even more rapidly into the arms of an authoritarian ideology.

Some types of technological change tend to increase the productivity of labor while other types decrease it. Those which decrease it reduce the incomes of the majority of the population, although they increase the national income.[15] Such techniques reduce the possibility of capital accumulation by the mass of people (although they may increase the total rate of accumulation since the concentration of the increased income in the hands of a few usually leads to more of it being saved). This not only decreases the possibility of their obtaining a property stake; it also decreases the market for equipment of the type which increases home productivity and productivity in small enterprises (since small enterprises will not exist on a sufficient scale if people lack the capital to start them).[16] To

[14] James C. Worthy, "Organization, Structure and Employee Morale", *American Sociological Review*, April 1950, p. 173.

[15] Productivity of labor is measured here in the marginal sense, not the average sense. Since most statistical studies of the productivity of labor measure average output per head, these measures always rise following the application of any new technique which is economic.

[16] Interviews with informants from the work force of a large American electronics manufacturer produced an interesting fact with regard to this point. The firm in question started a profit-sharing plan in 1947. Employees who leave the company before spending ten years under the plan receive only a portion of the profits set aside to their credit. Those who leave after ten years receive the full amount

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this extent, improvements of methods of small-scale production will be less likely to occur, since there will be no market for them. Large-scale enterprises will become dominant by default, and this dominance will then act to slow the rate of economic advance.[17]

In so far as decreased wage rates following from decreased labor productivity cause declines in levels of living to the stage where a number of people fall below their standard of living, these people will become anti-*status quo*. This makes the situation ripe for the revolutionaries who wish to institute totalitarian structures,[18] despite the historical experiences which demonstrate that such structures will not deliver what they promise to those dissatisfied with current levels of living.

A criterion which should be used in selecting techniques, if we wish to increase adherence to democratic values, then, is the effect on wage income. The types of technological change which reduce the marginal productivity of labor and, consequently, wage rates are those which are labor-saving. Not all labor-saving techniques reduce marginal productivity, however, and we should not condemn labor-saving changes as such. Only if the demand for the affected product is not very elastic or if the product requires far above average amounts of capital relative to labor will labor-saving techniques reduce marginal productivity and wage rates.

credited to their accounts. According to the informants, a substantial number of employees are planning to leave in 1957 and use the lump sum they will receive at that time to start new businesses.

[17] "Large organizations as such, apart from their degree of maturity, set up certain hazards to innovation. . . . they require delegation of specialized authority and responsibility to a considerable number of individuals. An innovation disturbs their tasks and their relations with each other. This disturbance . . . is not adjusted through market mechanisms. . . . It involves planning activity. Decisive importance can scarcely be allowed to attach to individuals who conceive new ideas, even when this duty is delegated to them." Leland H. Jenks, "Railroads as an Economic Force in American Development", *Journal of Economic History*, 1944, p. 17.

[18] "In Asia the revolutionary fact is that it is getting steadily poorer. . . . People in Asia go Communist primarily because they see no hope in the present system and feel that any change can only be for the better." Cited by Karl de Schweinitz, Jr., and K. W. Thompson in *Man and Modern Society* (New York, 1953), pp. 465–466, from *The Economist* (London), vol. CLIX (1950).

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Few technical advances have been of this type. The improvements in cattle and sheep breeds in the eighteenth century which led to the substitution of livestock farming for crop farming in some areas of England may have been of this character. Automation seems, also, to have this characteristic. However, even where change is of this sort, it may provide its own offset. The greater income of capitalists resulting from this type of change may lead to an increase in rate of accumulation of capital.[19] This may be sufficient to provide, in a short time, enough capital to other industries to raise their marginal productivity schedules and offset the increase in supply of labor relative to the previously available capital. Ordinarily, when labor-saving changes have occurred, the simultaneous occurrence of capital-saving changes has released enough capital to prevent any decline in productivity.

For those designing development programs for low-income regions, however, the warning against labor productivity-reducing change should be taken seriously. There seems to be a proclivity for capital-intensive projects such as steel mills, hydroelectric undertakings, and extensive farm mechanization. These drain capital from other industries, unless the rate of current saving is large, and cause a drop in labor productivity. Technical assistance which takes the form of demonstrating methods of sinking wells and introducing improved seed varieties and new types of crops requiring large quantities of labor are far more suitable for densely populated areas poor in capital than capital-intensive enterprises.

Technique Choices and the Diffusion of Decision-Making

Changes in techniques influence ideology in other ways besides redistributing stakes in the property system or changing wage levels. They also influence it through changing the degree of diffusion of decision-making. Not only did Cort's invention draw the forge branch of the iron industry from its scattered haunts to concentrations in the coal fields of England where coke-smelted pig-iron production had already concentrated. It

[19] For historical illustrations, see T. S. Ashton, "Capital and Labor", *The Industrial Revolution* (New York, 1948).

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also led to the growth of great integrated establishments in which all the processes, from the mining of ore and coal to the slitting of rods, were controlled by a small group of proprietors. In these great establishments, decision-making, which had been diffused among many heads of small shops, was concentrated in the few heads of large organizations. As control moved into a smaller group, fewer persons were left to whom it made any difference whether power became centralized in a nationalized industry or in the headquarters of a totalitarian state. The "big boss" became a remote, little-known, semimythical personage who could as well have been the head of the state as the head of an industrial corporation.

One statistic for the United States well represents the change. Little more than a century ago, four out of five persons were self-employed. Today, four out of five people are employees.

The growth in size of production units and the change from the self-employed to the employed status were not the only factors affecting the amount of decision-making in the hands of each individual. Along with the growth in size there came into being a type of organization which contributed to the same movement. In these organizations, specialization by individual workers and functionalization by department units were carried to a point which necessarily resulted in the concentration of decision-making at top levels. This concentration not only affected ideology in that the individual with little or no decision-making power in his own hands did not oppose its further centralization in state hands; it also affected productivity. James C. Worthy described this effect in the following words:

> In a very large number of cases, employees perform only elementary, routine functions because jobs have been broken down "scientifically" into their most elementary components. . . . In many cases . . . the process has been carried to such extremes that jobs have little inherent interest or challenges. . . .
>
> One has the feeling of division of labor gone wild, far beyond any degree necessary for efficient production. Peter F. Drucker, in a penetrating analysis, has pointed out that over-specialization is not an inevitable consequence of mass production and that "The traditional assembly line is simply a piece of poor engineering judged

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by the standards of human relations, as well as those of productive efficiency and output."

> The evidence of studies conducted in our own company strongly support this conclusion, for we have found that where jobs are broken down too finely we are more likely to have both low output and low morale. . . .[20]

The loss of a feeling of responsibility by workers for the tasks to which they are assigned and of a feeling of the importance of the job directly affects productivity as well as ideology. The worker's attitude is a key factor in productivity. "Output takes a wallop unless a worker gets a kick out of his job." [21]

EFFECTS OF TECHNIQUES ON PERSONALITY

In choosing new techniques and administrative methods to be applied in underdeveloped areas, it would certainly be wise to select those different from the type described by Worthy. Otherwise, a proletariat ripe for a totalitarian take-over will be created. Under even the best of circumstances, with the political structure remaining democratic in form, initiative will not be widely diffused. This will be the case not only because of the concentration of decision-making described above, but also because the type of close supervision required with over-specialization and over-functionalization does not develop people able and willing to make decisions.[22]

To develop people capable of exercising initiative, areas launching development programs should, in so far as any choice

[20] *Op. cit.*, p. 174.

[21] J. D. Elliott reported that his company (Detroit Edison) "has often reduced office costs by making clerical jobs more, instead of less, complicated. Detroit Edison found that the office clerk needs breaks, such as walking across the room or searching for papers, to make her job less repetitious and more interesting." "Management Briefs", *Business Week*, October 24, 1953, p. 99. See also "By Varying Worker's Task, Firms Lick His Boredom, Cut Costs", *Wall Street Journal*, March 11, 1954.

[22] See, for examples, W. Brennan, *The Making of a Moron* (New York, 1953). In an interview reported in *Newsweek*, September 13, 1954, p. 86, B. J. Mullerthym of McKinsey & Co., management consultants, stated: "There's only one way to develop an executive and that's to put him on a job with real responsibility, a job that forces him to make his own decision. Build that into the spirit of a company, and you build a whole pool of potential top people."

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can be exercised, lean toward decentralizing types of administration and techniques of production. Although early stages of development may require organizations in which there is close supervision because of the lack of skilled personnel, this should be relaxed as quickly as possible. The early stage of close supervision should be regarded as one in which supervisors primarily train rather than supervise. Supervisors should explain why certain methods are used and their relationship to the whole undertaking. They should avoid simply telling people under their direction what to do.[23]

The difference in the two approaches may be illustrated by Morris Opler's criticism of the approach used in a medical dispensary in India.

> On one occasion I brought an Indian villager to a medical dispensary established by American missionaries. The American doctor in charge diagnosed the case as malaria and prescribed a course of atabrine tablets as treatment. The only directions to the patient had to do with when to take the pills.
>
> On talking over the matter with this villager, I learned that he had no idea that mosquitoes had anything to do with malaria. He owned a mosquito net but used it only when the mosquitoes became too annoying and not out of fear of contracting disease. This man was certainly "aided" by the services at this American clinic; in fact, he was cured temporarily by the treatment. But few will hold that this kind of technical aid is enough. The person helped remained unconscious of his problem and unable to prevent a repetition of his sickness. Needless to say, he could communicate nothing useful about the matter to others. Yet this man was very intelligent, quite receptive to new ideas, and a leader in his caste and village. It is obvious that malaria and this kind of treatment could exist side by side for hundreds of years.[24]

After the learning stage has passed, supervision should be reduced to a minimum. As much decision-making as possible should be placed in the hands of the individuals doing a job,

[23] See Yale Brozen, "Technology and Entrepreneurship" in *Conditions for Economic Development*, edited by Harold Williamson (New York, 1954), for a discussion of the conditions necessary for creating personalities of the "promotable" type.

[24] "The Problem of Selective Culture Change", in Hoselitz (ed.), *op. cit.*, pp. 132–133.

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and tasks should be broadened to the point where workers do something more than constantly repeat a single, robotal motion. They will learn quickly to think for themselves, will become the sort of people who can be promoted and, perhaps, even reach the stage of being able to found their own enterprises. As we have pointed out elsewhere, this is one of the avenues through which technological advance has occurred.[25]

To minimize detailed supervision, not only must this philosophy be present. Techniques of production and organization must be selected which lend themselves to minimizing supervision. In a functionally organized manufacturing operation, for example, where all lathes are grouped in one center, milling machines in another, grinding machines in another, with a foreman assigned to each, supervision will be detailed. Each workman will be performing a task like every other worker under his foreman. Each foreman will have only one type of operation to supervise and will be able to do it in detail.

With a flow organization, with lathe, milling and grinding machines in one center, the foreman will be unable to supervise in detail since each man will be performing a different task. He can do little more than coördinate. As a consequence, more of the decisions on detail will be made by the men. It has been found that, under these circumstances, many more "promotable" people are developed than under the functional organization. By minimizing supervision, more people are produced who will be able and willing to make decisions.

RECENT TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE

Recent technological developments have made available techniques for use in programs of economic development which avoid some of the dangers indicated above. The development of pedal-operated threshers, highly productive hand looms, foot-operated sewing machines, and small-scale equipment in other fields which require little power makes its possible to increase productivity greatly in industries such as textiles and

[25] Gardner Murphy, in his *In the Minds of Men* (New York, 1953), reports an experience in an Indian textile mill. He found that, in a section of the mill using explanatory supervision, productivity was much higher than in a similar section in the same mill using non-explanatory supervision.

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woodenware without destroying cottage and small-shop production where it is now carried on by handicraft methods. Small gasoline engines have been developed which can be used economically as small power units in contrast to the dis-economy of small steam engines. The progress of methods of economically transmitting electric power long distances makes it less necessary to locate machinery next to prime movers. We can use small electric motors in diffused locations instead of clustering around a large steam engine along its shaft and attached by belts to its pulleys.

Many of the new devices in our society are putting production back into the home. The home freezer is displacing the food locker; the automatic home laundry is replacing the central laundry; television is making inroads on movies; the development of machinery for the small-scale, family-size farm is slowing the trend to the factory farm.[26]

More decision-making is moving into the hands of workers in our economy because the rising tide of capital formation is making it possible to avoid the use of labor for machine-like tasks.[27] The use of machines to replace repetitive labor is increasing the demand for engineers and maintenance men relative to the comparatively unskilled. We now use one engineer for every 60 workers today in contrast to one for every 300 in 1890.

Administrative methods also are changing. Organizations such as General Electric, Allis-Chalmers, and Sylvania are

[26] Farm data for 1950, while not conclusive, seem to indicate that the most efficient size farm now is one which produces between $10,000 and $25,000 worth of commodities. "The Outlook", *Wall Street Journal*, November 30, 1953, p. 1.

[27] The effect of modern techniques in increasing the directing rôle of the industrial worker has been pointed out by Herbert von Beckerath, *Modern Industrial Organization* (New York, 1933), p. 99, and Lewis Mumford, *Technics and Civilization* (New York, 1934), pp. 410-417. W. E. Moore notes "that the general trend of occupational class distribution is toward a smaller proportion of interchangeable automatons, and a larger proportion of persons whose work may be called professional and administrative." *Industrial Relations and the Social Order* (New York, 1946), p. 292. Supporting data also given on p. 486.

Peter F. Drucker, in *The Future of Industrial Man* (New York, 1942), argues that even in the nineteenth century, a statistical investigation would "show that at the close of the century the proportion of unskilled, automatic workers was much lower than it had been at the beginning."

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replacing giant producing establishments employing tens of thousands of workers with scattered plants where the ideal sought is a plant size employing a few hundred people. Large enterprises such as General Motors and Sears Roebuck are putting power to make decisions in the hands of division managers instead of keeping all decision-making concentrated in a head office.

The growth of suggestion systems and incentive pay plans is having a salutary effect. Workers are given an opportunity and a motive to exercise initiative. As a consequence, its exercise is becoming more widespread than it was in the recent past.

The great rise in wage income has had a beneficial effect on the dispersion of ownership of property. A larger proportion of the people in the United States now occupy their own homes instead of renting.[28] The great growth in ownership of automobiles and capital equipment of the type used in homes is a consequence of rising wage income (and the development of financing plans). The increase in numbers of new businesses being started has been made possible by the increased ability to accumulate the necessary capital since wage income has increased.

> . . . [Modern technology] is re-humanizing the industrial process. In its early stage, not yet completely passed, mechanization has had a dehumanizing effect. It took a man from a skilled and individual craftsmanship and made him a cog in a machine. But as mechanical invention progresses, it makes a human being too expensive a cog and finds mechanical methods of replacing him. The men devoted to manufacture will be increasingly engaged in making the intricate machines, or be skilled engineers occupied in managing and repairing them, or administrative staff in organizing the business they serve. The work will evoke, educate, and express human personality and, since the principal formative influence upon men is the character of the work in which they are engaged, it is difficult to conceive a greater boon.[29]

[28] The proportion of homeowners in the United States was 55 per cent in 1953 as compared to 44 per cent in 1940. *Economic Intelligence*, November 1953, p. 2. Recent data indicate home-ownership is approaching the 60 per cent level.

[29] Sir Arthur Salter, "Modern Mechanization and Its Effect on the Structure of Society", *Science and Social Change*, compiled by J. E. Thornton (Washington, 1939), p. 337.

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CONCLUSION

The application of techniques which increase income but which result in the agglomeration of people in metropolitan areas, particularly as members of large organizations in which they are over-specialized members of over-functionalized departments where they have little control over details of their activity, leads to concentration of decision-making and the concentration of property. The former concentration makes for a totalitarian-prone attitude since the output of decisions by a central government bureau will seem little different than their output by a "big boss" or a distant "front office". The concentration of property means the loss of a stake in a property system by most individuals and, therefore, gives rise to an unwillingness to support an institution which is essential for the maintenance of democracy.[30]

Since democracy is a system which permits, and requires, decentralized initiative, it is a precondition for rapid progress in productivity. The wrong technique choices may, then, lead to attitudes which result in the choice of a political structure which is less conducive to further advances in productivity.

In so far as these same technique choices tend to create low morale and output by laborers, they directly affect productivity. By choosing the techniques of administration and production with opposite results, the consequent decentralization of initiative and increased morale and output of laborers will cause more rapid increases in productivity. The experience of the Lincoln Electric Company with the latter type of administrative technique vividly illustrates the effect on productivity. Since the institution of a system of decentralized initiative at Lincoln Electric, together with the appropriate incentives to make people willing to exercise initiative, productivity has risen phenomenally. Lincoln's employees now have an output per employee which is double that of the average manufacturing employee in the United States, and which is far above that of employees of other firms in the same industry.

Ideally, from the point of view of diffusion of initiative and property, technical assistance programs should be directed

[30] Robert M. MacIver, *Democracy and the Economic Challenge* (New York, 1952).

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toward increasing the productivity of farmers, fishermen, tradespeople, mechanics and workers in small shops (who are usually handicraft workers in underdeveloped areas). Aid which leads to the creation of a factory system, if it must be given to meet the objectives of a development program, should carefully orient systems of administration and techniques of production in a direction which will keep at least some initiative and the incentive to use initiative in the hands of individual members of the factory work force.

If those engaged in technical assistance programs are to be enabled to do as effective a job as possible, alternative methods of administration and production should be evaluated in terms of the criteria described here. With the aid of such evaluations, choices among techniques may be more wisely made in terms of achieving continuing progress toward goals of higher productivity and greater democracy and freedom.

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BENTHAM LOOKS AT AMERICA

NEITHER American experience nor institutions played any part in the development of Jeremy Bentham's utilitarianism in its initial and seminal phases.[1] His thought was based squarely upon the work of fellow Englishmen and of Europeans. Conversely, it is difficult to place one's finger upon the specific influences which he exerted upon American developments when he was at the height of his fame. In time, however, a few Americans grew to appreciate the greatness of his work; and Bentham, highly susceptible to flattery, reciprocated, in part, by developing an affectionate regard for many aspects of American life. How true this was is indicated only partially by the editor of his works, John Bowring, or by writers upon Bentham, both American and British.[2] Fortunately, the great collection of his papers in University College, London, contains a number of unpublished letters which he exchanged with Americans. They shed additional light upon the subject of Bentham's interests in America and his opinion of the country, its people and their institutions.[3]

Bentham's correspondence with Americans began even before his own government was willing to recognize their right to be independent. Before the end of the Revolution, possibly in 1780, he wrote to Benjamin Franklin, sending him a copy of his *Fragment on Government*, a work, he said, which had been written for the use of leading men everywhere. He lauded Franklin as a "benefactor of mankind", and declared that if his work should contribute to the prosperity of Franklin's own country,

[1] Halévy, Elie, *The Growth of Philosophical Radicalism* (New York, 1928).

[2] See Bowring, John, *The Works of Jeremy Bentham* (Edinburgh, 1843); Palmer, Paul A., "Benthamism in England and America", *The American Political Science Review*, XXXV (October 1941), 855–871.

[3] University College, Bentham Manuscripts. See Milne, A. T., *Catalogue of the Manuscripts of Jeremy Bentham in the Library of University College* (London, 1937). Microfilms and photostats of Bentham's American correspondence have been made available through the courtesy of John C. Berthel of the Library of Columbia University.

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it would be "some consolation for the misfortune you have been the means of bringing on mine."[4]

Bentham's more fruitful interest in the United States began with the very favorable response on the part of a small number of American readers to the work of Etienne Dumont, his French popularizer. Edward Livingston, author of the celebrated Louisiana Code, was acquainted by about 1804 with Dumont's edition in French of Bentham's *Principles of Legislation*.[5] By 1809, Aaron Burr, his career under a cloud despite his acquittal on the charge of treason, had communicated with Bentham while he was in London. Bentham found Burr an attractive personality, although he was highly critical of Burr's duel with Hamilton as well as of his supposed aim to create a new empire in the Western hemisphere.[6] Henceforth Bentham was to correspond with other famous Americans, including James Madison; and two American ministers to Great Britain, John Quincy Adams and Richard Rush; as well as the relatively obscure Yankee, John Neal. In time Neal so wore out his welcome in London as to cause Bentham to brand him a "non-descript", but Neal went on to become the publisher of an American edition of *The Principles of Legislation* (Boston, 1830).[7] It was largely through such channels that Bentham was able to exert influence upon America. An examination of American newspapers published in twenty-four different states during the period from the Revolution to the Civil War did not produce any positive evidence that they were an important means of disseminating his ideas. Nevertheless, his fame had spread across the Atlantic as it had to the Continent and Latin America, with flattering results.

Partly for this reason, Bentham hoped that he might gain the

[4] Bentham Manuscripts, ca. 1780, CLXIX, 118.

[5] Bowring, *op. cit.*, XI, 23; X, 432; VIII, 515.

[6] Bixby, W. K., *The Private Journals of Aaron Burr* (Rochester, 1903), I, 3; Parton, J., *The Life of Aaron Burr* (Boston, 1876), II, 168–169.

[7] Bowring, *op. cit.*, X, 556. For other Americans who were acquainted with Bentham or his work, see Malone, Dumas, *The Public Life of Thomas Cooper, 1783–1839* (New Haven, 1926), p. 370; Baker, Elizabeth F., *Henry Wheaton, 1785–1848* (Philadelphia, 1937), p. 82.

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privilege of codifying the laws of most of the states, chiefly in order to eliminate the influence of the "fluctuating" mass of precedents comprising the English common law as it existed, with some modifications, in the United States. As early as 1811 he wrote to President Madison requesting that he use his influence to secure the adoption of his proposal, stating that in Britain any effort to change any existing arrangements was howled down by the cry, "You want to republicanize us."[8] Madison's failure to answer the letter until 1816 and the outbreak of the War of 1812 caused an interruption in his communications with Americans. He did not renew his efforts to be the codifier of American law until 1817.

At this time Bentham's friendship with the members of the American diplomatic corps provided him with the means of circularizing governors of various American states. John Quincy Adams and his nephew, John Adams Smith, as well as Richard Rush encouraged him to write such governors as William Plumer of New Hampshire, requesting permission to produce a code free of charge, presenting as his credentials copies of *Chrestomathia, Circulars on Codification and Public Instruction* and his pamphlet on parliamentary reform.[9] John Adams Smith built extravagant hopes for Bentham's plans, predicting a ready acceptance for them if only "from the gratitude of my countrymen, for your devotedness to the interests of mankind, and to the immediate improvement of the conditions of our happy country."[10] The response, though friendly, was negative. In Bentham's opinion, the United States had lost an opportunity to produce codes of law which even the nonrepublican states of Europe could have copied, to the great enhancement of American prestige in the world.[11]

If Bentham's interest in America had arisen only from American flattery and from his codification scheme, he would not have concerned himself so much nor so often with the United

[8] Bowring, *op. cit.*, IV, 454–467.

[9] *Ibid.*, IV, 468–514. Bentham Manuscripts, J. A. Smith to Bentham, December 1, 1817, XII, 16; Bentham to J. Q. Adams, June 7, 1817, XII, 9.

[10] Bentham Manuscripts, XII, 16.

[11] Bowring, *op. cit.*, IV, 506.

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States. His interest became greater as he entered his "democratic phase". By 1806 or 1807 he lost faith that the British oligarchy would be the vehicle for Benthamite reform after the government had rejected his Panopticon scheme for scientific, cheap prison reform and convict rehabilitation. Beyond this point, Bentham placed his trust in reform of representation and of suffrage as the only effective means of creating an electorate with the power to set Britain on the highroad to Benthamite Utopianism.[12]

As a convert to political democracy, Bentham wished to know the American people and their institutions better. Through his American friends he was able to satisfy his curiosity, if only in part. With their help he was able to secure the *Memoirs* of the notorious James Wilkinson (Philadelphia, 1816), the account of Zebulon M. Pike's expedition to the Southwest (Philadelphia, 1810), the two volumes on the Lewis and Clark expedition (Philadelphia, 1817), Tench Coxe's account of the arts and manufactures of the United States (Philadelphia, 1814), and issues of the *North American Review.* John Quincy Adams and his nephew secured for him eight volumes of *Niles' Weekly Register*, a magazine of enormous usefulness for understanding the contemporary scene in its economic and political aspects. Eventually he set up an American "Collecteana" composed of these works as well as of information culled from English and American newspapers. At one time he hoped to establish a library in London to be composed of works relating to American law.[13]

At this time his chief concern with America consisted of a desire to secure information about topics of current interest and significance in Britain undergoing the rigors of a post-

[12] See Brebner, J. B., "Laissez Faire and State Intervention in Nineteenth Century Britain", in Schuyler, R. L., and Ausubel, H. (eds.), *The Making of English History* (New York, 1952), pp. 501–510. For his conception of the ideal state, see Peardon, T. P., "Bentham's Ideal Republic", *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, XVIII (May 1951), 184–203.

[13] Bentham Manuscripts: William Vaughan to Bentham, May 16, 1817, XII, 5; Vaughan to Bentham, July 23, 1817, XII, 8; Rush to Bentham, February 3, 1824, XII, 182; Bentham to Vaughan, July 23, 1817, XII, 12. U.S.A., Collecteana, XXI, 77–179.

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Napoleonic reaction. These included information about state laws dealing with libel, blasphemy and religious tests for office, the state of religion, including the popularity of deism and any controversy between those of Trinitarian and Unitarian beliefs. As for constitutional changes then taking place in New England and the Middle Atlantic states, Bentham was most interested in the new constitutions of Massachusetts (1820) and of New York (1821). The latter, conceding a taxpaying qualification for the suffrage for both branches of the legislature, so interested him that he was not content with borrowing a copy of it from his American friends, but tried to secure one to place permanently on his library shelves, his own having been turned over to the editor of the London *Morning Chronicle* who had neither published it nor returned it to him.[14]

His collection of American items included a most interesting clipping of an exchange between a Massachusetts minister and an English counterpart, describing the Massachusetts Convention of 1820. The American approved in general the various compromises which had produced the new constitution. Conceding that some "fanatics" had indeed been elected to membership in the Convention, he maintained that the majority had been well-disposed and that because there was absolutely no disqualification for voting "except absolute pauperism", the people had held at their mercy life, liberty and property but without endangering any one of them. Such a situation, he said, was entirely unknown in the old world.

Other fragments showing the general tenor of his interests included clippings dealing with internal improvements in Pennsylvania and with the existence of six thousand common schools in New York which he identified on the margin as being Lancastrian in their teaching methods. Sometime after 1816 Bentham wrote Governor DeWitt Clinton of New York for the purpose of interesting him in a similar scheme to remedy the lawlessness, drunkenness and quarrelsomeness of Irish immigrants in his state. In addition to his acquaintance with the

[14] Bentham Manuscripts: Bentham to J. Q. Adams, June 1, 1817, XII, 10; Bentham to Rush, December 4, 1823, XII, 161; Bentham to J. Q. Adams, no date, XXI, 84. U.S.A., Collecteana; Bowring, *op. cit.*, X, 512, 533–534.

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school system in vogue in New York, he knew of efforts to establish a system of public education in Virginia. Such plans led him to applaud the means and the ends which they had in view, declaring that they were for the benefit of all instead of, as in Britain, serving the "separate and sinister interest of the few."[15]

Bentham's correspondence and collection emphatically increased his knowledge of the United States, so much so that John Adams Smith could compliment him upon his "acquaintance with the principles and institutions of freedom in America."[16] In gratitude for the help of his American friends, he presented Richard Rush with a relic of John Milton's home as well as with a piece of wood from the ancient roof of Westminster Hall. Whenever he thought he could help the United States he did not hesitate to offer suggestions and to extend any information he thought might be useful. He sent Rush confidential information relating to the situation in Greece in 1823 and proposed to John Quincy Adams a plan to reform the government of the Barbary Powers in such a way as to end forever their capacity to make trouble. Possibly, Bentham was the writer of a letter in his collection which suggested that the crisis over the Arbuthnot-Ambrister Affair be overcome by establishing an arbitral tribunal to determine the justice of any pecuniary claims the survivors of these hapless Englishmen might have.[17]

Nevertheless, in some respects his knowledge was quite deficient. He never commanded a precise, technical knowledge of the United States such as would be expected of a specialist either in history or in political science. On some matters he remained hazy, to say the least, especially perhaps of the actualities of American political processes. On one occasion he complained in a letter to the editor of the *National Calendar* that his index was difficult to use unless one was "very familiar" with the government of the United States. Elsewhere he

[15] Bowring, *op. cit.*, IV, 531, 531n; Columbia University, De Witt Clinton Papers, XXIV, 19.

[16] Bentham Manuscripts, J. A. Smith to Bentham, August 1, 1821, XII, 33.

[17] *Ibid.*, Bentham to Rush, August 14, 1821, XII, 36; Rush to Bentham, August 18, 1821, XII, 38; Rush to Bentham, November 20, 1823, XII, 153 *et seq.*; Bentham to J. Q. Adams, January 10, 1823, XXIV, 378. See also XII, 26.

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referred quaintly to the Secretary of State as the "Home Secretary".[18]

These deficiencies never prevented him from developing some very strong likes and dislikes regarding America. On the debit side, he strongly deprecated the abstract quality of the philosophy of John Locke upon which the American democratic experiment rested to a great degree. With regard to the Declarations of Rights of some of the states he once exclaimed: "Who can help lamenting that so rational a cause should be rested upon reasons, so much fitter to raise objections than to remove them?" Though he expressed admiration for Jefferson's rôle in placing the liberty of the press upon a secure foundation, he ridiculed in a famous passage the Declaration of Independence as "a hodge-podge of confusion and absurdity in which the theory to be proved is all along taken for granted."[19] He deplored also the great prestige of Sir William Blackstone's *Commentaries on the Laws of England* with its apotheosis to the common law as the last English yoke which the American people had not yet cast off. "The yoke, the foreign yoke," he said, "is already about your necks; you were born with it about your necks."[20] He was critical of the United States Senate and of bicameralism in general in a way reminiscent of certain seventeenth-century English theorists and of the Frenchman, Turgot, in the eighteenth.[21] He distrusted an aristocratic upper house because it was not subject to popular control and for this reason he displayed very great interest in the New York Constitution of 1821, undoubtedly because it discarded the theory of balanced government. If American democracy was open further to criticism, it was on the grounds that even in the United States the rich could tyrannize over the poor and that states which had a militia qualification for voting, as did Connecticut, had committed themselves to a qualification

[18] *Ibid.*, Bentham to the Editor of the *National Calendar*, August 5, 1821, XII, 35; Bentham to Rush, April 11, 1821, XII, 30.

[19] Bowring, *op. cit.*, I, 154n; X, 63.

[20] *Ibid.*, IV, 461.

[21] *Ibid.*, IV, 448; Everett, C. W., *Anti-Senatica* . . ., Smith College Studies in History, vol. XI, No. 4, July 1926, pp. 209–267.

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wholly inconsistent with the principle of universal manhood suffrage.[22]

On balance, however, Bentham gave overwhelming approval to the United States. He praised it as a country with a written constitution whose grand objective was "the greatest happiness of the greatest numbers."[23] As to the extent of political democracy, Bentham had sufficient discernment to see that remaining property qualifications were, more often than not, purely nominal and that the existence of the secret ballot in New York was a landmark in that it provided a legal safeguard against coercion of poor and lowly voters by the rich and the powerful. For these reasons he did not unduly exaggerate by characterizing the United States as a "total" democracy.[24] Furthermore, this form of government, so essentially "illegitimate" as Bentham took pleasure in saying, had not proved itself at all incompatible with material prosperity or with the rights of persons and of property.[25] To this extent he accepted American institutions without any of the trepidations or reservations of Alexis de Tocqueville in his *Democracy in America*.

With regard to the liberty of the press, Bentham believed that the United States, with the sole exception of the Sedition Act of 1798, had a record which put Britain to shame after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. Having no sedition act in America, he said, there was no sedition. At one time he thought to use his knowledge of the American law of libel to help the defense in English trials, but never did.[26]

Above all, the Americans had no such dread of change as did Britons. In the United States such "fallacies" as precedent, wisdom of ancestors, dread of innovation, the immutability of legislation, were not so deeply engrained as they were in his country. As a result, the progress of the American states in material prosperity ("matchless good government the cause"), in education and in public improvements was striking.[27] Because this country, in contrast to Britain, was the land of good

[22] Bowring, *op. cit.*, IX, 348n.

[23] *Ibid.*, IX, 9.

[24] *Ibid.*, III, 447.

[25] *Ibid.*, III, 437, 447.

[26] *Ibid.*, III, 562; X, 512–513.

[27] *Ibid.*, II, 482; III, 437.

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government and no corruption, of governmental economy rather than of extravagance, of low rather than of high salaries for public officials, the American government enjoyed a financial surplus instead of a deficit.[28]

The strong contrasts which he drew between the two countries were, in his opinion, the fruits of the American Revolution. The Americans, he said, had fortunately shaken off the "yoke of English monarchy—the yoke of English aristocracy—the yoke of English prelacy—all those galling yokes" save that of the common law.[29] Even this last yoke might go, too, because Bentham had a higher opinion of American lawyers than he had of English. The former would in time see the necessity of replacing the authority of judicial precedent with a rational code of law. No wonder, therefore, that Bentham should have written John Adams Smith that he had sent him six copies of his works in which he said he had appeared as a "Philo-Yankee".[30] In old age, he went so far as to write Andrew Jackson that he was actually more a "United States man" than he was an Englishman.[31]

With this assertion Bentham betrayed the intensity of his admiration for the United States. In so doing, he illustrated the truth of the statement that during much of the nineteenth century British radicalism looked to America as the working model for the future happiness of the British people.

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[28] *Ibid.*, II, 201; III, 494; V, 344.

[29] *Ibid.*, IV, 503–504.

[30] Bentham Manuscripts, Bentham to J. A. Smith, December 22, 1817, XII, 18.

[31] Bassett, J. S. (ed.), *The Correspondence of Andrew Jackson* (Washington, 1926–1931), IV, 46. In this connection see Kraus, Michael, *The Atlantic Civilization: Eighteenth Century Origins* (Ithaca, 1949); Lundin, Hilda G., *The Influence of Jeremy Bentham on English Democratic Development*, University of Iowa Studies in the Social Sciences, vol. VII, No. 3, 1920.

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THE WAVERING "LINE" OF INDIAN COMMUNISM

"INDIA does not want Communism."[1] So spoke Gandhi in 1921. The same hostility to violence and the same rejection of the doctrine of class struggle which led Gandhi to reject communism permeate the thinking of Gandhi's disciple, Jawaharlal Nehru. In 1946 Nehru declared that the Indian Communist party "speaks in a language which finds no echo in the hearts of the people."[2]

With its vast size and population, its highly strategic position on the Asiatic continent, and its influential status as a leading spokesman for the newly formed Asiatic democracies, India has received the special attention of the international communist movement. In its effort to build strength, with the hope of eventually winning India over to the Communist bloc, the Communist party of India (CPI) has employed three basic strategies: coöperation with the Indian government, attempt at revolutionary seizure of power, and united front with other leftist parties vis-à-vis the Congress party. These shifts in strategy have been closely related to the changing international scene, especially in Asia, and to the numerous zig-zags in the international Communist line.

* * * *

When, with the implementation of the Mountbatten Partition Plan on August 15, 1947, the Congress party of Jawaharlal Nehru assumed control of the Indian government, the CPI, under the leadership of Purand Chand Joshi, supported the new government. Since the end of the war, the CPI had been pursuing a moderate reformist policy, parallel to, but to the left of, Congress party policy. Although British "imperialism" had ended in India, Joshi reasoned, a proletarian revolution was not yet feasible and would not be feasible until the country had been industrialized and "feudalism" completely eliminated. Meanwhile, the CPI program called for coöperation with the

[1] Fischer, Louis, *The Life of Mahatma Gandhi* (New York, 1950), p. 330.

[2] Nehru, Jawaharlal, *The Discovery of India* (New York, 1946), p. 528.

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Nehru government, complete withdrawal of British troops, full democratization of the state apparatus, full civil rights and liberties. The party favored "liquidation of landlord ownership" and "nationalization of the key branches of industry" but only upon "payment of just compensation."[3] One might summarize Joshi's policy as one of peaceful rivalry with the Nehru government. His main concern was with the modernization of the Indian economy.

This policy conformed to the over-all strategy of international communism in 1945–47. The Soviet Union was recuperating from the devastating effects of the war and was consolidating its hold in Eastern Europe. In general, Soviet foreign policy was based on "friendly competition" with its wartime allies rather than open hostility. Soviet policy toward Asia was based on the belief that "colonialism" could be eliminated in a peaceful and gradual way. This view was championed by Eugene Varga, an economic advisor to the Soviet government.[4] In late 1947, however, Varga's gradualist views were repudiated and the international communist line took a radical turn.

Andrei Zhdanov's speech at the founding conference of the Cominform, in September 1947, indicated that Soviet policy had moved sharply to the left. All the old arguments against capitalist imperialism were refurbished. In essence, Zhdanov proclaimed a return to the revolutionary policy of the Sixth Comintern Congress of 1928. The Communist parties of the West were told to return to insurrectionary tactics, and the nationalist movements in the backward areas were actively encouraged to rebel. In Asia, over a period of some months, the policies of the various communist movements were altered to conform to this new directive. The "lovable" Japanese Communist party of Sanzo Nozaka, engaged in "peaceful revolution", was severely criticized and a much more militant line was then imposed. In Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines, armed insurrections were attempted by the Communists.

[3] *Pravda*, January 1, 1948, p. 3.

[4] See Mosely, Philip E., "Soviet Policy and the Revolutions in Asia", *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, July 1951, vol. 276, p. 95.

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The implications of Zhdanov's speech were spelled out for the CPI at its Second Congress, held during February-March 1948 at Calcutta. Joshi was removed from office after being charged with "reformism" and "right deviation". Balchand Trimbak Ranadive, elected to succeed him, repudiated Joshi's revisionist policy and declared Nehru a representative of the bourgeoisie and an ally of the imperialists.

> We characterize the National Government as a Government of collaborators, of national surrender, a Government of compromise. Thus in place of our former wrong characterization of the Government as one of national advance with which we should have a joint front, we now have a characterization that it is a Government of national surrender and collaboration.[5]

Ranadive declared that Nehru was selling India out to imperialism. Hence, "the basic policy of the working class and its party must be one of opposition to this Government".[6]

The new program of the party called for liquidation of the feudal principalities, liquidation of the holdings of the landlords and distribution of the land to those who till it, nationalization of the basic branches of industry, and establishment of workers' control over enterprises—all without compensation.[7]

Ranadive now called for a "fighting alliance" of the masses against imperialism, feudalism and the bourgeoisie. A few months later the new General Secretary exhorted: "We cannot trim our policies to suit the delicate constitutions of the moneybags. We must fight."[8]

The new strategy was quickly translated into action. India became the scene of widespread strikes, civil disorders and demonstrations involving the use of physical violence—sabotage, looting, incendiarism and political assassination. Ranadive ap-

[5] "Secretary of the Communist Party of India, B. T. Ranadive", *Forum*, October 9, 1949, vol. VII, No. 9, p. 5.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[7] *Communist Party of India. Political Thesis Adopted at the Second Congress, Calcutta, February 28–March 6, 1948*, Bombay, May 1949, pp. 69–70; quoted by D'iakov, A., *Indiia vo vremia i posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny, 1939–1949* (*India During and After the Second World War, 1939–1949*) (Moscow, 1952), p. 227.

[8] "Secretary of the Communist Party of India, B. T. Ranadive", *loc. cit.*, p. 6.

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parently felt that the time was ripe to engineer the final revolutionary push in India. The party organized "shock brigades" and guerrilla bands. Taking as his guide the orthodox Leninist theory of the seizure of power through a revolution based on urban insurrection, Ranadive initiated a program of violence and insurrection aiming at the overthrow of the Indian government. His strategy was based on the assumption that the "substitution of a proletarian state for a bourgeois state is impossible without violent revolution."[9]

The new strategy of the CPI called for both urban and rural insurrection. Industrial violence was widespread, especially in Calcutta and Bombay. In February 1949 an extensive plot to sabotage the railroads was reported. In the same month there was a Communist-led attack on Dum Dum Airport and on Jessop and Company in Calcutta.[10] These tactics were, according to the Communist timetable, to culminate in a country-wide railway strike planned for March 1949. Aware of this plan, the government stepped in and rounded up some 600 Communists charged with inciting the workers to strike, thus aborting the strike. According to one observer, "this failure perhaps more than anything else sealed the fate of the communist plan for revolution, besides exposing the weakness of the Party's hold on the rank and file of the workers."[11]

Communist agitation was strong and effective in Telengana, Andhra and Travancore-Cochin, regions which had long suffered from agrarian impoverishment. In the Telengana district of Hyderabad, Communist activity also benefited from the chaotic conditions resulting from the resistance of the Nizam of Hyderabad to the incorporation of his principality into the Indian Union. In the Andhra section of Madras, the Communists were able to exploit popular sentiment for establishing a separate Andhra state based on the unity of the Telegu-speaking peoples. In Travancore-Cochin, the most literate and most politically conscious state in India, the CPI sponsored

[9] Quotation from a secret party document seized during a police raid on CPI headquarters; as reprinted in *New York Times*, July 2, 1949, p. 4.

[10] *Ibid.*, February 21, 1949, p. 7.

[11] Masani, M. R., *The Communist Party of India* (London, 1954), p. 94.

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and encouraged a literary movement which stressed the popularization of poetry, drama and the novel, hoping through these media to carry the message of communism to the villager. These varied activities illustrate the tactical flexibility of the CPI.

These peasant struggles were quite successful, especially in the Nalgonda and Warangal districts of Telengana and the Kristna, East Godavari and West Godavari districts of Andhra. In parts of Telengana the Communists actually succeeded in temporarily supplanting the governmental administration. The Soviet press reported that the rule of the Nizam was overthrown in one sixth of the territory of the principality with a population of four million. Soviet accounts claimed that in 2,500 villages People's Committees had been formed, land had been distributed to the peasants, workers' debts to the landlords had been abolished, and People's Courts and Militia had been established. The struggle in Telengana was referred to as the "first harbinger of the agrarian revolution, exemplifying the most important form of the present stage of the national liberation movement."[12] Despite these glowing reports, the party could not withstand the effective counter-measures of the government, which reestablished its control in 1949. However, pockets of Red resistance continued to hold out.

Meanwhile, Ranadive's position within the CPI was deteriorating. His personal dictatorship over the party caused the disaffection of many intellectuals who had been drawn into it during Joshi's easy-going rule. Moreover, Ranadive's stress on the proletariat as the prime factor in the revolutionary struggle had never been popular among large segments of the party. With the failure of the insurrection, the opposition to Ranadive came into the open. In the spring of 1949 a policy split developed between Ranadive and the Communist leaders from Andhra. The Andhra Communists believed that in India the revolution must be based on the peasantry, which forms more

[12] Balabushevich, V., "Novyi etap natsional 'no- osvoboditel 'no borby narodov Indii" ("The New Stage of the National Liberation Struggle of the People of India"), *Voprosy ekonomiki* (*Problems of Economics*), No. 8, 1949, pp. 42–43. See also "Peasant Unrest in Central India", *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, June 1, 1948, No. 11 (14), p. 1, and "The Situation in India", *New Times*, June 2, 1948, No. 23, p. 15.

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than 90 per cent of the population, rather than on the proletariat. They also felt that the party should coöperate with the rich peasantry and other sections of the "national bourgeoisie". The Indian revolution, according to their analysis, was a bourgeois-democratic revolution, not a proletarian revolution.[13] Ranadive attacked this "right deviation" for collaborating with bourgeois elements, for adopting a policy "based on the vacillating politics of the middle peasant", and for being "influenced by rich peasant ideology." Ranadive stated that the Andhra Communists had not allowed the poor peasantry a dominant voice in party councils.[14]

This condemnation, published in the theoretical organ of the party, *The Communist* (Bombay), severely criticized the Andhra leaders, interestingly, for justifying their analysis by reference to the example of Mao Tse-tung. The Chinese leader, charged Ranadive, had brought sections of the bourgeoisie into the government and had neglected to ensure the hegemony of the proletariat.

> Some of Mao's formulations are such that no Communist can accept them. They are in contradiction to the world understanding of the Communist Parties. . . . Why do the Chinese have to go through a protracted civil war? Just because the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party at times fails to fight for the hegemony of the proletariat, . . . because it followed tactical policies which led to disaster.
>
> . . . We must state emphatically that the Communist Party of India has accepted Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin as the authoritative sources of Marxism. It has not discovered new sources of Marxism beyond these.[15]

[13] See Bhargava, G. S., *A Study of the Communist Movement in Andhra* (Delhi, 1955), pp. 22–25, and *The Statesman* (India), Overseas Edition, July 16, 1949, p. 9.

[14] "Struggle for People's Democracy and Socialism—Some Questions of Strategy and Tactics", *The Communist* (Bombay), June–July 1949, p. 35; cited in Curran, Jean A., "Dissension Among India's Communists", *Far Eastern Survey*, July 12, 1950, vol. XIX, No. 13, p. 134.

[15] *The Communist* (Bombay), June–July 1949; cited in North, Robert C., *Moscow and the Chinese Communists* (Stanford, 1953), pp. 242–243, and in Masani, M. R., "The Communist Party in India", *Pacific Affairs*, March 1951, vol. XXIV, No. 1, p. 29.

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Although Ranadive was not averse to creating disturbances in rural areas where conditions of unrest prevailed, as demonstrated by party activities in Telengana and Madras, the essential feature of his program was urban insurrection. The Andhra group's policy, which sought to exploit the dissension prevailing among all elements of the peasantry—a policy based on the experience of the Chinese Communists—was thus rejected by him.

Ranadive's criticism of Mao Tse-tung, however, did not go unheeded. In an editorial in the January 27, 1950 issue of the Cominform publication, *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, the CPI was censured for its attack on Mao. Quoting a speech made by Liu Shao-ch'i at the World Federation of Trade Unions Conference of Asian and Australasian Nations at Peking, November-December 1949,[16] the Cominform announced that "the path taken by the Chinese people . . . is the path that must be taken by the people of the various colonial and semi-colonial countries in their fight for national independence and People's Democracy."[17] The editorial declared that "sham independence was bestowed on India. But the interests of British imperialism remain 'sacred and inviolable.' "

> In these conditions, the task of the Indian Communists, drawing on the experience of the national liberation movements in China and other countries, is naturally to strengthen the alliance of the working class with all the peasantry . . . [and] to unite all classes, parties, groups and organizations willing to defend the national independence and freedom of India.[18]

Summarizing one of the key points made by Liu Shao-ch'i, the editorial concludes with a statement justifying the use of armed struggle. "As the example of China, Viet Nam, Malaya and other countries shows, armed struggle is now becoming the main form of the national liberation struggle in many colonial and dependent countries."[19]

[16] For the complete text of Liu Shao-ch'i's speech see *World Trade Union Movement*, December 1949, pp. 12 *et seq.*

[17] *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, January 27, 1950, No. 4 (64), p. 1.

[18] *Ibid.* [19] *Ibid.*

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This reprimand by the Cominform was met by an immediate apology. Ranadive, indulging in the communist ritual of *samokritika* (self-criticism), admitted that the editorial "gives to the working class, headed by the Communist Party, powerful weapons for the carrying out of its leading role in the supreme struggle for national liberation and helps it correct all mistakes obstructing its growth."[20] Fully accepting the editorial's conclusions, Ranadive stated:

> The lessons of the victorious people's liberation struggle in China, in which the Communist Party of China, under the leadership of Mao Tse Tung, successfully applied the teachings of Lenin and Stalin, will be the unfailing guide for the Communist Party and working class of India in discharging their leading role in the national liberation struggle.[21]

The rebuke administered by the Cominform to the CPI and the subsequent *volte-face* by the party leadership incited many discontented members of the party to express their criticism of Ranadive openly.[22] CPI unity and discipline began to deteriorate rapidly. In July 1950 Ranadive was dismissed by the Central Committee as General Secretary of the party.

Ranadive's dismissal marked a significant shift in the strategy of Indian communism and of Asian communism in general. By this time the international communist movement was well aware of the rôle which agrarian insurrection and guerrilla warfare had played in the victory of the Chinese Communists. Since, in communist jargon, China was a "semicolonial" country and since most Asian countries are described by the Communists as "colonial or semicolonial areas", Mao's techniques were immediately hailed throughout the communist world as the model for other Asian countries, especially for a predominantly agrarian country like India. The international Communist leaders apparently believed too that the Chinese Communist

[20] *Cross Roads*, March 10, 1950; cited in D'iakov, *op. cit.*, p. 234.

[21] "Indian CP on Revolutionary Experience in China", *Daily News Release*, New China News Agency (English Language Service), March 14, 1950, No. 313, pp. 65–66; see also "Indian Party Statement", *World News and Views*, March 18, 1950, vol. XXX, No. 11, p. 121.

[22] *The Statesman* (India), Overseas Edition, March 18, 1950, p. 8.

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tactic of allying, if only temporarily, with all groups "opposed to imperialism" could also be useful to the CPI. In India, according to their analysis, some elements within the bourgeoisie, the so-called "national bourgeoisie", whose interests were opposed to those of the "big bourgeoisie", could be included, temporarily, in the "united anti-imperialist front", a term synonymous with the "national liberation movement", under the leadership of the CPI. Seeking to take advantage of any possible conflicts within the bourgeoisie, the CPI now adopted the tactic of a "united anti-imperialist front", an adaptation of the Chinese Communist concept of the "bloc of four classes".[23]

Under the influence of this interpretation the February–March 1950 issue of *The Communist* (Bombay) observed that the party had not sufficiently emphasized the subordinate rôle of the national bourgeoisie to British imperialism nor had a distinction been made between the "big bourgeoisie" and other sections of the bourgeoisie which "can still at one time or another play the role of 'fellow travellers' in the national liberation struggle. . . . At the same time . . . these oppositional strata of the Indian bourgeoisie ought not to be regarded in any way as reliable or stable members of the anti-imperialist camp."[24]

Following the repudiation of Ranadive, the leadership of the CPI was shaken up, and Rajeshwar Rao, leader of the Andhra

[23] One shortcoming of Masani's analysis is his failure to relate changes in CPI strategy to developments in the international communist movement. He fails to realize the degree to which the victory of the Chinese Communists affected developments in other Asian Communist parties; hence, his treatment understates the influence of Mao's strategy on CPI policy.

[24] "Statement of the Editorial Board", *The Communist* (Bombay), February–March 1950, cited in Curran, *op. cit.*, p. 134. For a more complete exposition of the Chinese Communist concept of the united front of all classes opposed to the "colonial rulers and their running dogs" see "All Oppressed Peoples Can Learn from Chinese Victory", *Daily News Release*, New China News Agency (English Language Service), February 21, 1950, No. 292, pp. 101–103, and Chen Po-ta, *Mao Tse-tung on the Chinese Revolution* (Peking, 1953), pp. 25, 45–46, 57–58. For an interesting discussion of the possible genesis of this concept in Soviet thinking see Kautsky, John H., "Indian Communist Strategy since 1947", *Pacific Affairs*, June 1955, vol. XXVIII, No. 2, pp. 147 *et. seq.* The author contends that some Soviet analysts conceived of the national bourgeoisie as a possible temporary ally of the CPI as early as 1947.

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Communists, became General Secretary. The party's Central Committee, bowing before the new interpretation, declared that its "new policy will be based on the experience of the national liberation movement in China. The course which China is taking and which the countries of Southeast Asia are following is the only correct course before our people."[25] Basing its policy on Mao's formula of the "united front", it promised to work for the establishment of an "all-national united front headed by the working class for the struggle against the Anglo-American imperialists in India."[26]

Unlike Ranadive, whose policy was based primarily on urban violence, Rao espoused a policy based on agrarian revolution and coöperation with other leftist groups. In September 1950 the CPI leadership announced that the party should

> put the peasant movement on the rails of armed struggle and that in agrarian relations they should, by mass mobilization and direct action, as in Telengana, create armed forces in rural areas and strong bases for their operation. It is further stated that there is no question of liquidating Telengana but that, on the contrary, it is a question of raising the movement in the rest of the country to the level of Telengana.[27]

In November 1950 the Politburo issued a statement which again emphasized the importance of the agrarian revolution: ". . . It is necessary to clearly grasp the truth that the armed struggle has become the principal form of struggle in the present agrarian revolutionary stage that our national liberation movement has grown to."[28] Apparently, Rao hoped that the Com-

[25] "Statement of the Central Committee of Indian Communist Party", *Pravda*, July 23, 1950, p. 3; translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. II, No. 30, September 9, 1950, p. 31.

[26] *Ibid.*

[27] Quoted by the Home Minister of India, Chavravarty Rajagopalachari; see *Overseas Hindustan Times*, March 15, 1951, p. 6.

[28] *Ibid.* According to one recent interpretation, "India was not considered a country where armed struggle was possible." By adopting a policy of armed struggle, according to the author, the CPI misinterpreted the Cominform directive of January 27, 1950. Kautsky, *loc. cit.*, pp. 154–155. This analysis does not seem to be consonant with the facts. While all of the communist movements in Southeast Asia were instructed to imitate the Chinese pattern of armed insurrection,

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munist-led agrarian movement in India could successfully adopt the Chinese Communist pattern and could establish its own "liberated areas", or bases for future operations, as the Chinese had done in Yenan.

In keeping with this shift in strategy, the international Communist press emphasized the crucial rôle of armed revolution in rural areas. The Soviet press also extolled the virtue of the Chinese concept of a united front which includes part of the bourgeoisie. However, perhaps to forestall any undue inflation of the Chinese ego, one Soviet writer described Mao's theories concerning the rôle of the middle bourgeoisie as temporary allies of the working class as a natural outgrowth of Stalin's "inspired precept".[29]

The situation of the CPI, however, continued to deteriorate. Rao's hopes of spreading Telengana-like movements throughout India went unfulfilled. Telengana's did not breed except in certain areas in Tripura, Manipur and Assam. The party continued to lose popular support, especially among the working class. Confidence of party workers in the CPI leadership also declined. A secret Politburo circular of September 16, 1950 took note of the internal conflicts and reported that the emergence of divergent views had had repercussions on the functioning of the party. "A state of semi-paralysis leading to lack of mass activities is now the general picture inside the Party. . . ."[30]

Thus, adherence to the "China model" had further weakened the party. This situation, plus the effect of the Korean War, necessitated another shift in CPI strategy. In December 1950

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it seems rather clear from the wording of the editorial that this directive was specifically aimed at the CPI. Further evidence of Moscow's general reliance on armed struggle at this time can be seen in the declaration that the Chinese revolution had given the people of Southeast Asia "a vivid example of how to fight for their national liberation. . . . Only armed resistance, only a resolute armed struggle . . . can secure national freedom and independence. . . . The great Chinese people have shown a remarkable example of how an armed rebuff to the imperialist enslavers should be organized." *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, September 1, 1950, No. 35 (95), p. 1.

[29] Kheifits, A. H., "Problems of the Chinese Revolution in the Works of J. V. Stalin", *Problems of Philosophy*, No. 3, 1950, pp. 53–74; translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. III, No. 22, July 14, 1951, pp. 3–6.

[30] Quoted in Masani, *The Communist Party of India*, p. 107.

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the Central Committee, at a new meeting, dropped its emphasis on the Chinese experience and on the tactic of guerrilla warfare and adopted a new policy based on the formation of an anti-imperialist united front which was to replace the Congress government with a "democratic" government pledged to establish "freedom, peace, democracy and agrarian reform." The Central Committee called, for the first time, for general elections. The party also urged all leftist parties and progressive elements to unite in a leftist bloc, for electoral and other purposes, on the basis of a program of minimum demands. The central slogan of this bloc was to be that "*the present Government must go and be replaced by a Government representing the democratic forces*".[31] While calling for the creation of a united front of all anti-imperialist parties and organizations, "united front from above", the CPI also employed the tactic of "united front from below". In criticizing the Congress and Socialist parties the resolutions stated that

> While the leadership of these groups generally consists of fractional and opportunist elements who must be exposed, *there is no doubt that in these parties, there are many honest and sincere people who desire to fight against the policies and methods of the present Government. The Communist Party shall strive to establish united front relations with all these people on all issues on which joint action is possible. . . .*[32]

This basic alteration of policy was presumably endorsed by Moscow, since *Pravda* published this decision of the Central Committee.[33]

In May 1951 the party published its "Draft Program", drawn up in a positive and constructive tone. Apparently, this was to be the "minimum program" on which the party proposed to build the "united front of all anti-imperialist forces." The program called for the replacement of the Congress government by a People's Democratic government, based on a coalition, with the following tasks: development of industry; improvement in working conditions; government based on the sovereignty

[31] *Cross Roads*, December 29, 1950, p. 6; italics in original.

[32] *Ibid.*; italics in original.

[33] *Pravda*, December 31, 1950, p. 3.

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of the people; civil rights and liberties; self-determination of the many nationalities. It goes on: "In view of the backwardness of the economic development of India and of the weakness of the mass organizations of workers, peasants and toiling intelligentsia, our Party does not find it possible at present to carry out Socialist transformation of our country."[34] Seemingly, the CPI was gearing itself for an all-out pre-election drive. This was immediately confirmed, for on June 1, 1951 the party announced that it would "participate in the coming general elections on the basis of its Program."[35] At this time Rao resigned as General Secretary. The Politburo stated that "for the present time there will be no General Secretary of the Party. The Political Bureau will also function as the Secretariat of the Central Committee with Comrade Ajoy Ghosh as Secretary of the Secretariat."[36] The failure to elect a new General Secretary may indicate that the splits within the party had not been healed.

Quickly implementing the new line, the CPI announced on June 15 that it was willing to enter into negotiations to end the fighting in Telengana and on October 12 the partisan war was called to a halt.[37] In August the party issued an "Election Manifesto" which proclaimed that the Congress government must go. "It has forfeited the right to remain in power" and must be replaced by a People's Democratic government. For this purpose the CPI agreed to "cooperate with all other democratic Parties" in the coming elections.[38]

At the All-India Party Conference held in October, Ajoy Kumar Ghosh, a Communist leader from Bengal, was elected General Secretary. One week after his election Ghosh made a public statement in which he criticized the former party leaders for their left-sectarian outlook which, he said, had prevented them from coördinating the many mass struggles into a united

[34] *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, May 11, 1951, No. 19 (31), p. 3.

[35] *Ibid.*, June 15, 1951, No. 24 (136), p. 2.

[36] *Ibid.*

[37] *Cross Roads*, June 15, 1951, p. 3, and October 12, 1951, p. 1.

[38] *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, August 31, 1951, No. 35 (147), pp. 3–4.

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mass movement. He emphasized the importance of working closely with the masses and of not losing contact with them, as had former leaders. He also stressed the importance of working for the victory of the "United Democratic Front" in the elections.[39]

In December Ghosh appealed to members of the Socialist party to join the CPI in a united front against the Congress. He admitted that differences existed between the two parties but felt that there was a common basis for agreement. "The CPI is prepared", declared Ghosh, "to make concessions and adjustments to build unity."[40] This tactic, however, had a negative effect when two of the strongest anti-Congress and anti-Communist parties—the Kisan Mazdoor Praja (Peasants, Workers, Peoples) party and the Socialist party—combined to form the Praja (Peoples) Socialist party.[41] However, in certain states, some other leftist parties, for example, the Marxist "Forward Bloc" and the Revolutionary Socialist party, joined forces with the CPI in the election campaign.

In the first all-Indian elections, held between November 1951 and February 1952, the CPI obtained 5.44 per cent of the popular vote whereas the Congress party received 44.9 per cent. Of the total number of 489 elective seats in the House of the People, or lower house, the Congress party contested 480 seats and won 364 while the CPI and allied groups contested 70 seats and won 27. Of the total number of 3,283 seats distributed among the legislative assemblies of the various states, the Congress party contested 3,278 seats and won 2,247 while the CPI and its allies contested 567 seats and won 174. However, in certain areas, that is, Madras, Travancore-Cochin, Hyderabad, West Bengal and Tripura, the Communist-led bloc achieved a substantial success.[42]

[39] *Ibid.*, October 19, 1951, No. 42 (154), pp. 2–3.

[40] *Cross Roads*, December 28, 1951, p. 3.

[41] *New York Times*, June 4, 1952, p. 4.

[42] For a detailed analysis of the 1951–1952 election results see Park, Richard L., "Indian Election Results", *Far Eastern Survey*, May 7, 1952, vol. XXI, No. 7, pp. 64 *et seq.*, and Schwartz, Samuel, "Communism and the Indian Election", *The American Scholar*, Autumn 1952, vol. XXI, No. 4, pp. 434 *et seq.*

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Since 1952 the strategy of the CPI has remained essentially unchanged. The party has constantly striven to unite all leftist parties in an anti-Congress bloc. In Travancore-Cochin an electoral alliance of Left-wing parties won a majority of seats in the State Assembly in the February–March 1954 elections. The Praja Socialist party, however, refused to form a coalition government with the "United Front of Leftists" and the Left front was broken. From March 1954 to February 1955 the Praja Socialist government depended upon the support of the Congress party. In February 1955, however, the Congress party withdrew its support of the Socialist ministry. Since then, the government has depended on the support of the Communist bloc. In the February 1955 elections in Andhra the Communists, according to first reports, suffered a severe setback. Detailed analyses of the election results did not bear out these early accounts. Although the Communists won only 15 seats, as against the United Congress Front which won 146 seats, the startling fact is that the Communists received 2.7 million votes (out of a total of 8.6 million), that is, almost double the amount they received in 1951–52. At the same time the Congress party and its allies received 4.3 million votes, only a 10 per cent increase over their total vote in 1951-52

In 1952 the CPI had hoped to form and lead a united alliance of leftist parties and thus to become the principal opposition party. Its failure to gain sufficient political support prevented it from organizing an effective opposition bloc. The other large anti-Congress parties, the Socialists and the Kisan Mazdoor Praja party, which later fused, refused to ally themselves with the CPI.[43] Though both devices—the pre-election blocs and parliamentary alliances—have thus far failed, the CPI continues to employ the parliamentary system adroitly in its search for further areas of vulnerability. One element of Rao's policy, the tactic of seeking support from the various sections of the bourgeoisie, has been continued as part of the unsuccessful effort to promote a united front.

[43] *The Statesman* (India), Overseas Edition, May 24, 1952, pp. 1, 4.

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The CPI policy of violence was abandoned because it had failed to gain support among the Indian peasantry and because this failure, in turn, caused widespread dissension within the party. The attempt to model CPI policy on the Chinese experience was sharply criticized in a "Policy Statement" issued in June 1951. In it the party stressed the importance of having India "Strike Its Own Path to Freedom and People's Rule". The situations in India and China were similar, it said, but "*every country has its own peculiarities, natural and social, which cannot fail to govern its path to liberation.*"[44] The policies of the former leaders were repudiated—the Ranadive policy with its neglect of the peasantry, and the Rao policy which minimized the rôle of the working class. Rao's concept of partisan warfare, based on the example of the Chinese Communists, came in for detailed criticism. The situation in India, the "Policy Statement" declared, is basically different from that which prevailed in China. The "liberation" movement in India does not have an army as did the Chinese Communists. India has a comparatively well-organized system of communication; in China the lack of a good communications system had "prevented the enemy from carrying out concentrated and swift attacks on the liberation forces." Finally, India does not have a firm rear which could protect the liberation forces from encirclement as the Chinese had in Manchuria (1945–49). Hence, "peasant struggles along the Chinese path alone cannot lead to victory in India."[45] The statement implored the party to be more realistic and employ a flexible approach basing its tactics upon existing local conditions.

Moscow's support of this analysis was made clear at a conference of Soviet oriental scholars held in November 1951. Ye. M. Zhukov, a leading Soviet expert, stated that "it would be risky to regard the Chinese revolution as some kind of 'stereotype' for people's democratic revolutions in other countries of Asia."[46] This same reasoning held sway at the Third Party

[44] *Cross Roads*, June 8, 1951, p. 3; italics in original. [45] *Ibid.*

[46] "On the Character and Attributes of People's Democracy in Countries of the Orient", *Journal of the USSR Academy of Sciences*, History and Philosophy Series,

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Congress of the CPI, December 1953–January 1954. At a press conference at Madura on January 2, 1954, E. M. S. Nambudiripad, member of the party's Politburo, said that while there was no difference at all between the Communist parties of Russia, China and India on the question of ideological "steeling", its application varied from place to place and had to consider the existing ideology in the particular country.[47]

For the communist movement "nothing succeeds like success." The strategy of Mao Tse-tung applied to India resulted in failure; hence it was abandoned.

Another factor which influenced this most recent switch in policy was the change in Moscow's attitude toward India, especially since the start of the Korean War. In an effort to capitalize on Nehru's "neutralist" foreign policy, the Soviet Union began to tone down its formerly vehement criticisms of the Indian government. Since then, Moscow has continuously striven, as an eventual goal, to pull India out of the Anglo-American orbit. The immediate object is to discourage Indian participation in regional groupings and collective security measures aimed at halting communist expansion. Thus, there is a dual policy employed by the communist nations—friendship, on the one hand, emphasized by beautiful speeches glorifying the feelings of friendship of the Soviet peoples for the peoples of India, offers of economic aid, scientific and cultural missions, exhibitions, and toasts on diplomatic occasions, and, on the other, insult and criticism. The negative reaction of Nehru to recent efforts to build a security system in Southeast Asia has given the U.S.S.R. an advantage which it values. "Neutral" India is a useful weapon in Moscow's propaganda arsenal.

This dual approach toward the Indian government is also employed by the CPI. Generally hostile toward Nehru's domestic policy, the party often supports his foreign policy. The rationalization used by the party illustrates its ability to

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vol. IX, No. 1, pp. 80–87; translated in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. IV, No. 20, June 28, 1952, p. 3.

[47] Radio Delhi, in English Morse to Asia and Australia, January 4, 1954, 0945 GMT-B.

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indulge in sheer double-talk when the situation requires it. In certain aspects of external relations, "when popular pressure compels the government to follow a 'progressive' policy," that is, a policy favorable to that of international communism, the CPI will support it. Hence, the party has backed Nehru's opposition to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, his advocacy of banning the atomic bomb, and his desire to seat communist China in the United Nations, and has supported his opposition to the Middle East Defense Organization. *Blitz*, a Communist-front publication, declared that "the international crisis arising from the US-Pak [Pakistan] military alliance makes an ALL-SUPPORT-TO-NEHRU policy imperative. . . ."[48] The pursuit of this policy by the CPI would have been impossible, had it been engaged in violent activities. With the Korean War and Nehru's subsequent advocacy of neutralism in the East-West conflict, the CPI policy shifted.[49]

The radical changes in the policy of the Indian Communist party are by no means unique; other Asian Communist parties have traveled the same tortuous path and for similar reasons. In 1948 the communist movements in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines attempted revolutionary seizures of power. The stress on armed struggle was increased after the Chinese Communist victory in 1949. In fact, in March 1950 the army of the Philippine Communists was renamed, after the Chinese Communist army, the People's Liberation Army. The Philippine Communists declared that their aim was to create a "New Democracy" on the Chinese pattern. These attempted risings all failed and the Communists, recognizing that their attempts to transplant artificially the Chinese tactics to their own countries were fruitless, shifted to the more flexible nationalistic tactic of the united front. In Burma the Communists are active in the Workers' and Peasants' party which demands formation of a coalition government. In Indonesia they have eschewed

[48] *Blitz*, January 2, 1954, p. 1; emphasis in original.

[49] Here again Masani's analysis falls short. He fails to consider the Soviet's desire not to antagonize and, if possible, to develop friendly relations with Nehru and the influence of this purpose on the policy of the CPI.

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violence and, through the united front tactic, have succeeded in getting a number of sympathetic members into the new government. The Communist parties of Indonesia and Burma, influenced by the desire of the Soviet Union to win the support of their newly independent governments, have adopted a "soft line". It is their hope that they will be able to discourage their governments from participating in anti-Communist regional groupings.

There has been one notable exception to the basic pattern—Indochina. Here, the Vietminh, taking advantage of widespread antipathy toward the French, has engaged in relentless guerrilla warfare in an attempt to expel the French.

* * * *

Despite the apparent shift in the Asian communist line, excepting Indochina, it would be a great mistake to assume that the Communists have renounced the use of violence. Even in India, where the Communists are seemingly devoted to parliamentary processes, the CPI has not disavowed violence. In the June 1951 "Policy Statement", the party declared:

> Even the most hardened liberal would now feel ashamed to maintain . . . that this Government . . . will ever allow us to carry out a fundamental democratic transformation in the country by parliamentary methods alone. Hence, the road that will lead us to freedom and peace, land and bread . . . is to be found elsewhere. . . .[50]

As to the question whether or not there will be armed struggle, the party stated that this was not the main question.

> Marxism and History have once and for all decided the question for the party and the people long ago. *All action of the masses in defence of their interests is sacrosanct. History sanctions all that the people decide to do that clears the lumber-load of decadence and reaction in their path to progress and freedom.*[51]

In October 1951 Ghosh declared that "the CPI does not create the illusion that it is possible—through the ballot-box alone—to establish a People's Democratic Government." He also

[50] *Cross Roads*, June 8, 1951, p. 3.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 6; italics in original.

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stated that the party "will fight . . . against all rejection of militant actions."[52]

It has recently been revealed that early in 1951 a commission of Indian Communists returned from Moscow with a new directive called the "Tactical Line". The first section of this document, entitled "Not Peaceful but Revolutionary Path", states that the main objectives of the CPI

> . . . cannot be realized by a peaceful parliamentary way. These objectives can only be realized through a revolution, through the overthrow of the present Indian State and its replacement by a People's Democratic State. . . .
>
> While resorting to all forms of struggle, including the most elementary forms, and while utilizing all legal possibilities for mobilizing the masses, . . . the Communist Party has always held that . . . the replacement of the present State upholding the imperialist order by a People's Democratic State is possible through the armed revolution of the people.[53]

The essence of Marxism-Leninism is, by definition, the extension of Communist power to all areas of the world. For this purpose, any and every tactic is required if it promises to be successful. In the words of Stalin, the object must always be "to put in the forefront precisely those forms of struggle and organization which are best suited to the conditions prevailing during the ebb or flow of the movement at a given moment."[54] The CPI's present policy of united front is a "form of struggle . . . best suited to the conditions prevailing" at the present time. With a change in the historical situation the policy will change. As stated by Sanzo Nozaka, a leading Japanese

[52] *For a Lasting Peace, For a People's Democracy*, October 19, 1951, No. 42 (154), pp. 2–3.

[53] *Communist Conspiracy in India* (Bombay, 1954), pp. 19–20, 35; see also Masani, *The Communist Party of India*, pp. 115–116. Though it is impossible to verify the veracity of this account, subsequent documents seem to confirm its accuracy. The June 1951 "Policy Statement" appears to be nothing more than a clever rehash of the "Tactical Line", following closely the analysis of the Moscow document, rephrasing wherever necessary for reasons of expediency and legality.

[54] Stalin, J., *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow, 1947), p. 75.

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Communist: "Although at times the possibility of a peaceful development of revolution may exist, peaceful revolution is no more than a change in tactics. With changing conditions, the approach must change."[55] As long as the chances for successful Communist insurrection remain small and as long as the vacillating foreign policy of Nehru remains an advantage to the Soviet Union the present policy will remain basically unaltered. However, if conditions change appreciably, a marked change in the policy of the Communist party of India can be expected.

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NEW YORK CITY

[55] Sanzo Nozaka, *Senryaku senjutsu no shomondai* (*Strategy and Tactics*) (Tokyo, 1949), p. 9; cited in Swearingen, R., and Langer, P., *Red Flag in Japan* (Cambridge, 1952), pp. 135–136.

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TOWARD A MODERN AMERICAN THEORY OF CHURCH-STATE RELATIONSHIPS

THE question of the relationship between religion and politics did not plague the ancient world, in which religion was civic religion, and largely polytheistic. But with the rise of Christianity in the Roman era, problems of the relationship between the Roman authorities and the Christian worshippers became inevitable, since Christianity could not be assimilated to emperor-worship, nor could the Christian God be allowed by His followers to enter the Roman pantheon. Complex problems of the relationship between religious and political authority have been with us ever since, and in modern times they have not been confined to Western Christian societies. The tension between the two seems to be endemic in the modern state, the form of which has by now spread over the world.

In the United States this problem, during most of the nineteenth century, was regarded as settled. But recent events indicate that it is still very much with us. The controversy over released-time religious education involves both local political authority and the Supreme Court of the United States. The proposals for federal aid to public education have bogged down partly because of religious complications. We presumably settled such issues by writing into the First Amendment and the state constitutions a principle usually called "separation of church and state". Obviously, however, the settlement did not work, if by settlement one means the elimination of controversy.

One result of these recent controversies has been a spate of publications which investigate church-state relationships from one angle or another. Such publications fall largely into three major classifications: Catholic apologetics,[1] defenses of the

[1] For instance, Christopher H. Dawson, *Religion and the Modern State* (New York, 1936); Robert C. Hartnett, *Equal Rights for Children* (New York, 1947); James M. O'Neill, *Religion and Education under the Constitution* (New York, 1949); Wilfrid Parsons, *The First Freedom* (New York, 1948); Heinrich A. Rommen, *The State in Catholic Thought* (St. Louis, 1945).

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principle of separation by controversialists,[2] and academic comment on court decisions.[3] There have also been a few major works investigating the principle from the historical or documentary standpoints.[4] However, to this writer's knowledge, there has been no recent American attempt to explore church-state relationships from the standpoint of political theory. This was last done, in a rather haphazard manner, by Madison and Jefferson. An attempt is made herein to construct—or, rather, to begin the construction of—a political theory of separation that is relevant to the conditions of modern America. The writer frankly favors separation, and he frankly looks at the problem as a political scientist: from the viewpoint of the welfare of the body politic, not that of any specific faith. The result is in no way definitive. It may, however, stimulate thought and discussion on a difficult and vexing problem.

I

Of the possible solutions of the problem of church-state relationships, several may be discarded immediately as having only slight relevance to American conditions. These are *pure theocracy* (in which the political power is held and exercised by

[2] For instance, Albert C. Dieffenbach, *Religious Liberty, the Great American Illusion* (New York, 1927); Ryllis C. Goslin, *Church and State*, Headline Books, No. 10 (New York, 1937); Sidney Hook, "The New Failure of Nerve", *Partisan Review*, X (Jan.-Feb. 1943), 2; Paul Hutchinson, *The New Leviathan* (Chicago, 1946); V. T. Thayer, *Religion in Public Education* (New York, 1947); Henry P. Van Dusen, *et al.*, *Church and State in the Modern World* (New York, 1937); Conrad H. Moehlman, *The Wall of Separation Between Church and State* (Boston, 1951).

[3] For instance, Edward S. Corwin, "The Supreme Court as National School Board", *Thought*, XXIII (December 1948), 665; A. W. Johnson and F. H. Yost, *Separation of Church and State in the United States* (Minneapolis, 1948); H. W. Barber, "Religious Liberty v. Police Power", *American Political Science Review*, XLI (April 1947); C. W. Summers, "The Sources and Limits of Religious Freedom", *Illinois Law Review*, XCI (May-July 1946); William G. Torpey, *Judicial Doctrines of Religious Rights in America* (Chapel Hill, 1948); Note, "Tracing the 'Wall': Religion in the Public Schools", *Yale Law Journal*, CVII (April 1948); Loren Beth, "The Wall of Separation and the Supreme Court", *Minnesota Law Review*, XXXVIII (February 1954).

[4] For instance, Evarts B. Greene, *Religion and the State* (New York, 1941); Leo Pfeffer, *Church, State and Freedom* (Boston, 1953); Anson Phelps Stokes, *Church and State in the United States* (New York, 1950).

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ecclesiastical authorities, as in the Vatican state); *mixed theocracy* (in which the government is subordinated to the church authorities); *total identification* (in which the church and state are coextensive geographically and have a complete identity of viewpoint); *total conflict* (a temporary situation in which both church and state claim complete control of human life and activity); and *Erastianism* (in which the state controls the church).

More relevant to the American experience are two other possible alternatives, *totalitarianism* and *total separation.* Totalitarianism has never existed in the United States, but modern trends in politics and social affairs throughout the world make it at least a danger to be recognized and avoided, while total separation—an impossible goal—has been set up by some extremists as a proper aim for America.

Totalitarianism has its basis in the creation of an omnipotent state, with the power to deny the right of any religion to exist, or at least to do so except on the state's own terms. This is essentially the situation in Russia, and was in Germany under Hitler. But totalitarian philosophy does not stop with the mere denial of religious rights. It has also its positive side; for the very word "totalitarian" implies an attempt to mold and control the total man—his soul and his character no less than his body and his economic activities. In the spirit of Hegel's dictum that the state is "the march of God on earth", the totalitarian philosophy envisages the state as a spiritual organism in which the citizen finds the entire meaning of life. The state does not deny religion—it is religion. The state is the object of reverence: it is the highest moral authority. Morality in its larger sense consists in total submission to the state, and, in detail, it exists only as defined by the state. It is the practically unanimous judgment of observers, therefore, that the Nazi state and the Communist dogma contain the main essentials of a religious faith, and that they consciously have attempted to substitute themselves for the traditional religions. In such states, of course, there can be no freedom of religion at all, much less any possibility of separation.

We should perhaps not be too hasty in our conclusion that

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this cannot happen in the United States; for, while it may be doubtful that revealed religion as we know it is necessary for the maintenance of moral standards in a political community,[5] it seems almost beyond doubt that if freedom is to exist in the community, some agency besides the state must be in a position to exert moral influence. The modern tendency to justify the church's existence primarily on the grounds of its necessity to morality is a dangerous one, for the position is open to grave attack. But once we recognize the fact that if the church were to disappear, one of the strongest bulwarks against the assumption by the state of *all* morality would be gone, we can proceed to justify the persistence of strong religious organizations as a necessity for freedom and a democratic political order. Democracy depends on the existence of groups within it which are in a position to criticize the state, not only on political but also on moral grounds. Strong religious groups are thus one symptom of a healthy democratic political life. We can well use the opposition between church and state in morality in the same way we use the opposition of the minority party to the administration in power politically.

It is commonplace to point out that all modern states have increased in power as a result of increasing industrialization and the wars of the twentieth century. It is likewise often pointed out that the increasing democracy which is a part of American history, combined with the growth of mass communications media, "scientific" propaganda, and the comparative failure of our school systems properly to prepare our mass citizenry for its rôle in democratic government, all lead in the direction of an increasing reliance on the state. This can easily be transformed into a belief in loyalty to the state as the only and all-consuming loyalty of human beings. The same trends of thought in other countries have produced a phenomenon sometimes called "totalitarian democracy"—totalitarianism based on mass enthusiasm and support, with suppression of competing social institutions.

[5] See, for arguments to this effect, Hook, *loc. cit.*, pp. 2 *et seq.*; Horace M. Kallen, "Churchmen's Claims on the Public School", *The Nation's Schools*, XXIX (May 1942), 50; Thayer, *op. cit.*, pp. 105–113; Harold J. Laski, *The American Democracy* (New York, 1948), p. 313.

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Separation of church and state, then, regardless of its other virtues, may be regarded as a major bulwark of the liberal democratic state as opposed to totalitarian democracy.[6]

The nature of government and of religion, however, and particularly the Christian religion, makes *total separation* a purely hypothetical situation. No state has ever achieved it, nor will any. Yet the idea has a certain significance, because it brings out a particular conception of what religion is or should be, because some leading thinkers have perceived only dimly its impossibility, and because today many writers on the subject assume its desirability and achievability.

Total separation of church and state assumes that religion is subjective and pietistic; but this view of religion is not typical of the Western world and certainly not of Christianity. There are, it is true, certain Christian sects which have approached this ideal, particularly some of the German pietistic sects and, at times, the Quakers. Christianity as a whole, however, has always attempted through the church organization to guide man's actions as well as his soul; for this reason it has inevitably come into conflict with the state, which must also concern itself with the overt expressions of human life. The subjective ideal of religion which might produce total separation would at the same time restrict the influence of organized religion to so small an area of human activity that it would cease to be a real force, if, indeed, it would permit organized religion at all.[7]

It is this fallacious concept of what religion is in our civilization which led Roger Williams, John Locke, and Jefferson dangerously close to the espousal of total separation. It is only in such a belief that Locke could write that "if each of them would contain itself within its own bounds—the one attending to the worldly welfare of the commonwealth, the other to the salvation of souls—it is impossible that any discord should ever have hap-

[6] For the concept of totalitarian democracy, see J. L. Talmon, *The Rise of Totalitarian Democracy* (Boston, 1952), pp. 1–13.

[7] See Robert I. Calhoun, "Church, State, and Human Devotion", in Van Dusen *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 47. *Cf.* John M. Mecklin, *The Story of American Dissent* (New York, 1934), p. 103.

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pened between them."[8] The whole argument of Roger Williams implies the same conviction; especially in his comparisons of the state and the church to a ship's crew and passengers does he seem to say that if only each would confine itself to its own sphere, peace would reign supreme.[9] Finally, Jefferson in his "wall of separation" metaphor is implicitly asserting a similar belief.[10]

Yet it must be granted that each of the trio saw, even if imperfectly, that what they were asking was impossible—that some conflicts were bound to occur even with the most rigid possible separation. Each admitted that the practice of some religious tenets might interfere with the peace and order of society, and that the state might demand things not permitted by the religion. It is significant that all three—even the personally fanatical Williams—gave the same answer to the problem posed by such a conflict: that the state must impose its standard. Williams, for instance, when faced with problems of religious license in Rhode Island Colony, invariably drew the line where disturbance of the civil peace began. The Rhode Island charter granted complete religious freedom, subject, however, to the qualification that citizens must behave themselves "peacablie and quietlie" without causing "lycentiousnesse and profanesse" or "civill injurye or outward disturbance of others."[11]

Similarly, Locke's refusal to tolerate Catholics and atheists was an implicit and significant recognition that religion and politics may and do conflict. He could not envisage a separation so far-reaching as to permit the practice of these beliefs, which he believed to be subversive of society. His comments on sacrifices, also, recognize the possibility of conflict, and here he explicitly gives the power of settlement to the state.

[8] John Locke, *A Letter Concerning Toleration*, ed. by Charles I. Sherman (New York, 1937), p. 220; *cf.* p. 184.

[9] Roger Williams, *The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution*, etc., ed. by Edward B. Underhill (London, 1848), pp. 322–326, 342.

[10] Thomas Jefferson, *Writings*, ed. by H. A. Washington (New York, 1854), VIII, 113.

[11] *Records of Rhode Island*, II, 1.

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> But if peradventure such were the state of things that the interest of the commonwealth required all slaughter of beasts should be forborne for some while . . . who sees not that the magistrate, in such a case, may forbid all his subjects to kill any calves for any use whatsoever?[12] But those things that are prejudicial to the commonweal of a people in their ordinary use, and are therefore forbidden by laws, those things ought not to be permitted to Churches in their sacred rites.[13]

And Jefferson, in his "wall of separation" letter, ended by averring that the civil authorities could interfere if the civil peace was disturbed: if, as he put it, the religious practices "break out into overt acts against peace and good order."[14]

Thus even the most uncompromising advocates of separation of church and state have realized—perhaps unconsciously—that *total* separation, in the sense of absolute elimination of the possibility of conflict, was impossible, however desirable they may have thought it. Whether or not it would be possible in the non-Christian East, where quietistic religions exist, is a question which need not concern us. Christianity as well as the state claims the right to control the acts of men. Separation is an important principle not because it ends conflict, but because it minimizes it. Such separation we may call *partial separation*—the theory to be advocated in this paper.

2

Any attempt to construct a theory of church-state relations, from the standpoint of the political philosopher, must guard against two major assumptions: that his theory can be arrived at apart from a general theory of what the state is and what the church is; and that any church or any religion can be assumed to hold all religious truth. On the other hand, he must equally try not to assume either that *no* church holds any religious truth or that *no* religious truth exists. The political philosopher, *as* political philosopher, is qualified to construct a theory of the state, but he is not a theologian and is in no position to judge

[12] Locke, *op. cit.*, p. 198.

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 199.

[14] Jefferson, *op. cit.*

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of either the existence or the value of religious truth.[15] This statement is made in the full knowledge that such complete ethical neutrality is impossible. All men, theologians or not, who have studied philosophy and politics are bound to have personal views as to the relations of man and the world to the supernatural. No man can be completely objective; we are all participants in life's drama. There is no audience, no critic, except one who shares the faults of the players because he is also one of them.

The concept of "state", while it seems to have been indispensable in modern political theory, must always be recognized as no more than a concept if the student is a believer in democracy. No one has ever seen a state; it cannot be described, as a government or a church or a labor union can. It should also be kept in mind that the traditional connection of the theories of state and sovereignty, which was begun by Bodin, has no meaning in a democracy and has led many democratic thinkers astray. As a consequence, some recent writers have suggested that we cannot use the state concept at all in a democratic society—that it has no relevance.[16] Others retain the state but distinguish sharply between different kinds of states—a semantic device which has practically the same effect.[17] It is not necessary here to enter into this controversy; it is sufficient that we realize that throughout the ensuing discussion, unless specifically labeled otherwise, the term "state" means the *democratic* state, and particularly the *constitutionally limited* democratic state.

There has, further, been a widespread tendency in political theory to confuse the state with the government, on the one hand, and with the society (community) on the other. We must begin therefore by denying that the state is society or that government is the state.

If we accept Robert M. MacIver's definition of the state as "men organized under government", and add his qualification

[15] The same can be said for the statesman.

[16] For instance, Carl J. Friedrich, *The New Belief in the Common Man* (Boston, 1942), pp. 43–59, 79.

[17] See A. D. Lindsay, *The Modern Democratic State* (New York, 1947), I, 27.

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that this is only one particular institution among many,[18] we shall avoid confusing the state with society. The state, in short, is merely one of the manifestations of human social life. It cannot, under this definition, embrace all of the community's activity. This is the fundamental difference between the totalitarian and democratic concepts of the state. Since it is only one phase of social activity, for one set of purposes among many, the loyalties of human beings cannot be wholly absorbed by it. The democratic state cannot be totalitarian.

The definition of the state as one social organization necessarily means that there must be others, of which the church is one of the most important. Here MacIver's fruitful concept of the "multi-group" society is relevant.[19] In short, this concept is that men always live in groups, and that most men belong to more than one group—state, family, business, club, church, city, social set, and so on. No one of these groups, moreover, can absorb all the rest, or wholly control the social life of man. Men do not live exclusively for any one group.[20]

In addition, MacIver's theory assumes that no man is completely absorbed in society itself; each always remains to some extent an individual with some autonomy in (at least) thought and motivation. His life in any group has personal aims and personal meaning as well as social; even in religion he seeks personal satisfaction (salvation). And the aims of the group, if attained, are enjoyed not by the group but by the individuals composing it.

Put into moral terms, this means that neither the state, nor even the more inclusive community itself, is absolute; for they have life only in the individuals who form them. Morality as an absolute is not a community concept any more than it is a state concept. The community is a sort of coöperative attempt to reach ultimate morality—it does not embody it.

[18] R. M. MacIver, *Leviathan and the People* (University, La., 1939), pp. 29, 72.

[19] R. M. MacIver, *The Web of Government* (New York, 1947), pp. 410 *et seq.*

[20] Since this analysis is particularly concerned with the United States, the author sees no point in considering whether MacIver's multi-group theory is universally valid.

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The idea of a multi-group society may seem to run counter to the prevailing theory that political stability requires unity (sometimes called "basic consensus"). Without denying that some unifying idea is needed for the maintenance of the political community, it may be doubted that this requirement is as important as has sometimes been assumed. As Carl J. Friedrich has pointed out, all Americans do not agree on the meaning of democracy itself, which is certainly a fundamental.[21] In fact, it seems more likely that democratic society assumes a certain amount of *lack* of agreement; it is only totalitarian states which find it necessary to insist on agreement. This is particularly true in the field of religion. No one will deny that religion is fundamental, or at least that it has been fundamental in all civilizations so far. Yet insistence on agreement in religion in Western history has led only to conflict and even to revolution. Only when men could "agree to disagree" in religion was the rise of democratic freedom in England possible. For our purposes this is all we need to establish. It indicates that no democratic society can insist on religious unity, that such insistence breeds only conflict, and that in the modern world religious unity is not a prerequisite for political unity. Such religious unity as exists must be voluntary.

This is only to say that no state can entirely reconcile all the conflicts within it; in the democratic state the attempt to do so can lead only to the loss of democracy. In religion the allowance by the state of a free play of opinion is necessary for the maintenance of democracy. Not only would enforced unity destroy the democratic state, it would render the religion sterile; for religion, like most "voluntary" activities,[22] depends largely upon spontaneity for its vitality. Religious differences exist in any modern multi-group society, and they are largely irreconcilable.

The really vital religious groups in our history have been those

[21] *Op. cit.*, p. 153; but *cf.* Rommen, *op. cit.*, pp. 276 *et seq.*, for a somewhat contrary view.

[22] Voluntary in the sense that there is no compulsion to belong to any particular sect, or espouse any particular belief; one is not born into a church in the same sense as one is born into a state, and the church can expel a member as punishment, which the modern state cannot generally do.

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which were opposed to government control, not those which were allied with government. The teeming nonconformist groups produced the English civil war; much of the early fervor of New England stemmed from its opposition to the established Anglican church; and the rapid growth of the sects forced toleration and was important in bringing separation of church and state to the United States. On the other hand, the established churches were always on the defensive and losing ground, and this was particularly true of the Congregational church in New England after 1700 and the Anglican church in Virginia and other colonies.[23]

It was such opposition by dissenting religious groups to the autocratic governments of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which played a major rôle in bringing about the birth of the democratic state. Churches closely allied with government were never on the side of democracy; the long fight for life by persecuted faiths went hand in hand with the rise of more democratic governments.[24] For religion, then, freedom is more important than uniformity under modern world conditions. As Heinrich A. Rommen points out, the test of a good state is not the degree of homogeneity that exists within it, for that would be to make totalitarianism ideal. This is also the argument that Aristotle brings against Plato's *Republic:* Plato's proposals, first, cannot achieve the objective of unity; and, second, unity in itself is not a valid end for a political association.[25] The objective should be to allow as much freedom as possible, and have only as much homogeneity as necessary. Men have many loyalties, and these loyalties do not necessarily cause dangerous conflict; the good government bends its efforts to avoiding such conflicts.[26]

[23] There is extensive documentation of this point in the many historical researches on the church-state problem during the colonial and revolutionary periods.

[24] Both of these points are analyzed at some length in the author's "Church and State in American Political Theory", unpublished dissertation (University of Chicago, 1949), pp. 109–176.

[25] *Politics* (Barker ed.), pp. 40 *et seq.*

[26] Rommen, *op. cit.*, p. 280; and see MacIver, *Web of Government*, pp. 182–184; Friedrich, *op. cit.*, p. 161; Lindsay, *op. cit.*, p. 265.

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Thus we posit a limited democratic state, limited as any democratic state must be, by the three facts that (1) it must recognize and permit the existence of other groups in society which may be as fundamental to that society as it is; (2) it cannot under any circumstances fill all the needs of its individual citizens; and (3) it depends on the free play of opinion for its own maintenance.

3

Any attempt to establish a well-grounded theory of separation depends to a large extent on a judgment as to what church and religion are and what functions they fulfill in society. In this attempt the author has tried to restrict himself to the factual position of the Christian churches in Western history, particularly in the United States. Recourse has been had mainly to churchmen's own ideas of the church; sociological study has of necessity been minimized.

The fact that religion is not purely a subjective experience of the individual has already been indicated. From the further conclusion that no individual completely loses his identity in any of his group associations, it also follows that it is not purely social.[27] Religion is both an individual experience and a social relationship, characteristics which the statesman and the political thinker must take into account. It suggests that the designation of our problem as "church and state" is somehow incomplete and misleading, for it makes no reference to the position of the individual. Our conflict is not merely between two institutions, but between two sides of the individual—the political and the religious.

The church may be regarded as the institutional and social manifestation of religion. As such, it has social rights, just as has any other basic social association. The problem is complicated, however, by the fact that the individual also has rights in religion which may sometimes conflict with those of the group. This problem becomes especially difficult in our secular society because of the large numbers of citizens who are attached to no

[27] This subject is discussed in some detail from the sociological and anthropological points of view in Joachim Wach, *Sociology of Religion* (Chicago, 1944), pp. 27–34; and see the numerous references therein cited.

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religious group. If all citizens were members of one church, or even of *some* church, we could perhaps assume that their rights in religion were to some extent given up to the church, or at least expressed through the church organization. In other words, under such conditions the institutional right would tend to be maximized while the individual right would be somewhat minimized. But when many persons individually retain all of their religious beliefs and rights, there tends to be at least an equality of right between the religious group and the unaffiliated individual, with the possibility of frequent conflict.

It has been said with some justice that separation in the United States has endowed the churches with freedom to the detriment of *individual* religious liberty.[28] It seems, however, that this is due, not to law or governmental act, but to a generally intolerant attitude in this country toward free-thinking—an intolerance perhaps stemming from the American reaction to the excesses of the French Revolution, and the long-standing connection in the public mind between religious and political radicalism. It does not seem as likely that this predominance of the organized form of religion is generic with separation; but American politics undeniably give great power to any organized group which is in a position to exert effective political pressure.

To the theologian or philosopher, the church stands for a moral position, which it claims is higher than that of the state. A believer in either natural law or God would perforce concede that such a higher morality exists, and even though he might not conclude that the church is the representative of the higher morality, he would be unlikely to affirm that the state is. This leads us to an important conclusion regarding the positions of state and church. The state—at least the democratic state—does not represent or enforce absolute morality (a statement that even the complete moral relativist would accept). Whether or not the church does, is not determinative of the conclusion

[28] Francesco Ruffini, *Religious Liberty*, trans. by J. Parker Heyes (New York, 1912), pp. 511–514; and see Dieffenbach, *op. cit.*, *passim*. This does not mean, of course, that all churches are internally authoritarian; it means merely that separation has worked to the advantage of *institutionalized* rather than *individual* religion.

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that in such a state there must be some standard other than that of the state itself. If there were no other morality (absolute or relative, as you will) the state would be in the absurd position of willy-nilly formulating and enforcing a morality which all agree is not absolute, and which could not be judged by reference to any other standard. This would be the essence of totalitarianism, not democracy.

In this view the church, as the representative of a morality other than that of the state, occupies a crucial position in society. If it represents absolute morality, and infallibly, it provides a definite standard by which to judge the morality of the state and the actions of the state; if it represents merely *another* standard of morality, it still provides a necessary alternative to the state's course of action. Democracy depends greatly on the existence of such an alternative, and on the maintenance of the freedom of the citizenry to choose this alternative in preference to that of the state.

It is true that modern multi-group society contains many different groups which also can provide alternative policy choices. Political parties are the most obvious and important examples. Yet this fact does not eliminate the importance of the church, for a multiplicity of alternatives is needed—if for no other reason than to avoid the polarity of two alternatives and the consequent labeling of one as white or pure, the other as black or sinful. Then too, the political parties often represent mere choices between political expedients rather than real moral alternatives; and the political actions fostered by the parties are those of compromise rather than moral choice. In a democracy such nonmoral compromise is a necessity,[29] but moral choice is also necessary for human beings. The political party, then, provides a vehicle for *political* choice opposing the government

[29] Because morals cannot be invoked to settle issues involving a dispute as to what the morals should be. Political action in a democracy therefore consists in creating "from contradictory claims an ideal that will satisfy both, or at least not leave either dissatisfied enough to prefer insurrection to acquiescence." This means, however, that basic issues which cannot be compromised must be left strictly alone by politicians, which is what the First Amendment seeks to ensure and what the present author is trying to prove desirable. See T. V. Smith, *The Legislative Way of Life* (Chicago, 1940), p. 28 and *passim*.

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in power; the church provides a means of *moral* choice. The existence of this alternative to the state has historically given liberty its chance to grow, through the maintenance of an organization in society which can oppose the state.[30]

For the church to maintain its position as the moral critic of the state, independence is required. By being subject to, or closely identified with, the state, it loses its own freedom to criticize, in the same way in which a British cabinet member, by remaining in the cabinet, relinquishes his right to oppose cabinet policies publicly. The church thus needs separation if it is to fulfill its *moral* function in the modern democratic state. The only other possibility would be the supremacy of the church over the state in the moral realm; but this is impossible and undesirable unless (1) everyone belongs to the same church and (2) the church's voice is morally infallible. The first condition is patently lacking in modern America or elsewhere in the world; the second, in view of the many religious beliefs in the state and the frequent disagreements between them, cannot be assumed by any conscientious statesman in his public capacity. Church supremacy, subjection, or identity—all are alike impossible under modern conditions.

The church is a free fellowship; it may formulate its own creed and determine and conduct its own organization; it may select and expel its own members. It may *not* exercise any control over anyone except its members, make its membership a requirement for any civil rights, or use legal compulsion of any kind. Nor may it require, in the name of religion, the state to observe its particular moral beliefs.

4

With this theory of the state and of the church in mind, we may proceed to that of separation itself, with the hope that it may be firmly grounded in the political and religious realities of American life.

The state is a fundamental expression of human life in society, but, as we have seen, other social groups are no less so. These other social groupings, because of their fundamental quality,

[30] See Lindsay, *op. cit.*, p. 60.

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have certain minimum rights which a democratic state can abrogate only at the price of ending its democratic existence. Chief among these is, of course, the right of existence; another is the right of free expression. The churches, as they are members of this group of free societies, partake of these rights. No democratic government can attempt to do away with them or with their exercise of their own forms of religious expression.

This, however, is only part of the story. Human beings as individuals—that is, without consideration as members of free associations—have rights also, which may be considered as in a sense more basic than the rights of groups. Certainly there is this added right of an individual: the right to join free associations, which stems from his own right of free expression as well as the right of the associations to exist.

These rights of individuals point to a fundamental reason why, in a democratic state, the state and the church must be as separate as possible. If the citizen has a right to join a voluntary group, he has the coördinate right to refrain from joining it, and the right to leave it after he has joined it. If these rights be granted, it follows that no church, in theory (whatever may be the case in practice), can be coextensive with the state, for there are always either actual or potential nonmembers. Therefore, the state cannot in line with its function of espousing the common good recognize and advance any church officially, since in so doing it would not be working for the common good but rather for the good of a particular group which was actually or potentially smaller than the population of the state.

It is obvious then that the theory of separation assumes that only the state is composed of the same individuals that compose the social community. Only the state can therefore be regarded as a compulsory organization. Here arises the distinction between the state and the church. A child is born into a state—a fact which may not be changed: he is fated to live in a political society. The state, to be a state, must have legal jurisdiction over every person within its borders. The church, on the other hand, cannot in theory be composed of all the citizens, since any of them have the right to withdraw or refuse to join. The outstanding fact of the modern day is that no one can escape

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political authority, for he leaves one state's jurisdiction only to enter that of another. This is obviously not true of the church nor of any other organized grouping of men in society.[31]

Separation of church and state thus flows in theory from the distinction between a universal and a particular organization, which in turn gives rise to the distinction between compulsory and voluntary.[32] The facts of American life have borne out this theory. At no time, obviously, have all Americans belonged to *the* church or *any* church. Thus it is not only theoretically a breach of democratic principle but empirically unwise and impossible for the state to ally itself with the church.[33]

It will be said by some, however, that the church is of divine

[31] As a corollary the state becomes incapable of deciding what is religious truth, since both the many religious associations and those individuals not belonging to any of them have the right to believe as they in conscience desire. Theoretically, truth in religion becomes, for the state, what each citizen or church believes it to be. This is bulwarked by the fact that religious truth, however true it may be, is not susceptible of proof in the ordinary manner. A scientific truth may be proved in such a manner that continued disbelief only makes one ridiculous; but theological truth may be disbelieved without such an effect. In fact, an attempt to prove it is merely likely to stir up an attempt to disprove it which may be just as convincing theologically as the original proof. This is a characteristic also shared by philosophy. The controversy over whether or not the world is round has been settled because the proofs convinced everyone; but the dispute over the Trinity has not, because its truth or falsity cannot be empirically proved. This does not mean that the Trinity is not as true as the sphericity of the earth, but only that its truth cannot be proved in a way that will convince one who does not wish to be convinced. See J. B. Bury, *History of Freedom of Thought* (New York, 1913), p. 17; A. N. Holcombe, *Foundations of the Modern Commonwealth* (New York, 1923), pp. 117–125. Also note Justice Jackson's discerning dissent in *U. S. v. Ballard*, 332 U. S. 78 (1944).

[32] See Lindsay, *op. cit.*, p. 209. This is a restatement of St. Optatus' fourth-century view that the church is in the state rather than vice versa. *Cf.* C. H. McIlwain, *Growth of Political Thought in the West* (New York, 1932), p. 164.

[33] The Catholic church accepts separation as an expedient in such circumstances; Rommen, *op. cit.*, pp. 600, 603–605. But I reject Rommen's contention that separation is merely a political expedient rather than a philosophical principle. My view is that the state is, as shown above, intrinsically incapable of judging religious truth; the religious equality implied in the separation principle is thus necessary not because all religions are actually equal but because the state is no fit judge. In support of Rommen's statement of Catholic principle, see two other Catholic writers: Wilfrid Parsons, *op. cit.*, pp. 103–104, and J. Maritain, *The Rights of Man and Natural Law*, trans. by Doris Anson (New York, 1943), pp. 26–27.

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institution and thus holds a moral authority which distinguishes it from a "voluntary" organization.[34] This argument assumes, it seems, two things which cannot be accepted by the statesman in his public capacity, whatever he may privately believe. First, it assumes that the church's moral authority extends even to those who reject its very claim to that authority. To exercise this authority, therefore, would be to deny the individual the freedoms which have been previously established. Second, it assumes the church's own infallibility, for only if its moral judgments are infallible can its moral authority be morally binding.[35] If the church could err, for men to obey it when it did would be for them to sin, in the view of God.[36] A democratic state cannot accept any religious pronouncement as infallible; for to do so would be the very negation of democracy, particularly when, as often happens, the majority of the citizens do not accept either the theory of infallibility or the infallibility of any particular church or any particular judgment.

The state is bound to regard all churches, all religious beliefs, as equal, not only with each other, but with individuals who believe in *no* religion; for if the state cannot judge what is spiritually true, it certainly can no better judge what is false.

If the church be not infallible it cannot claim that its moral judgments should by right be enforced by the state, for it is not then responsible for them to God, to its own members, or in any way to the nation's people. Only the assumption of infallibility can give its moral judgments any political value beyond their intrinsic merit from the political point of view.[37]

[34] See Rommen, *op. cit.*, p. 571.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 579; *cf.* Pope Pius XI, "Encyclical Letter on the Christian Education of Youth", January 11, 1930, *Current History*, XXXI (March 1930), 1093.

[36] Even though the church be regarded as divine it cannot be accepted that the mantle of divinity extends to the individuals who compose it. To the state it must ever remain an institution composed of fallible human beings. Thus even though a citizen may subject himself ecclesiastically to a church, he cannot in conscience do so politically; particularly, as John M. Figgis points out, because in so doing he would be acting for the good of a particular group rather than for the common good. See Figgis, *op. cit.*, pp. 113–135; *cf.* Maritain, *op. cit.*, pp. 26–27.

[37] See Sidney Hook, "The New Failure of Nerve", *loc. cit.*, p. 23; as one writer says, "the relativity which we try to get rid of when we proclaim the authority

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It may be objected at this point that religion is necessary for the common good, and that the state's recognition of religion, and promotion of it, are actually for the public good even though many in the public do not think so. This position, however, seems to me to beg the question; for even though it be conceded that religion is a necessity for the maintenance of social stability and morality, that would still not answer the question as to what *kind* of religion, nor would it provide a reason for government action. After all, there are many kinds of activity which are good for society, but democratic governments cannot be expected to promote or regulate all of them, and still remain democratic. Democracy must always leave a large area of private voluntary activity even in things which are considered desirable or necessary from the public standpoint. If for no other reason, this is because, ordinarily, voluntary activities are more vital and enthusiastic than directed ones.

Additionally, it seems fairly clear that for the government to aid religion in a general sense would involve political authorities in wholly needless controversies over definition. What is a religion? Can the term include ethical culture societies? Masonic organizations? Cults, such as "I AM"? Spiritualism? To raise such questions is to conclude almost automatically that the state should be left free from such affairs, both for our protection and for its own welfare.

Much of the opposition to official neutrality seems to stem from the common belief that neutrality is the same as opposition.[38] The Biblical phrase, "He that is not with me is against me", is often quoted in this connection. Whether neutrality actually amounts to hostility, however, depends largely on circumstances; and the circumstances for such a situation probably do not exist in the United States. In practice, neutrality more often gives the impression of *support of the status quo*. If most people are Christians, probably most schoolteachers are also, and, if so, their influence, even without formal religious

of the moral law slips in the back door again when we turn to the task of applying it." Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, p. 167; see also p. 181.

[38] For example, Wilber G. Katz, "Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality", *University of Chicago Law Review*, vol. 20, No. 3 (Spring 1953), pp. 426–440.

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education, will inevitably be on the side of the churches. Nor does the objection that in university philosophy departments neutrality amounts to the freedom only to teach irreligion stand up under analysis. There is no reason at all why universities cannot hire philosophers who are Christians as well as those who are not. The fact that state universities do not give courses in Christianity does not, therefore, mean that Christianity must be unmentionable or even neutrally treated by individual teachers.

The state, therefore, limited as we have seen, is the only agency which expresses the political will of at least a majority of the citizenry. Since this is so, and since the decisions of a democratic state can be reversed by the use of the democratic processes which are open to churches and their members as they are to anyone else, it seems logical and necessary that in cases in which there is conflict between church and state, the organs of the state must assume the responsibility (however onerous) and the right to decide the issue.[39]

No one, of course, questions the right of a church or any other voluntary group to demand of its members adherence to its standards of moral conduct and its creed. The church can therefore forbid members to drink or to teach evolution on pain of excommunication. It is the right to enforce such ideas on the general populace which is in question. There would be no issue if the people as a whole accepted the particular standard, but in such a case there would be little need for the churches to make special efforts to secure legislation. For instance, monogamy is universally enforced in this country because it is generally accepted as being right, not because it is espoused by the Christian churches (although there is an obvious connection). Conversely, the prohibition amendment failed because large numbers of people did not accept the standard which the churches sought to enforce.

Direct political action is barred to the churches by the separation theory. Organized religion is restricted to influence over society brought to bear through influence on its own membership, not through direct political pressure. The Catholic writer Luigi Sturzo recognizes this when he says that the power of the

[39] See Holcombe, *op. cit.*, p. 287.

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church today is not expressed in control of the state, but in "spiritual power over the faithful as individuals".[40] The church works indirectly on the state through the Christian ideals of its members.

This conclusion results from the separation doctrine that in theory the church is never universal within any state. It is strongly reinforced by the fact that no church is *actually* universal or even nearly so, in the modern United States. Whatever the ideal situation in the mind of the religious man, this fact must be accepted at least for the present. "On what ground can we expect the government of a country in which half the people are not even nominally Christians, to lay down policies which are specifically related to Christianity?"[41] This is an unpleasant fact for many Christians, but it must nevertheless be faced.

> . . . as members of the State we have to think and to vote for what is the wisest course in a nation of which many of the Christians refuse to submit to our discipline, and many are not Christian at all. As citizens we have no right or claim to appeal to motives specifically Christian, or to lay down lines of policy which have no meaning except from the standpoint of the . . . Church.[42]

Thus both theory and actuality deprive the church of the right to enforce her beliefs through legislation. As John M. Figgis wisely concludes: ". . . the business of Christians is with the moral standard of their own society church and with themselves as its members. The raising of that will gradually bring about the elevation of the great mass of those who do not belong to it."[43]

If the state remains within the limits outlined above, as it must if democracy is to be retained, it can do no harm to the church and can be a positive protection of both church and individual rights. As the McCollum and Zorach cases illustrate,

[40] Luigi Sturzo, *Church and State* (New York, 1939), p. 547; Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 183 *et seq.*

[41] Cavert, "Points of Tension Between Church and State in America Today", in Van Dusen, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 182.

[42] Figgis, *op. cit.*, p. 113.

[43] *Ibid.*, p. 130; *cf.* Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 185 *et seq.*

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the state in exercising this responsibility must often draw a tenuous line between the rights of the individual and those of the religious association, but, as Francesco Ruffini points out, the organization does not ordinarily lose by this process. If anything, organized groups gain at the expense of individual rights. In any case, if our argument has been sound, the state has no choice but to make the decision. As long as the remedial processes of democracy remain open, and the state protects the rights of minorities both individual and associated, the churches cannot complain of injustice. It is likely that any weakness of the church under such conditions will be the fault of the social environment and of the churches themselves, not that of the operation of the separation principle.[44]

On the contrary, it is probable that the church can actually gain from separation. It can thus be free to perform its "personal" function of preparing individuals for salvation without interference from the state. It is thus left free to perform its "social" function as moral critic of state and society without being forced to degrade itself to the support of the lower morality of state or society. It is also left free to propagandize in its own cause and its own way, to teach its members as it wishes without governmental direction, to proselyte for new members, to impose upon its members such discipline as it believes in and can enforce, and in general to conduct itself with a liberty that has been gained by no state church.

The individual gains in separation by the freedom from compulsion of his own religious conscience and of his religious actions. If to mere separation be added a genuine spirit of tolerance in the society, this legal freedom is enhanced by an actual social liberty which is the right of every social being.

Finally, the state gains undeniably from a policy of separation. It is thus relieved of the burden of attempting to do that of which it is generically incapable: judging of religious truth. It is relieved of the necessity of upholding a belief which many or most of its citizens may deny. It is relieved of a tremendous number of the disputes which require either a decision or an

[44] Winthrop S. Hudson, *The Great Tradition of the American Churches* (New York, 1953), Foreword.

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acceptance of the church's decision. Such relief leads to a lessening of conflict in an absolute sense; the democratic structure also renders such conflicts as still may arise less explosive, for the intense antagonisms which religious controversy may generate cannot easily focus against the state and thus do not so readily lead to violent reactions against it. In a sense a democratic state may be regarded simply as the institutionalization of change. The only universally accepted requirement in the way of belief is a belief in the method of democracy.[45] The state gains stability, not by the uniform acceptance of certain "fundamentals", but rather by faith in a method which can adapt itself not only to differences in such beliefs but also to changes in them. Separation is necessary to the democratic state, for it assures that the state can survive religious change; it is tied to no religious orthodoxy, truth, or organization which may lose its hold on the people. The decline of the religious motive in American society is not due to separation but to this precise difference between the democratic state and the church: for the church has proved unable, so far, in the opinion of many, to adapt itself to the great social and economic changes of the last century.[46] It is well for the state that it has been largely unhindered by the churches in its own faltering efforts at adaptation.

It is to the self-interest of the state, as well as to that of the church and the individual, to uphold as strictly as possible the separation principle. For much of the life of democracy depends on the existence of legitimate opposition to governmental courses of action. Only through such opposition, and the publicity given to suggested alternatives, is the public enabled to study intelligently the issues with which it is confronted. The moral—and perhaps often practical—alternatives advanced by the churches can be provided only by a church which is legally and morally free of the government. The

[45] Friedrich, *op. cit.*, p. 153.

[46] See Mecklin, *op. cit.*, pp. 341–371, for a spirited indictment of the Protestant churches on this count; and the Lynds' Middletown studies for a sociological study, especially *Middletown in Transition* (New York, 1937), pp. 295–318. Also the recent criticism of the churches by Winthrop S. Hudson, *op. cit.*

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church's freedom to oppose the government is inevitably lessened by every favor it accepts or begs.

There is a final reason why from the church's standpoint she cannot be closely allied with the state. We have already seen that the church does not contain all the citizens of the state, and that therefore she does not have jurisdictional rights coextensive with those of the state. But there is an added factor which must be taken into account as long as national states exist. For religion—especially the Christian religion (and the Catholic church particularly)—is not only inter-national but supra-national. The ecumenical movement of even the Protestant faiths transcends national boundaries. An international church cannot ally itself with any of the states in which it exists. To do so is to invite its own destruction. The divisions, north and south, of the great Protestant churches of America, which are only today being eliminated, were caused by just such identification with the political positions of the Union and the Confederacy. Perhaps the greatest strength of the Roman Catholic church has been its determination to avoid any such identification, as indicated by its insistence on the maintenance of the Vatican City as an independent territorial base. Catholics could fight for Germany, Italy, or the Allied nations without destroying either their own religious membership or the fabric of the church itself. Protestants find this question particularly trying, especially when as citizens of a colonial Power they go as missionaries to one of its restive colonies. For Protestant churches have had a tendency to identify themselves with the nations in which they exist—a tendency which has been damaging to them individually (particularly the Lutheran churches) and to Christianity in general.[47]

Conversely, it is apparently unwise for the state to ally itself closely with a church that is international, thus raising the old (and in the modern world largely fallacious) fear of control of the state by some foreign religious leader.

In cases of actual conflict between church and state, in which the state as of right makes a decision, it cannot be assumed, of course, that the actual decision will be right, either politically

[47] See Hutchinson, *op. cit.*, pp. 68 *et seq.*

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or morally. There may even be extreme cases when disobedience is a moral duty of the church or the individual. But this does not and cannot derogate from the right of the state to make the decision. The choice of disobedience, even though inspired by duty, is not a right in the political sense; he who disobeys must be willing to take the consequences of his disobedience. If, in the circumstances, he can successfully, by revolt or appeal to popular sentiment, force a change in the decision, well and good. But if he is not successful in so doing, he must suffer the penalty. This may sound somewhat Hobbesian; yet it is in reality only to assert that the individual or group does not have the right to disobey as it pleases. Political order requires general obedience.[48] The problem as to when morality requires disobedience—when Christ must be placed before Caesar—is the most serious problem confronting the religious man. But, as Locke so admirably stated, it does not arise nearly so often in a society where church and state are separated as it does where they are not.

It should be almost needless to add that this theory of separation assumes the existence of a fundamental social unity which unites all men regardless of religious belief. "Whether a man be an Anglican, a presbyterian, a congregationalist, a Catholic, a Jew, or even an atheist, he is a *socius;* and whatever his particular way of salvation, it must be accommodated to the requirements of the social order."[49]

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[48] See Lindsay, *op. cit.*, p. 210.

[49] R. B. Perry, *Puritanism and Democracy* (New York, 1944), p. 349.

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REVIEWS

Academic Freedom: An Essay in Definition. By RUSSELL KIRK. Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1955.—210 pp. $3.75.

The key to this book is its subtitle, which shows the purpose to be logical analysis, not history or a current survey. From this it should not be inferred that the author has no message for our time; much less that his temper is even. Defining academic freedom as security against all hazards to the Academy's pursuit of Truth, Professor Kirk correctly perceives that the hazards are created from within, by professors who do not seek the Truth, but seek security, "fatter salaries" and the "right to doze". Aware that academic freedom derives from the special immunities of the medieval cleric and his university, Professor Kirk properly refuses to subsume it under modern laic freedoms, or to seek its justification in positive law or the people's will. Above all, knowing that nothing, not even reckless Congressional investigations, threatens academic freedom more than the modern universities' own lack of dignity, he argues with good effect that it is necessary "to give teachers some respect for themselves; to teach the students some respect for their calling and for learning itself; and to remind the college administrators that they are not really industrialists, but members of the clerisy" (p. 178). In arguing out his postulates, the author sometimes finds important truths.

Unfortunately, more often the path of his logic cuts through air, and carries him out to absurdity, or back to his starting-point prejudices. When he asks why professors are not sufficiently dedicated to their calling, why they are not passionate to be free, he concludes that it is the fault of the pragmatists, the doctrinaire secularists and liberals, who, in undermining Christian Truth, have substituted Demos for God, destroyed the academic's sense of mission, and reduced the professor to a servant's status. Here history should have tempered logic. If he had felt the friction of facts, he would not have moved so fast; he would have had to acknowledge that academic servilities predated the lucubrations of John Dewey; he would have known that the old denominational college, though firm in its Christian convictions, held professors to the tasks and afforded them the low esteem of student wardens and nursemaids; he would have had to account for the sleepy scholasticism of the German universities before theology was successfully challenged by skeptical philosophy and science. Once again, under no compulsion to follow the contours of

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history, the author flies into fancy with the statement that "the medieval universities did indeed enjoy academic freedom, in a larger measure, probably, than any academies before or since" (pp. 16–17). He adds that this freedom was achieved, not *despite* the prescribed framework of Christian doctrine in which they operated, but actually *because* of it. The subject is complex: but that this is a mixture of truth, hyperbole and error is almost too apparent. It is quite true that the medieval universities enjoyed an admirable measure of corporate autonomy. But this autonomy demanded internal discipline which could be achieved only at the expense of individual independence. Moreover, the external freedom of the medieval university owed much more to the decentralization of medieval society (a factor Professor Kirk does not mention) than to the acceptance of a framework of doctrine, which heroic strategists from Abelard to Pomponazzi deftly redesigned or evaded. There is more than a core of truth in Gilson's statement (quoted with approval by the author) that "where there is no dogmatism, there can be tolerance, because there is nothing to tolerate." This is not the same thing as saying that where there is a single authoritative dogma, there one will find the highest degree of tolerance.

The historical errors in this book are matched at times with logical infirmities. This reviewer has read and reread but still cannot reconcile the statement on page 117 that "legislative bodies have a right to try to prevent members of the community of scholars who abuse their privileges from corrupting the whole body of scholars and the nation at large" with the statement on page 140 that "the problems of subversion and indoctrination in the Academy must be solved by the Academy itself." Perhaps this contradiction results from an honest failure to solve a perplexing problem. But other confusions cannot be so extenuated. Professor Kirk condemns Henry Steele Commager (whom he uses as the archetypical doctrinaire liberal) for saying that "every effort to confine Americanism to a single pattern, to constrain it to a single formula, is disloyalty to everything that is valid to Americanism." For this, Professor Kirk accuses him of "praising liberty because liberty gives opportunity to demolish ancient things", and of wishing to "dislodge the wisdom of our ancestors" from its place in the Academy. In short, to argue that there is a plural tradition is to argue that there is no tradition. If this is a good example of the semantics of the "neo-conservatives", then it is fair to charge *them* with subverting tradition—the traditional meaning of words.

For all its factual errors and loose ratiocinations, this book should be widely read. In its vigorous upper-case letter prose, many good things

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can be found with the bad; sometimes the bad makes provision for the good. For example, partly because the author accepts William Buckley's anti-secularist bias, he provides one of the best explicit refutations in print of that gentleman's views. And always there is the saving grace—an unfaltering, belligerent belief that academic freedom is a precious inheritance that must be saved for ourselves and posterity.

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The Crime of Galileo. By GIORGIO DE SANTILLANA. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1955.—xv, 339 pp. $5.75.

In his preface Giorgio de Santillana notes that the condemnation of Galileo has obvious parallels with the case of the Russian geneticists and with that of Dr. Robert Oppenheimer. As one reads his shrewd and scholarly account of the drama of Galileo's trial, one is convinced that this remark is no casual aside or specious gesture of present-mindedness, but that the parallels are real and instructive. For the student of politics, the chief interest of this account is the light it casts on the perennial habits of bureaucracy attempting to cope with the scientific mind in terms of political expediency. The conventional myth of Galileo presents a hero of progress martyred by a reactionary church. A slight shift of values yields the usual apologetic view of a rash genius insisting on pressing a controversial argument in defiance of a categorical prohibition. Santillana's deft and subtle analysis of all the available evidence contradicts both views. He leaves the reader in no doubt that Galileo never had the slightest thought of defying the church of which he was a faithful son, and that his steps in preparation for writing his *Dialogue of the Two Chief Systems of the World* were anything but hasty or rash. He published with the knowledge that many highly placed clerics agreed with him, in the belief that he had the highest ecclesiastical sanction for his book, and in the faith that demonstrative science could not conflict with theological dogma. He was tripped, not by any settled hostility of the church to new ideas, but by his own failure to see that his views had become a matter of internal church politics and by the failure of highly placed churchmen, among them Cardinal Bellarmine and Pope Urban VII, to grasp at all what he was talking about or why he felt so deeply about it.

If, scientifically, Galileo was ahead of his times, in what might be called his political assumptions he was behind it. He thought that as long as he was a loyal Catholic he could say what he pleased about natural science, just as if he still lived in a day before theoretical physics had become a matter for censorship and the security police. It was this

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double lack of harmony with his age that betrayed him, as it has betrayed others since. And though there was an element of malice and treachery, petty spite and political chicanery working toward his ruin at almost every stage, his judges were, in the main, not bigots or fanatics, villains or fools, but honorable and conscientious men struggling as best they could with ill-chosen investigative procedures and with issues which they did not understand. Perhaps it is a persistent trait of inquisitorial investigations that the accused may not know who his accusers are or what they have alleged against him. In Galileo's case, as in some others, one of the chief reasons for the intellectual catastrophe of his condemnation was that he did not realize until too late what he was charged with. In other respects, however, a comparison of Galileo's trial with the typical proceedings of a loyalty review board gives us little reason to be proud of three centuries of legal progress. All this Santillana sets forth with lucidity and restraint, with logic and persuasive scholarship. He has couched it in admirable prose and salted it with wit and irony. The result is a valuable and an absorbing book.

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The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought since the Revolution. By LOUIS HARTZ. New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955.—ix, 329 pp. $4.75.

Something important is astir in American political and historical writings. For a number of years the tendency had been to emphasize the economic and social conflicts in the past of the United States and to make them much the same as the European pattern. Since World War II, the trend has been to stress the uniqueness of the American tradition and to find that uniqueness in our relative lack of genuine ideological conflicts. Among these recent studies, Louis Hartz's *The Liberal Tradition in America* takes a top-ranking place. The book is original, meaty and endlessly provocative.

The heart of Mr. Hartz's argument is that the distinctive feature of American development has been the absence of a feudal stage. The people of the United States never had to overthrow a feudal system. Hence they never developed the extreme, bitter ideological differences which racked Europe and shaped its political history. The dominant theme of America has been a broad Lockean, or "liberal", consensus, from which most variations have been simply shadings. Projecting his thesis into the present world situation, Mr. Hartz concludes challengingly:

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"Can a people 'born free' ever understand peoples elsewhere that have become so? Can it ever understand itself?"

The approach of this volume, though not entirely new, brings all American history into a fresh perspective and lights up corners never thought of particular significance. Most of the treatments of specific periods are richly suggestive. With the exception of the handling of the pre-Civil War Southerners, which seems to me inchoate, each section of the book commands the attention of men working in that field.

Yet the volume has a telltale characteristic. It is consistently combative, at times dogmatic, at other times plainly overargued; page after page is devoted to a belligerent explaining away of "exceptions". In the course of breaking away from an approach that was certainly too sweeping and unrefined, *The Liberal Tradition in America* seems to have swung to another extreme.

Of special importance, the volume never really comes to grips with the fact that at least until the early 1900's American ideology did show deep and angry cleavages. All sides may have agreed on certain fundamentals; the fundamentals may have been affected by the absence of a feudal past. But it is certainly defensible to argue that these cleavages resembled the European pattern in important ways; that they created an abyss between American groups as wide, or almost as wide, as any existing across the Atlantic; and that the differences could have led to class war and, in more than a nominal sense, did lead to it in the turbulent 1890's.

Mr. Hartz's thesis is less open to attack as it is applied to the twentieth century. Then the American pattern became incontestably different from that of most of the rest of the world—a pattern of continuing compromise on the part of all groups, who drew on common traditions to arrive at adaptation and adjustment. His argument is most strikingly supported by the present, when ideological lines have become so blurred that the words "liberal" and "conservative" have little meaning except in a mezzotint from the past.

Not the least of the fascinations of Mr. Hartz's volume is the way it raises the eternal question of historiography. Could it be that historians and political scientists of the 1930's frame of mind, thinking amid such strident ideological warfare, overemphasized the degree of cleavage in previous decades? Could it be that a later generation, thinking amid rampant middle-roadism, is overemphasizing the extent of agreement in the past?

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Princeton University

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The Political Ideas of Harold J. Laski. By HERBERT A. DEANE. New York, Columbia University Press, 1955.—xii, 370 pp. $5.75.

The late Harold J. Laski, who died five years ago, continues to be, as he was during his lifetime, a much-written-about individual. For some years it has been the general consensus of the scholarly world that this admittedly superb teacher and generous friend of youth, who was primarily responsible for making politics a university study in Britain, this devoted servant of the British Labor party, was not a political philosopher of major significance. It is, therefore, a bit ironic that Laski should be repeatedly analyzed by scholars mainly in terms of his political thought. As section three of Professor Deane's bibliography indicates, the different ideas in the three major periods in which Laski's thought is usually divided have been discussed in books and essays by European, American and Asiatic scholars. And, in view of the negative judgment already rendered in certain academic circles twenty years ago, it seems somewhat surprising that during his lifetime the name "Laski" appeared on the roster of those thinkers seriously discussed in several histories of political thought.

Professor Deane's exposition of Laski's apparent failure to become a theorist of rank is the most comprehensive and scholarly critique of Laski's ideas that has yet appeared. To be sure the major points of the study—Laski's chronic attachment to contradictory and confusing views, his penchant for rhetoric, his periodic apologetics for communist totalitarianism, his affinity for dogma—have long been known to those who have "lived a little" with their subject. To Professor Deane's extensive bibliography, moreover, might be added several unpublished graduate theses in which attempts at a comprehensive treatment of Laski's ideas have also been made. Where this book surpasses all the other studies is in the careful, thorough and deeply intellectual manner in which the author has accomplished his task.

The book is a masterpiece of documentation. Professor Deane very wisely has permitted Laski himself to do the talking. It could never be said that the author came to his conclusions by the use of selected instances. Without malice, he has, for all those who demand consistency, clarity and a spotless integrity as the yardstick of a great political mind, effectively deflated the reputation of one whom he, along with many critics, greatly admired for other achievements.

Laski's adherents may claim that he should not be judged as a political theorist. Indeed, Kingsley Martin, for example, has insisted that Laski's sense of duty drove him into the market place of politics as a partisan during the dangerous inter-war years and thus that he sacrificed the

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very real opportunity that he had of remaining sufficiently detached so that he would have the time, energy and perspective to devote to a systematic theory. Professor Deane can surely reply that Laski considered himself primarily as a theorist and that it was in the field of political thought that he made his greatest impact upon students and scholars the world over. In this exposé he has taken Laski, one might say, at almost his every word.

Yet, somehow, one cannot escape the feeling that in the future Laski's flagrant inconsistencies will be forgiven along with the other weaknesses as a theorist that his many critics have noted. Perhaps what will be remembered is that Laski, as Alfred Cobban has said, was the only one of the recent political thinkers who, like the great theorists of the past, accepted the problems of his age and devoted himself to trying to find answers to them. It was surely this, as Professor Deane notes on his last page, that fired the imagination and won the hearts of some of the ablest and socially sensitive young people in Europe and America in the years between the wars. It is possible, too, that Laski will also be remembered for his continuing service to the intellectual tradition of the West. For, as Max Beloff has told us, Laski never stopped asking the Big Questions concerning man's relation to the political order in the face of an indifference which arises from an overemphasis upon pragmatism and which, to quote Beloff, threatens to reduce politics to the study of "who lays the drains and where."

So perhaps it will be felt that inconsistency, confusion, rhetoric and even occasional emotionalism were not too stiff a price to pay to produce one practical political theorist—not too small a price, that is, in an age in which the tendency to cease thinking in terms of what is now called "traditional" political theory is observable. One cannot escape the feeling that it is because even his critics subconsciously feel that the man *was* in several ways a significant political thinker that they have given so much attention to his ideas.

CARROLL HAWKINS

MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY

The Tree of Culture. By RALPH LINTON. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1955.—xv, 692, xvi pp. $7.50.

This is a tremendous book. Long before he wrote his famous *The Study of Man,* Ralph Linton had this book in process. The reviewer who worked with Linton in the Field Museum of Natural History, and later at Columbia University, talked it over, shared it in lecture notes, and was amazed when *The Study of Man* (1945) appeared because of

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its basically sociological orientation. What the orientation of his later *Cultural Background of Personality* may be is aside from the present point.

The Tree of Culture is straight historical anthropology. It is comparable in scope with H. G. Wells's *The Outline of History* but infinitely better from all anthropological standpoints. It reaches back into the origins of mankind and culture process but stresses those roots and branches which have developed into the great world culture of today. It has scope and detail: "Because we are close to this series of cultures—despite Mr. Toynbee who has apparently no cultural perspective whatever—we see the minor differences in them as being of supreme importance" (p. 662). Linton stresses these differences at the same time that he shows the common sources from which the cultures of Southeast Asia, Southwest Asia and Europe, Africa, the Orient and aboriginal America arose.

The first two chapters, "In the Beginning" and "Evolutionary Processes", cover, in highly condensed form, much of the theoretical approach put forward in his earlier *The Study of Man*. They establish the social anthropological orientation upon which he later interprets the development of the great regional cultures of the world. "Basic Inventions", the chapter which follows, lays down the technological background for the same. Paleolithic and surviving hunting cultures are treated next. Then comes the bulk of the book including six world regions treated in broad cultural historical perspective. These include the "Southeast Asia Complex", "Southwest Asia and Europe", the "Mediterranean Complex" (Crete, Greece, Barbarians, Rome, and Islam), "Africa" (Egypt and Negro civilization), the "Orient" (India, China, Japan, and their basic cultural patterns and religions), and, finally, "The New World", whose aboriginal civilization he sees as entirely autochthonous. Drawing on various sources (listed in a brief terminal bibliography by chapters) Linton gives pungent summaries enriched by highly original and pithy interpretations and, especially, by the fact that he has worked or traveled in nearly all of these areas and has a deep feel for the "ethos" of each. That he was a master craftsman (trained in wood carving in the Marquesas), a splendid worker in the museum as well as in the field, and an art collector of tremendous perception becomes evident in each chapter. Vivid black and white illustrations by Will Huntington, as well as maps, enrich the book.

This work was nearing completion when Linton died in 1953 and it was finished under the direction of his wife, Adelin Linton. Lecture notes were drawn upon and incorporated in places, but it is clear to the reviewer, who has an early set of these notes, that the vast majority of the book has been rewritten and brought up to date by the Lintons.

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The conclusion is a verbatim, concluding lecture given by Linton to his class in June 1948, and reads like most transcribed or wire-recorded speeches usually do. It deals with the maladjustments between social systems and modern science and technology. His conclusion as to the increasing totalitarianism in the world is grim but, as in *The Study of Man*, he is hopeful that even if eclipse may come the social sciences will have laid "a solid platform from which the workers in the next civilization can go on."

Space is lacking for any critical analysis of this massive work which is, of course, highly interpretative and at times somewhat off the cuff. Basically, however, it is sound and it has vast scope in time and space. Above all, it is readable, original and highly stimulating.

WILLIAM DUNCAN STRONG

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Great Cities of the World: Their Government, Politics and Planning. Edited by W. A. ROBSON. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1955.—693 pp. $10.00.

Bagehot said somewhere that "an age of great cities requires strong government." When this was written it referred primarily to the government of London and of Paris: the unsolved administrative problems of decent existence in the "Great Wen", the unsolved political problem of a revolutionary city which dominated a conservative countryside. It was easy for an acute observer to see where this would lead if strong government were lacking. On the whole, it *has* been lacking; and we have now arrived in the situation predicted. The engineering problems of life in cities have been resolved, and there are now virtually no limits of size set by nature. The metropolitan problem therefore becomes a problem within the scope of deliberate human choice—an alarming situation, for we are not within sight of agreement either about the methods of decision and administration or about the major premises on which policy should be based.

The debate hitherto has been conducted mainly in terms of social structure and social setting; there is no lack of literature about city planning. But discussion of possible cities has largely been divorced from discussion of the process of government in actual cities. In England at least the split goes so deep that the word "planning" scarcely means the same in the context of "town and country planning" as it does in that of "economic planning". Virtually no thought has been given to the problem of how urban planning is to become effective within a framework of local and national democracy.

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Professor Robson opened up this field with his study of *The Government and Misgovernment of London*, first published in 1939; and he has now assembled a band of contributors to discuss the same issues in a wider perspective. As can be seen from the bibliographies given, there are few adequate studies of individual cities outside the United States, and there is virtually no comparative literature about metropolitan government. Further developments will owe a good deal to Professor Robson's initiative in raising the topic in this book and at the conference of the International Political Science Association in the summer of 1955.

There are defects implicit in the symposium form, and Professor Robson alludes to some of them in his Preface. The contributions are uneven in scope, style and quality: some of them are written in rather formal terms, and will be dry reading except for those who already know how to read between the lines of civic constitutions; and there is great difficulty in establishing any but the most tentative general conclusions from data presented in this way. Indeed, one of the most certain conclusions which emerge is the negative one, that metropolitan government in each county is embedded in the structure of national government, and that it is difficult to grasp how the city is run till one knows how the state is run. (Probably if more were written about city government we should be as ready to assert the converse.) The result is that one gets a general rather than a specific picture only in these chapters where one author compares two cities within the same national setting, as in Keith B. Callard's article on Montreal and Toronto and in that of Professor M. Venkatarangaiya on Bombay and Calcutta.

Nevertheless, the subject could not have been effectively launched at all except in a symposium of this kind. The chapters on individual cities give plenty of hints, though few conclusions, and Professor Robson has himself introduced the book with a long chapter of general discussion. This is a chapter of summary and comment, rather than of deductions; very wisely, he is content primarily to set up a framework for comparison, rather than to teach lessons. Later writing will doubtless introduce refinements, but his scheme has the essential merits of directness, simplicity and familiarity, and it is surprising how far he is able to go in creating some sort of order in a mass of confusing material. But this is essentially a pioneer work. An immense amount remains to do, and, for so far ahead as we can foresee, this will remain one of the central issues in the study of government.

W. J. M. MACKENZIE

UNIVERSITY OF MANCHESTER,
ENGLAND

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The TVA: An Approach to the Development of a Region. By Gordon R. Clapp. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1955.—xi, 206 pp. $3.50.

Originally presented as Walgreen Foundation Lectures at the University of Chicago, Mr. Clapp's new volume is both a reflection on his experience as Chairman of the Board of the Tennessee Valley Authority and a powerful political broadside calling for a new departure in our electric power policies. The first two-thirds of Mr. Clapp's book, a vigorous defense of TVA, will not be new to anyone familiar with the basic literature of TVA, particularly the annual reports of the Authority. At the same time, it should be said that, although the material is not new, he marshals his arguments with great vigor and makes as persuasive a case as has been made for TVA. To the argument that TVA is an opponent of private enterprise, he replies that few regions in the country have seen the expansion of private business that has taken place in the Tennessee valley in the past twenty years. To the contention that TVA violates the rights of the states and snuffs out local initiative, he retorts that there has been a greater rate of increase in money spent by valley states on resource development programs in recent years than in any other section of the country. Nor does he see the TVA in industrial terms alone. He points out that in 1943, $18,000 was spent on regional library services in the state of Tennessee, of which $14,000 came from TVA. Ten years later, Tennessee was spending $295,000 on libraries, all from state and local funds. TVA, declares Mr. Clapp, has cut through the alleged dilemma of federal vs. state action, and shown that enhanced federal power can stimulate local action rather than crush it.

Mr. Clapp makes his chief contribution in the last third of the volume, arguing convincingly for a new national power policy based on encouragement of more federal power projects and federal financial aid to private companies to enable them to build up reserves without fear of serious financial loss. In a quietly devastating fashion, Mr. Clapp points out that the private utility leaders have always seriously underestimated the market, as a result of which we have at various times in the past fifteen years suffered critical shortages of power. In 1933, for example, a vice-president of Commonwealth and Southern stated he could see no market for the power TVA proposed to produce; twenty years later, the electric power demand in the valley was seventeen times what it was in 1933. This " 'built-in' psychological pessimism of the private utilities" resulted in serious shortages of power in World War II, in the reconversion period, during the Korean war, and since the Korean truce; in short, year after year "with monotonous regularity", the private

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companies badly misgauged the market for power. To provide adequate low-cost power, Mr. Clapp would rely neither on total government ownership, which would be stultifying; nor on private ownership, which has repeatedly failed; nor on government regulation, which fosters a "management of complacency bred by a cost-plus security paid for by the consumer." Instead, Mr. Clapp would place his faith in the competition of public and private power systems. Competition, he observes, is not synonymous with private ownership, despite the effort of utility public relations men to make them appear the same; privately owned utilities are monopolies, and when they do not have the stimulus of competition from publicly owned systems, they become sluggish. The question of ownership, on which most of the controversy has centered, is less important than the quality of management, Mr. Clapp argues, and management is most creative in an atmosphere of competition.

One wishes that Mr. Clapp would have used the opportunity of the Walgreen Lectures for a more thoughtful look at the meaning of TVA; too often, writers on TVA tend to write in the fashion of advertising men selling a product. Certainly this is understandable, given the unrelenting barrage of misleading attacks on TVA, but it is unfortunate that no one connected with TVA has concerned himself to comment on a work like that of Selznick, or argue his case without using unweighted figures of comparison of regional electric rates, or give sufficient attention to the differences in public and private financing. Moreover, Mr. Clapp appears to be unconscious of the degree to which he approaches public problems with the ethical values of a new public managerial class. Yet, within the confines of his approach, Mr. Clapp has written a brilliant indictment of the damage wrought by the power policies of the Eisenhower Administration, and has charted an imaginative program for the future development of the power industry.

WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

A Chronicle of Jeopardy, 1945–55. By REXFORD G. TUGWELL. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1955.—v, 489 pp. $7.50.

Rexford Guy Tugwell, a prominent figure in the New Deal régime, and latterly a Professor of Political Science in the University of Chicago, has written a thoughtful and thought-provoking book on the ten years since the atom bomb fell on Hiroshima. It might be called "Learning to Live with the Bomb", except that, as Professor Tugwell views the matter, little has been learned about that precarious way of life. No

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less surprised but much more deeply disturbed than most Americans by the Hiroshima holocaust, Tugwell was convinced that the vast new force which man had let loose rendered existing forms of control obsolete. Collective ownership of the new source of energy seemed to him imperative; and, since no one nation could long monopolize it, only some form of world government could be depended upon to preserve civilization against self-destruction. Today he sees, in the United States at least, the productive uses of atomic energy being channeled into private hands, while, instead of world government, the two super-powers tremble on the brink of mutual destruction by means of the A-bomb's giant offspring, the H-bomb. In default of world-government and of any international control of atomic energy, Tugwell would have settled for an agreement for peaceful coexistence between the United States and the U.S.S.R. Since that has until now proved impossible, the best thing in sight when he wrote his final chapter was a stalemate, in which each antagonist would fear to start a war which in all probability would destroy both.

While recognizing Soviet communism's plans for world domination and the frequently provocative character of Soviet diplomacy, Tugwell nevertheless places upon the United States a large share of the responsibility for failure to reach an agreement. By November of 1945, he remarks, "it began to be plain that the Truman administration would not be able to maintain President Roosevelt's kind of relation with Soviet leaders." For this failure he blamed at the time not so much Truman as the men around Truman. The military men and spokesmen of big business, who played increasingly important parts in the administration, seemed to Tugwell to be plotting not only to keep control of the new force in their own hands, but also to wage a preventive war against the Soviet Union.

The book, it should be explained here, consists of ten chapters, plus a prologue and epilogue. The first chapter was written at the time of the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima, and succeeding chapters were put together on or about the successive anniversaries of that event, each therefore covering approximately a year. These chapters have been left as written, so that they present not only "annals" of the time but also the progression of the author's ideas. It is noteworthy that one finds less and less of the conspiracy theory as the chapters proceed and a growing concern with the obstacles to any fruitful negotiations with the U.S.S.R. presented by Congress and the press.

One rather puzzling feature of the book is the author's attitude to democracy. Repeatedly he castigates the powers that be for making decisions of the most vital consequence—such as adoption of the "new look" in defense—without consultation with the organs of democracy;

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but when those organs, in the shape of congressional and public opinion, are allowed to control diplomacy, he deplores the results. And yet, on general principles, foreign policy would seem a more suitable subject for democratic determination than such a technical matter as a choice of weapons and strategy for defense. If, as Tugwell believes, the threat of the bomb produced a species of hysteria, rendering American public opinion incapable of reaching reasoned conclusions on negotiating with the communist world, could any better results be hoped for if questions of defense were submitted to the same arbitrament?

While making the A- and H-bombs and their relation to foreign policy the center of attention, Tugwell offers shrewd observations on many related matters, such as McCarthyism, the Oppenheimer case, and security policy in general. Very suspicious at first of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he later has high praise for General Bradley's level-headedness. Henry A. Wallace, much acclaimed in the early chapters, later fades from view. Eisenhower's statesmanship is rated much superior to that of his Secretary of State, but not very high at that. In fact, the only American statesmen who appear to the author to measure up to the requirements of the age are the dead Roosevelt and the defeated Stevenson. Many readers will disagree strongly with many of Professor Tugwell's opinions, but few men of good will can avoid sharing his concern for the fate of humanity under the threat of thermonuclear force or his discouragement at the failure so far to face that threat realistically.

JULIUS W. PRATT

THE UNIVERSITY OF BUFFALO

The Structure and Government of Labor Unions. By PHILIP TAFT. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954.—xix, 312 pp. $6.00.

Professor Taft's extensive researches in the fields of trade-union radicalism, internal union politics and administration, and union structure have been combined in this volume. The result is a collection of empirical essays, rather than the duly organized treatment suggested by the book's title. Four of the chapters are entirely new, and the other four represent substantial revisions of articles published earlier.

Major contributions to research on trade-union democracy are to be found in Professor Taft's systematic analysis of union constitutions, proceedings and related materials in the chapters on the impact of the locus of union power, union finances, and union disciplinary arrangements. Another chapter describes the failure of the Communists, despite their camouflaging pursuit of bona fide trade-union policies, to imprint their

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ideology on the rank and file where they became strongly entrenched in trade unions. Three chapters deal with particular phases of the problems and policies of several unions: the unlicensed seafaring unions; the Teamsters; and a comparison of the Auto Workers and the Steel Workers.

In his analysis of the measure of individual freedom permitted in trade unions, Professor Taft's premise is that the standards customarily applied to ascertain the existence of political democracy in society at large cannot be applied to trade unions. He contrasts the rôle of society in fusing and protecting conflicting interests with the primary function of the union in protecting its members' economic interests. That there has been a failure to realize this distinction apparently accounts for his criticism of those he designates as the "self-appointed supervisors of the purity of the labor movement" (p. 205). The task he has set himself is to determine in fact whether the disciplinary arrangements in union constitutions, although normally well administered, themselves constitute a constant threat to union democracy, a view held by some.

Is there ample play for democratic expression despite the general absence of opposition to top union officers after initial political differences have been resolved? He finds adequate opportunity for the play of opposition at the local union level, and adequate restraints on the authority of top union officials in the diffusion of power among several echelons of officials. On the basis of thorough study of appeals and related data in six AFL and two CIO unions, he finds that there is generally adequate recourse for the protection of individual rights. Many cases involving a wide range of issues are appealed to international union officers. The cases generally involve the violation of trade rules, rather than civil rights, with most of the charges originating in the ranks; the international officers are often appealed to because of the undue leniency of the local union. Dues, initiation fees, and salaries of officials—other internal union affairs for which government supervision has been argued—are found to be relatively modest and reasonable.

On the basis of his research, Professor Taft opposes those who would establish governmental standards for internal union administration, particularly of the appeals machinery. He holds that the penalties imposed are "seldom severe and unwarranted" and that the disciplinary machinery functions, on the whole, "justly and effectively". For him, the present recourse to the courts is the limit for outside intervention.

The evidence marshaled by Professor Taft in replying to the *in terrorem* view does not, however, provide a ready answer to the problem of dealing with the relatively isolated but serious instances of abuse in trade unions. As Sumner Slichter points out in his introduction to this volume, the

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evidence relating to well-administered unions cannot obscure the recent disclosures relating to the abuse of union welfare funds. The AFL and CIO have themselves established standards for the administration of such funds, and have acknowledged that there may be an area for governmental supervision. The failure of the combined efforts of the AFL and federal and state action to dislodge the gangster-ridden control of the International Longshoremen's Association reflects the complexity of the problem—where it has long festered. Certainly, the fact that union discipline is generally well administered would not be altered if general standards in this area were established with union participation in the process.

JOSEPH P. GOLDBERG

WASHINGTON, D. C.

Short-Term Economic Forecasting. Volume Seventeen of Studies in Income and Wealth. A Report of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1955.—xi, 506 pp. $7.50.

Because of Keynesian economics, modern statistical analysis and the government questionnaire, a taste for looking into the future can now be combined with annual salaries as high as $36,000 (*Business Week*, Sept. 24, 1955, p. 96). A good indication of the respectable status of economic forecasting is the recent publication by the National Bureau of a volume dealing chiefly with the post-war questionnaires used by the United States and Canadian governments to estimate forthcoming consumer expenditures and private business outlays on plant and equipment. Four of the seven papers are exclusively devoted to appraisals of the government questionnaires; two other papers analyze specific private questionnaires, and the remaining essay candidly discusses the present unsatisfactory state of short-run economic forecasting.

Government inquiry about anticipated private spending significantly reflects the current trend towards so-called "framework planning" in the United States and Canada. By correctly forecasting private investment and consumer expenditures, national governments presumably can adopt policies more likely to ensure full employment and/or price stability. The real problem concerns not the applicability of the forecasts to government policy but rather the desirability of publishing the government's findings and its own plans based on such findings. Publication may cause consumers and business men to readjust their plans and therefore raises the question whether the government should keep its information and its intentions to itself. With respect to anticipated

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private capital outlays, Professor Dobrovolsky suggests that a policy of secrecy may create "inaccurate rumors concerning the impending government action . . . and upset the initial business intentions to an even greater degree than an official announcement would" ("Comment", p. 252).

The United States capital outlays questionnaire is sent to about 1,000 corporations registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission and to 1,100 nonregistered manufacturing companies reporting to the Department of Commerce. At the beginning of each quarter, every firm is asked to report plant and equipment expenditures for the preceding quarter and planned expenditures for the current and succeeding quarters. In addition, at the end of each year the firms are asked to anticipate both their capital outlays and their sales for the following year. On this basis, estimates are made for all nonagricultural business by major industry groups and publicly released as a regular quarterly series. A similar procedure is followed in Canada.

The chief method devised by Friend and Bronfenbrenner ("Plant and Equipment Programs and Their Realization") to evaluate the degree of accuracy with which the United States government has forecast annual private capital outlays compares the percentage deviation of actual expenditures from: (a) the government's forecast; (b) the actual expenditures of the previous year; and (c) the actual expenditures of the first quarter of the year being forecast, at seasonally adjusted annual rates. In every year between 1947 and 1952, the percentage deviation from (a) was less than from (b). In 1950, however, the percentage deviation from (a) was slightly greater than from (c) and in 1947 and 1952 the absolute percentage deviations were the same. In another paper ("Economic Expectations and Plans of Firms in Relation to Short-Term Forecasting"), Modigliani and Sauerlender found that the government forecasting record in 1948 and 1949, the two years tested, compared favorably with that of private organizations and with the forecasts "that might have been made by simply extrapolating the latest level of activity" (p. 263).

Perhaps the most encouraging result was the fact that the expenditures anticipated by the government respondents projected correctly the "downward movement in actual outlays at the cyclical turning point which occurred at the beginning of 1949". (Friend and Bronfenbrenner, p. 61). Because the paper by these two authors was written in the summer of 1951, it contains no information about the cyclical turning points in 1953 and 1954.

Unlike the results of the inquiry into private investment intentions, the results of the survey of consumer intentions cannot be adequately

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appraised because they have not been used directly to make forecasts. The stated reason for this is that consumer survey data are not combined with data from other sources and prediction of demand for specific commodities is thought unwise "without taking into account what . . . government policies can do to the level of consumer income . . . the terms on which consumers can borrow . . . [and] without considering the supply side of the market" (J. B. Lansing and S. B. Withey, "Consumer Anticipations", p. 386). This explanation is surely unacceptable when it is realized that the responses to the questionnaires on private capital outlays have provided a fairly satisfactory basis for government forecasts without taking into account the ever present possibilities of changes in long-term interest rates, revisions of the corporate income tax, and so on.

The book as a whole suffers from the basic defect of most National Bureau publications: reading them requires an almost superhuman indifference to boredom. This may partially reflect the fact that statistical studies rarely make exciting reading (always excepting, of course, Dr. Kinsey's works); more probably, it reflects the inability of National Bureau authors to write gracefully and obvious National Bureau unwillingness to edit properly.

Anyone with sufficient interest in economic forecasting to wade through this entire book faces another danger besides boredom. He may emerge with as gloomy a view of the prospects for short-run economic forecasting as Benjamin Caplan's. "We do not yet have reliable scientific forecasting—i.e. a reliable method invariant with respect to the forecaster . . . but we [may] have a fundamental problem . . . not that we do not know, but that we shall never know" (p. 43).

LEON QUINTO

NEW YORK CITY

Tempestuous Journey: Lloyd George, His Life and Times. By FRANK OWEN. New York, Toronto, London, McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1955.—784 pp. $7.00.

This is the first biography of David Lloyd George based upon a study of his private papers. Frank Owen, an able and well-known journalist has, as he tells us, "quarried" for three years in the more than 1,000 boxes of the Lloyd George archives, studied over 200 volumes dealing with men and events of the period, searched the newspaper files, and consulted with a "host" of those who knew Lloyd George personally.

The result is a substantial volume which must rank alone until others have had the opportunity to go through the Lloyd George papers (sold by his widow to Lord Beaverbrook) which are to be housed in the Uni-

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versity of New Brunswick. Summarizing, paraphrasing, and quoting from the rich store of memoranda and letters, Mr. Owen has succeeded in laying before the reader a vast amount of information dealing with Lloyd George and the events of his time. Though he makes a number of errors of fact and some questionable interpretations, no one interested in the history of Great Britain (and of the world at large) in the first half of the twentieth century can overlook this work unless he wishes to go through the material upon which it is based. As a "source" for the period it is valuable, marred though it is by the fact that Mr. Owen has been more than negligent in the almost total lack of documentation. This is true not only where the material presented is apparently based upon the Lloyd George manuscripts; it applies even to conversations between others, who are quoted with no indication as to the source. Except where it is self-evident, the reader is left in the dark as to the nature of the material used. The historian knows that this is poor "history"; is it not also poor "journalism"? And it is to be hoped that Mr. Owen has exercised more care in culling the material contained in them than is indicated by the fact that he has overlooked a number of published volumes which would have been more useful than some of the two hundred that he did consult.

Mr. Owen is much better at exposition than at analysis. He is at his best when he portrays Lloyd George's boundless vitality (the first requisite for a politician) and his spirited approach to life. The picture of Lloyd George's early years is presented with compassion and skill; if overdrawn, it may help nonetheless to stimulate the nonprofessional reader to become interested in one of the significant figures of modern democracy. Wherein Mr. Owen fails, as have all his predecessors who have been unable to use Lloyd George's private papers, is in presenting a coherent and intelligible study of an outstanding personality who was the prototype of the successful political leaders of our time. Back in 1919 an exasperated and disillusioned John Maynard Keynes penned (but held back from publishing for fourteen years) a bitter indictment of "this half-human visitor to our age." Keynes, in attempting to explain the "Welsh Wizard" could only fall back on Celtic magic. Yet, he, too, was aware of what so many observers have noted but have failed to understand: that "Lloyd George is rooted in nothing; he is void and without content; he lives and feeds on his immediate surroundings; he is an instrument and a player at the same time which plays on the company and is played on by them too; . . . a vampire and a medium in one."

The answer to the "sorcery" of the very human David Lloyd George (the great commoner who, remarrying at the age of eighty, was persuaded

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to accept an Earldom) lies in a study not only of the man but also of the theatre in which he performed. Now that the Lloyd George papers will be made available, we have, perhaps, the material for a study which can go far in explaining not only Lloyd George, but, more important, something of the nature of modern "mass" society.

SAMUEL J. HURWITZ

BROOKLYN COLLEGE

Welsh and Scottish Nationalism: A Study. By SIR REGINALD COUPLAND. With a Foreword by Jack Simmons. London, Wm. Collins & Co. Ltd., 1954.—xxii, 426 pp. 25*s.*; $6.25.

It is always something of a shock to Americans, used as they are to the continental stretches of their own national domain, to realize just how diverse and deep-rooted the national loyalties of Europe continue to be. In particular, it is usually startling to realize that Britain, despite the fading rumbles of the age-long Irish Question, is not the homogeneous society it frequently seems on the surface. How many of us as tourists have had the mildly surprising experience of discovering the existence of diminishing linguistic pockets of Celtic speech in Wales or Scotland? How many of us may have puzzled at the resurgent nationalist movements in both countries and wondered at the strong sense of social and cultural difference that continues to characterize both Welshmen and Scotsmen, though both share in the geographic unity of an island area scarcely larger than a medium-sized American state? Why has this sense of national distinctiveness persisted within such brief territorial compass, and why does it seem to be increasing at the very moment in history when mass communications and mass transportation facilities appear at last to be on the verge of annihilating the differences caused, at least in part, by the barriers of time and distance? For those of us raised in the political environment of North America such questions seem almost to veil a kind of enigma. Southern sectionalism and French-Canadian ethnocentrism in their recent manifestations have not taken the form of nationalist movements. Though both have had their discontents, neither has sought within the present century to withdraw from the political system of which it is a part.

In many ways it is difficult to think of a person better equipped to explain the imponderables of Welsh or Scottish nationalism to outsiders—and particularly to American or even English outsiders—than the late Sir Reginald Coupland, formerly Beit Professor of the History of the British Empire at Oxford. The work itself reflects his great learning, catholicity of interest, and wide human understanding. At no point

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does it descend to the level of sarcasm or captiousness. The nationalist movements of Wales and Scotland, as he saw them, are but natural manifestations of a centuries-old historical development that, for a variety of reasons, has been increasingly stimulated since the latter part of the nineteenth century. In common with many other present-day observers, Coupland felt that the world is moving in the direction of larger and larger agglomerations of power and that this process, for good or ill, makes it necessary for Britain to preserve its unity. Unity does not, however, mean stifling uniformity. Let Scotsmen be Scottish and Welshmen be Welsh, he broadly implied, but do not let them destroy the political structure that gives them a greater collective strength than they would possess as members of independent states. Coupland's conclusion in this connection is made plain in his introduction. National characteristics and the concept of the sovereign state have been linked together in the past. To continue to link them is to perpetuate international chaos. Must national traditions always be institutionalized in the form of the state? Above all, need "it ever be a sovereign state"? Here, even the learning of Sir Reginald Coupland cannot yet provide us with an answer. Moreover, for all of its excellent intentions, this is no solution for the Welsh or Scottish nationalist who will continue to believe and fear that unity may yet create—has, in fact, already very nearly created—its own kind of uniformity.

Unhappily, the work, despite the fact that it is the only adequate survey of its kind in existence and despite its many excellences, must be used with caution. It will need a thorough reediting for factual and other errors before it can be recommended unreservedly as an introduction to the subject with which it deals.

SIDNEY A. BURRELL

BARNARD COLLEGE

The Study of International Relations. By QUINCY WRIGHT. New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1955.—xii, 642 pp. $6.75.

This task of synthesizing and integrating the entire field of international relations is the most ambitious undertaking yet attempted by Professor Wright. His developing interests may be traced from his first book in 1922 when he applied a legal analysis to the formulation of American foreign policy. His volume on Mandates in 1930 reflected an appreciation of historical perspectives, while his *A Study of War* in 1942 emphasized the psychological and sociological point of view. This book demonstrates his gift for logical analysis, and it is unusually suggestive in relating values to the objective study of social systems.

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Earlier investigations of the study of international relations have not attempted to be as definitive or as comprehensive as the one under review. Grayson Kirk's excellent essay, *The Study of International Relations* (1947), was an effective plea for the approach of power politics. The recent publication by UNESCO, *The University Teaching of the Social Sciences—International Relations* (1954), has been suggestive and helpful. The present volume should be considered more properly a monograph, rather than a textbook.

The book is divided into five parts: an Introduction establishes the meaning of international relations; Part II defines the component parts of a discipline as being history, art, philosophy, and science; Part III analyzes ten practical disciplines of the field (international politics, war, diplomacy, conduct of foreign relations, colonial government, international organization, international law, economics, communications, education); Part IV provides a similar analysis for six theoretical disciplines (geography, demography, technology, sociology, psychology, ethics); Part V relates these disciplines to each other and pioneers a new field theory of international relations.

Professor Wright's analysis of the sixteen disciplines highlights the limitations as well as the contributions of each. The statement of definitions and assumptions for the several disciplines do not appear arbitrary or categorical. The author's able use of logic is well justified with this type of analysis. A concluding chapter suggests a pattern relating the disciplines to each other. The author seems to find those subjectively-oriented disciplines stemming from psychology more rewarding than the objective disciplines related to geography. He values most highly the general disciplines of sociology and ethics and the practical disciplines of international communications and the control of foreign relations. Apparently the general discipline of geography and practical discipline of war have least to contribute to the study of international relations.

A unique contribution of the book is the author's adaptation of a field theory to the discipline of international relations. As the discipline has matured, it has proceeded from the description of such entities as states, governments, and grand designs for world peace, to the consideration of balance-of-power situations. Subsequently, processes useful for international organization were evaluated, leaving the last stage—the analysis of relations—undeveloped. It is this final stage for which Wright has evolved an analytical field theory. The theory is well deserving of careful study. The author compares his scheme to a twelve-dimensional cheese within which crawl maggots representing countries with the government at the head, followed by the state, the nation and the people at the tail.

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The governments vaguely perceive each other as they approach, often changing direction in response to primitive instincts, to sophisticated policies and to deliberate appraisals of purposes and powers. Charting their position and anticipating the rapidity and direction of their movement within a system of action, established by six capability coördinates, would produce fruitful results.

Withal, *The Study of International Relations* has encyclopedic proportions. Professor Wright strives for balance and prefers eclecticism to any one philosophical system. He does not neglect possible contributions of intuition as well as the scientific method, and his chapter on realism and idealism should impose a merciful silence on those who still tilt their lances at these windmills. He has located a system of values for states which embraces humanism, relativism, pragmatism and liberalism. His analysis of the conduct of foreign relations as essentially an art in which decision-makers imaginatively adapt means to ends may give pause to those who would make a science of it. Few readers will disagree that this volume has gone far to accord to international relations the dignity of a discipline.

MARTIN B. TRAVIS, JR.

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 1946–1951. New York, United Nations, Department of Political and Security Council Affairs, 1954. Distributed in the United States by the Columbia University Press, New York.—xi, 514 pp. $5.00 or equivalent in other currencies.

Repertory of Practice of United Nations Organs. Vol. I: *Articles 1–22 of the Charter.* New York, United Nations, 1955. Distributed in the United States by the Columbia University Press, New York.—xi, 742 pp. $3.50, or equivalent in other currencies.

These two substantial volumes are further evidence of the effective skills of the Secretariat of the United Nations although a private research institution free from official inhibitions would have prepared them differently. No student of the United Nations or its Charter, however, can afford to bypass these volumes in any research. It is safe to say that well-worn copies will be on the desks of staffs of the permanent delegations of the Member Nations and of foreign offices throughout the world. Both volumes are guides to the already vast official documentation of the organs of the UN. The Repertoire deals only with the Security Council;

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the Repertory includes the Security Council as well as the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretariat. The Repertoire in this first volume goes down through the 569th meeting of the Security Council on December 18, 1951; a second volume covering subsequent meetings is in course of preparation and further volumes are projected as future meetings supply the raw material. The Repertory in Volume I covers Articles 1–22 of the Charter; Volume II will cover Articles 23–54; Volume III, Articles 55–72; Volume IV, Articles 73–91; and the final Volume V, Articles 92–111. There will be a separate index volume. The terminal date is August 31, 1954.

The origins of the two volumes are to be found in two different resolutions of the General Assembly having different objectives. The Repertoire was called for as part of the "ways and means for making the evidence of customary international law more readily available." Clearly the work of organs other than the Security Council would be equally pertinent to such an objective and this in its origin might be considered a pilot project. The Repertory, on the other hand, was authorized by the General Assembly in the context of considering the Review Conference contemplated in Article 109 of the Charter although the general intrinsic value of such a compilation was recognized irrespective of the question of Charter review. Both studies were outlined first in memoranda submitted by the Secretary-General. It would seem reasonable that in future years the two compilations might be combined into one periodically continuing series, probably on the model of the Repertory.

The Repertoire is meticulously careful to avoid evaluating the proceedings of the Security Council, insisting that the Council must be free to determine its own practice. It was considered improper for the Secretariat to suggest which actions of the Council constitute "precedents" and it is insisted that the reader must draw his own conclusions. For convenience all actions by the Council in the form of resolutions of any character are recorded under the label of "decisions". In spite of this official caution, which is understandable, anyone studying such a question as the so-called "double veto" will find the material well arranged with due attention paid to the way in which the President put the questions to the vote of the Council. This instance perhaps exemplifies the procedural rather than substantive emphasis of the work. While the Repertoire does not purport to record every instance in which a matter has been raised in the Council, the illustrative "cases" seem ample as leads, well chosen and supplemented by other footnote references. The scheme of arrangement needs to be studied since it does not attempt to follow articles of the Charter. Thus one begins with the Rules of Procedure

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and the Agenda going on through such chapters as "Voting" and "Relations with Other United Nations Organs" and admission of new members. Then there is a chapter on the Council's responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, one on other functions and powers, ending with two chapters on Chapters VI and VII of the Charter and another on certain other articles such as Article 2 (7). Obviously this arrangement must involve some overlap and, in spite of frequent cross-referencing and very useful introductory notes, the reader needs to acquire familiarity with the volume before he can use it freely.

The Repertory on the other hand, being arranged analytically with reference to the articles of the Charter considered in regular order, is somewhat easier to follow. The introductory notes again caution that the Secretariat, in listing a "decision" under what is considered the relevant Article, does not purport to exercise a judgment as to whether the decision is a "ruling" on the question. Again, not every instance is covered, but sampling—as for example of the interesting section on Article 2 (7)—shows the convenience and utility of the organizational scheme. Here one finds a general survey separately under the General Assembly, under the Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, under the Security Council and under the International Court. This is followed by an analytical summary which takes up first the term "intervene" and then the matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction. The section concludes by covering the Chapter VII exception and the procedures by which Article 2 (7) was invoked. The explanatory notes are clear and helpful as are various charts. The subsequent volumes of the two compilations will be eagerly welcomed by anyone who has consulted these two initial volumes.

Philip C. Jessup

Columbia University

Soviet Law and Soviet Society. By George C. Guins. The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1954.—xv, 457 pp. Guilders 27.50.

The literature on Soviet law has been growing in recent years. Gsovski's elaborate presentation of Soviet Civil Law has been followed by the recent books by Berman, Hazard, and Hazard and David. Professor Guins's book is concerned primarily with Soviet society. It deals with law in so far as law is a tool used by the Soviet rulers to fashion Soviet society.

Properly Mr. Guins observes that "the social life of a country is characterized by the number and kinds of its organizations and by the degree of their independence." In the Soviet Union he finds social life "char-

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acterized by the dependence of all social organizations upon the state" (p. 271). The state is compulsion and its characteristic order is that which is enforced by compulsion, that is, the law. Contrary to the Marxist expectation that in socialist society law would wither away, it has, in the U.S.S.R., vastly expanded its scope and increased its intensity. Professor Guins undertakes to prove that this development is of the very essence of a system in which all economic activity is the monopoly of the state and is carried on under a scheme of all-comprehensive planning. Such a system must be directed from above, fully centralized, bureaucratic, and, as it cannot rely upon the private initiative of individual entrepreneurs, must use as incentives rewards bestowed from above, propaganda and compulsion. There can be no room for self-government, democratic institutions, guaranteed individual rights, or social organizations independent of the state. Terms taken from the vocabulary of traditional democracy must assume different meanings, so that their use serves primarily purposes of camouflage.

The rôle of the law as the essential compulsory tool to fashion the new society upon the ruins of that of the Russia of the tsars and the February Revolution, to elaborate the new system and keep it going, is illustrated by the author in the fields of general economic planning, agriculture, labor relations, and the organization of political, social and family life. In an initial part Professor Guins presents a survey of Soviet legal theory. He has succeeded in making it clear why there had to be such a tortured development, and why so much effort had to be expended upon the formulation of ideas appearing to the outside observer to be devoid of practical significance. The book concludes with chapters on Soviet principles and practice of international law, and on the "inevitable" way in which the essential pattern of Soviet laws had to be imposed upon those countries which have become satellites to the Soviet Union.

As a former citizen and, as the publisher tells us, high official in pre-Revolutionary Russia, in Siberia and Manchuria, Professor Guins is familiar with the historical background of Russian institutions and with those Russian source materials which are accessible outside of the U.S.S.R. These materials contain a great wealth of information and he has used them extensively. As a one-time pupil of Tsarist Russia's celebrated jurist, Leo Petrazycki, the author has been steeped in nineteenth-century continental jurisprudence as well as in that line of psychological investigation of socio-legal phenomena which was specially developed by his teacher.

With such a background and method Professor Guins has been able

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to elucidate important aspects of Soviet life, such as the precarious nature of private rights in personal property, the dependence of the peasant upon his kolkhoz and, through it, on the state, the essentially ornamental rôle of Soviet federalism, the function of the trade unions, professional organizations and all other associations of any kind as government-ally-sponsored organs of the state, the rôles, actual and potential, of the Church and the Army, and, above all, the peculiar techniques by which the absolute control of every aspect of life is maintained by the leadership of the Communist party, and the complete dependence which results therefrom for the individual Soviet citizen.

With its emphasis on discipline, enthusiasm, rewards, uniforms, titles, decorations, punishments, hierarchy and absolute power of command, the author finds that "The Soviet state is like a military camp even during the peacetime." This same conclusion was drawn not for the Soviet Union alone but for the modern totalitarian state in general by Harold Lasswell, who coined for it the descriptive term of "garrison state". Professor Guins's analysis would have gained in depth if, like Lasswell, he had treated the Soviet pattern of government as but one specimen of the larger species of state which was represented also by National-Socialist Germany and Fascist Italy.

Professor Guins's main thesis is of such a broad scope that it is probably too much to expect full documentary proof. The scholarly significance of the book would be increased, however, if evidence were more consistently adduced. The author is certainly correct when he asserts that in the Soviet system the public law of domination is vastly more important than the private law of coördination. It would have been interesting, however, if he had sought to apply to the Soviet Union the suggestive idea of the "dual state" which Ernst Fraenkel has developed in connection with National-Socialist Germany. In that instance of totalitarian government the state applied the "rule of law" quite well in all cases of private and criminal law which were not affected by any political interest of the leadership group; but where such an interest obtained, the state acted as "prerogative state", that is, arbitrarily and in accordance with political expediency. It was characteristic of the prerogative state that it had the power to determine its own scope of jurisdiction; but it left room for a continuously varying scope of jurisdiction of the rule of law. These concepts appear to be helpful for the analysis of any kind of totalitarian state. Their application to the Soviet Union might open significant insights into the relationship between the Soviet citizen and his government. They might also be helpful in the elucidation of one of the most puzzling aspects of Soviet economic

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organization, namely, the relative scope of plan and contract in the relationship between economic enterprises.

In spite of occasional inaccuracies and some unanswered questions, the book presents a comprehensive picture of Soviet society and its legal bases.

MAX RHEINSTEIN

UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Admiral Ambassador to Russia. By WILLIAM H. STANDLEY and ARTHUR A. AGETON. Chicago, Henry Regnery Company, 1955.—533 pp. $6.00.

Having served with distinction for forty continuous years in the Navy and having attained the highest post in it, early in 1937 Admiral Standley relinquished his last assignment as the Chief of Naval Operations, retired and withdrew from public life. But World War II upset his plans for a quiet life. Early in 1941 he was recalled, and, after serving in the Office of Production Management and also after exposing himself to the Russians (as a member of the Beaverbrook-Harriman Mission to Moscow), he succeeded the late Laurence Steinhardt as our Ambassador to the Soviet Union in April of 1942. At the end of his six months' "apprenticeship" he returned to Washington (at his own request) for consultation. One day in October, when he called upon the President, he was greeted with a "Hello, Bill. What brings you home?" "Trouble, Chief," replied the Ambassador, "plenty of trouble."

The elderly admiral who was pressed by his "Chief" to fill the most difficult of our embassies did not overstate his case in his brief reply. Plenty of trouble he had during his short stay in the Soviet Union. Nearly all his difficulty stemmed from the very system of Soviet governmental machinery, which was a root cause of trouble. The rest of it stemmed from Washington, and he had no doubt that the "Chief" and the man (Harry Hopkins) "who lay back in a big armchair in the corner beyond the Chief's desk" could eliminate it. For instance, too many special representatives were being sent to Moscow. They all were by-passing the Ambassador and thereby lowering his prestige. There was also the case of other officials of our government in Moscow who were not subject to his jurisdiction. It was degrading to approach the Soviet leaders "as mendicant coming cap in hand", but it was humiliating to one who could not have the full confidence of his Chief and be master in his own household. And of course there was the trouble which made headline news in this country when the Ambassador demanded some public recognition by Russian leaders of the aid given by America.

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Within a fortnight the Ambassador was back at his post with a promise to bring all American officials in the Soviet Union under his jurisdiction. But that did not take place, and the Ambassador's troubles, instead of diminishing, were on the increase. In May of 1943 he summed up his feeling of frustration in a note to his wife, stating that "there are too many people at home ready to heave dead cats at the moment any one refuses to swallow Sovietism . . . and I prefer to maintain a benevolent neutrality for the rest of my days here" (p. 361). And in October when his resignation was accepted his frustration in the Soviet Union came to an end. His quasi-biographical book, written by himself and by Admiral Ageton, successfully aims to narrate fully and factually the story of his troubles and frustrations. He states that it is not only impossible to deal with responsible Soviet leaders honorably, but he thinks that it is not possible to live with them peacefully. Perhaps that is why he offers "A Program" in which he advocates the maintenance of a "posture of strength"—military, economic and moral strength.

Among the multitude of post-war books on the Soviet Union, those written by retired admirals and generals certainly stand out. General Deane in his *Strange Alliance* offered us some austere admonition. General Smith gave us a graphic picture in his *My Three Years in Moscow*. Last year we had the delightful and informative *Russian Assignment* by Admiral Stevens. And now we are fortunate to have this valuable addition to that short list by the venerable Admiral Ambassador.

A. O. Sarkissian

Library of Congress

Communism and the Russian Peasant, by Herbert S. Dinerstein, and *Moscow in Crisis*, by Leon Gouré and Herbert S. Dinerstein, *Two Studies in Soviet Controls*. Foreword by Philip E. Mosely. Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1955.—xviii, 254 pp. $4.50.

These two studies, prepared as part of a RAND Corporation research program for the Air Force, deal with quite distinct aspects of life in the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, as Philip E. Mosely points out in his introduction to the volume, both focus on the central problem of the Soviet system—control of the population and of the apparatus of rule. Moreover, the studies are closely related in methodology. The authors conducted numerous interviews with Soviet defectors and other eyewitnesses; they also utilized an extensive body of published sources, both Soviet and non-Soviet in origin. The careful weaving together of these materials

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has enabled the writers to treat features of their subjects which could not have been presented from Soviet accounts alone, and to check the reliability of their oral informants against other evidence.

Mr. Dinerstein's purpose in *Communism and the Russian Peasant* is "to examine and evaluate Soviet leadership and control in the collective farm." He adds that "attention will be directed specifically to the official on the lowest level of the hierarchy; we shall inquire into how he discharges his duties, and into the nature of the relationship between him and the working peasant" (p. 3). The author's analysis of the rôle of the collective farm chairman is especially interesting. While the chairman's "election" is ordinarily staged by the local party authorities, the wishes of the peasants must sometimes be taken into account. Moreover, according to one of Mr. Dinerstein's informants, the peasant can "talk back" to the chairman, for the chairman "may make things difficult for him, but he will never report him" (p. 127).

The author's account of the rôle in agricultural control of agencies such as the Machine Tractor Station and the local press is equally illuminating. His description of the organization of the collective farm is generally good, although it contains a few misleading statements—e.g., that a village "containing a hundred peasants [perhaps *households* is meant] will be among the larger ones" (p. 38). The introductory chapters, briefly treating a wide range of subjects such as the pre-revolutionary status of the peasant, collectivization, and "Party Techniques in Managing the Masses", contain a number of debatable interpretations. For example, many students of Soviet affairs would place less stress on the ideological motives behind the collectivization program, and would give greater attention to the Soviet leaders' aim of securing a greater food supply for the urban population without providing the increased quantities of consumer goods necessary to induce the individual peasant to bring his products to market.

Moscow in Crisis deals with a considerably more limited subject, but is much more exhaustive in its treatment. Attention is concentrated on the brief period in mid-October 1941 when the invading German armies neared Moscow. About October 15, the Politburo apparently lost confidence in Soviet ability to defend the capital. The NKVD and the police "virtually disappeared from the streets" and a state of near-anarchy prevailed. Numerous key officials and technicians were tacitly permitted to flee, but the Politburo did not publish an evacuation order or otherwise confess its failure. On October 18, a state-of-siege decree was issued, the NKVD reappeared, and the population was mobilized for a determined defense.

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Perhaps even more interesting than the behavior of the Soviet leadership is the reaction of Moscow's people. Both authors conclude that the only group which maintained its enthusiasm for the Soviet régime during the interval of relaxed control consisted of youths who feared that the Germans would "rob them of the future." Most Muscovites, skeptical of Soviet propaganda, were undismayed by the prospect of German occupation. They expressed little hostility for the Soviet rulers, however; there were "no leaders, no programs" of rebellion. "All informants agreed that if the population had seen evidence of the actual entrance of the Germans, or if shooting within the city had been heard, there might have been overt rebellion" (p. 217). But in Moscow, these signals of revolt never appeared.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG
UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

The Third Reich. Edited by MAURICE BAUMONT, JOHN H. E. FRIED and EDMOND VERMEIL. New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1955.—xv, 910 pp. $9.00.

At the Beirut General Conference of UNESCO in 1948, a resolution was adopted authorizing a "conference of leading authorities" to prepare a report on "the methods and procedure used to propagate Fascism and Nazism" prior to the Second World War. The present symposium, a tardy product of this resolution, fortunately has exceeded these terms of reference and, relegating the purely manipulative aspects of Nazism to a tertiary position, appropriately concentrates upon the "philosophic origins of Nazism", and the "circumstances which made possible the transformation of an ideology into a political program" (p. xiv). Unavoidably, a symposium of twenty-eight scholars, each examining a specific aspect of National Socialism, risks fashioning a Rube Goldberg hodgepodge bearing little resemblance to the reality being studied. Yet the well-planned editorial blueprint, the presence of several important general essays, and the high standards of scholarship in most of the specialized chapters serve to avert what might easily have been a typical collaborative disaster, and make this work of considerable importance to the study both of German history and of political behavior.

It is interesting that ten years after the collapse of Nazi Germany sufficient consensus exists among such an internationally diverse group of scholars to give a work of this kind the degree of internal consistency it possesses. And yet *The Third Reich* does contain one major unresolved dispute of considerable importance to European historians: posed most clearly by the essays of Professor Vermeil, one of the editors, and

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the German historian, Professor Gerhard Ritter, of Freiburg. The tone of the whole work is set by Vermeil's comprehensive and temperate essay on "The Origin, Nature and Development of German Nationalist Ideology in the 19th and 20th Centuries", occupying the first 111 pages and supported, in its premises, by a series of able essays chiefly by French scholars, on Constantin Frantz, H. S. Chamberlain and others of the nineteenth-century German romantic irrationalists (implicitly regarded by the editors as the chief sources of Nazi ideology). The Vermeil-Ritter disagreement (clearly evident from the latter's essay on "The Historical Foundations of the Rise of National Socialism") involves the following issue: may we speak of the Nazi revolution most meaningfully as the culmination and consequence of specifically *German* phenomena; or, the other way around, was not National Socialism a perverse consequence of crises within European society as a whole, triggered by specifically German forces? Vermeil holds to the former premise, and Ritter to the latter.

These polar positions easily can be exaggerated. Vermeil's essay, reminiscent of A. J. P. Taylor's *Course of German History*, builds a Germanic family tree upon which to perch the Third Reich; yet he does concede the play of more universal forces which at least served as midwife to the birth of Nazism. Discussing the wave of German intellectual protest against "Western" intellectualism under Bismarck and Wilhelm II, Vermeil says, for example: "it became the action of a people made extremely vulnerable by an excess of industrialization, which emptied its fields and crowded its workers into enormous improvised cities, of a people . . . whose living institutions and most cherished traditions . . . were being undermined by the inevitable mechanization of technical ideas and activities" (p. 93). Ritter likewise (whose essay reveals an undisguised conservative contempt for and distrust of mass democracy), while deploring Vermeil's Germanocentric approach as "sterile" in explaining the rise of Nazism, can yet speak of unique, if regrettable, "national characteristics" of the German people, as, for example, when he concedes "this lack of political and moral flair" as "the most serious guilt with which the Germans who supported Hitler . . . can be reproached" (p. 411). The issue is one of degree, but of great degree nevertheless; and it should be noted that greater weight, in the organization of this book, is on the side of Vermeil. Unfortunately, none of the ancillary chapters on the German irrationalists—with the notable exception of Wilhelm Grenzmann's fine essay on "Nietzsche and National Socialism"—manages to assess the place of these strange men within European romanticism as a whole, or succeeds in shedding much light upon the rôle of the discontented intellectual in his own cultural milieu.

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Aside from this general issue, mention should be made of several excellent monographic contributions on the Nazis in power: notably Karl Paetel's chapter on the SS ("The Reign of the Black Order"), F. Grégoire's essay on Nazi philosophers, and Arthur Schweitzer's chapter on "The Nazification of the Lower Middle Class and Peasants". Both Schweitzer and Paetel, establishing the social base of the Nazi mass movement in the German lower middle class, small business and the peasantry, trace the "betrayal of the revolution"—in Schweitzer's socio-economic analysis to the army and big business; and in Paetel's political analysis, to the administrative nihilists and terrorists of the SS: whose image of the New Order went beyond the cruder Germanic mysticisms of party ideologues and far beyond the limited aspirations of the ordinary Brownshirt who sought, after all, not world empire, but a selfish *bourgeois* order and social harmony. This was a goal brutally to be achieved but nevertheless limited. For the Black Order, however, the German populace came to be no less despised and tagged for violent purification and transformation than its neighbors in Europe. Here it is that one recalls the comment of Wilhelm Grenzmann on Nietzsche: "Not only Germany but the whole world will be in mortal peril so long as normal relations with the world have not been restored in the conscience of man" (p. 238).

Paul Seabury

University of California (Berkeley)

The Economic Development of Japan: Growth and Structural Change, 1868–1938. By William W. Lockwood. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954.—xv, 603 pp. $10.00.

Among all the countries now being scanned for case histories of economic development, few have attracted more interest than Japan, with its intriguing combination of "oriental conditions" and Western economic institutions. Yet all this post-war interest had not produced until now a full-scale restatement of the Japanese record in terms of the developmental process as we now conceptualize it. Professor Lockwood's book is therefore a major contribution. Comprehensive, factual, cautious and balanced, it surveys practically every aspect of Japan's economic evolution from the Meiji Restoration to the eve of World War II, and undertakes to examine these aspects in the light of theory, notably with the "new tools of economic analysis".

The volume begins with two chapters of historical review; proceeds to a largely statistical chapter on available measures of Japan's growth; and devotes the remaining seven chapters to a functional treatment,

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covering technologic change, capital accumulation, foreign trade (two chapters), shifts in demand, allocation of resources, and the national state. This is a massive integration of the existing literature in English on the Japanese record, revised and amplified with technical data from various scattered English and Japanese sources, old and new. Although Lockwood's interpretations do not differ on many points from G. C. Allen's little gem of a *Short Economic History of Modern Japan* (published in 1946), he quantifies and elaborates many of Allen's points, and develops others particularly in the aggregative mode and in structural breakdowns.

It is one of Lockwood's aims to challenge some of the many myths and misconceptions about Japan and about economic development generally. He has frequently succeeded very well, chiefly by substituting a broad evolutionary perspective for a limited static view. Thus in considering the Colin Clark thesis of progress via the shift of labor out of primary occupations, Lockwood indicates (pp. 131–32) how growth in Japan involved progressive specialization and separation of functions, so as to qualify the meaning of the statistical data. Again, Lockwood stresses the persistence of small-scale enterprise in Japan and its suitability to the local conditions, not only in the face of the factory type of "industrialization" but often because of it (see especially pp. 213–14). An excellent passage (pp. 226–35) balances the undesirable features of the Zaibatsu system against its valuable historical functions, notably in providing not only capital and entrepreneurship but also "combined investment" (that is, the "external economies" and "balanced growth" which Professor Nurkse has recently stressed). Lockwood recognizes (p. 243) the importance of the general-purpose type of foreign loans, in contrast to the tied loan, for promoting development. And he opposes the contention of E. Herbert Norman and other social critics that Japan's industrializing economy was driven toward foreign markets chiefly because of restriction of domestic purchasing power (pp. 307–9).

On the other hand, does not the author himself set up a new misconception when he raises Keynesian issues in so non-Keynesian a context? For at several points he inquires whether the investment forces were sufficiently strong to balance the saving propensities, although it appears that in Japan's evolution—as perhaps in most other cases of a strong secular advance—investment chronically tended to exceed saving, and employment was full up to the limits of existing bottlenecks. A few other instances of dubious relevance occur in the discussion of the rôle of labor scarcity (p. 161), the alleged influence of foreign trade in restraining monopolization (pp. 232–34), and the economic sacrifices supposedly avoided in capital formation of the domestic-construction type (pp.

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243–44). Stylistically, there is some room for improvement by eliminating repetition, especially recapitulations of whole arguments each time certain points are adduced. But these are very minor blemishes in a sound and solid product.

Lockwood is very cautious in deducing the implications of his account. Indeed, he has been so impartial in his assemblage of elements and factors that none emerges as particularly strategic. This is most noticeable in his discussion of the rôle of the state, whose vital and pervasive activities he describes only to back away toward the contribution of business enterprise, and he ends by assuming a "latent" developmental process which was "only accelerated" by the state (p. 574). This kind of interpretation is not very satisfactory, but the difficulty is, in the last analysis, not factual but conceptual, and must wait upon progress in developmental theory. Meanwhile, every theorist and policy-maker must be grateful for case studies as comprehensive and thorough as the work discussed here.

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Fundamental Law in English Constitutional History. By J. W. GOUGH. Oxford, The Clarendon Press, New York, Oxford University Press, 1955.—x, 229 pp. 25*s.*; $4.00.

A favorite cudgel, used by all factions against opponents, in the great constitutional struggles of the seventeenth century was the phrase, "the fundamental laws". Practically everybody of any stature was denounced at some time for disregarding these laws. And in the twentieth century a new disagreement—this one academic and polite—has centered on the historic meaning of the phrase. English writers, most notably Sir William Holdsworth, have dismissed it as meaningless except as a sign of muddled thinking. American historians, led by Professor Charles H. McIlwain, have taken the repeated references to "the fundamental laws", and especially Coke's words in Bonham's Case, as presaging the American Constitution. Mr. Gough's work should end this dispute.

He finds that neither interpretation is correct. Two items—the common lawyers' belief that the principles of even the most startling modern decisions have been inherent in "the good old law" from times immemorial, and the fact that undivided sovereignty (lodged, as it happened, with Parliament) finally did develop—have combined to mislead the English into thinking that the constitutional crisis must be understood, not as a series of efforts to maintain or restore a traditional division of power, but as a struggle for sovereign (or absolute) power.

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The Americans, accustomed to divided power, have not made this mistake; however, they have erred by thinking that the seventeenth-century phrase, "the fundamental laws", implied that common law was then superior to statutes, and that judges could make a serious claim to practice judicial review. Mr. Gough argues—surely correctly—that at the start, and throughout most of that century, nobody was seeking to rationalize the inherited conglomerate of the constitution. Nobody was proposing that the Judiciary, Parliament, or King was supreme and could control (or review) the acts of the others. It was assumed that there was a fundamental law which settled both the rôles of these public agencies and the rights of subjects; and it would have been a violation of this same law for any one of these bodies to set itself up as the supreme protector of fundamental law. Only at mid-century, when all seemed in dissolution, and then for only a short time, was the old notion of the constitution challenged by new ideas. It was almost inevitable that at times during and immediately after the Civil War the Parliament should act as if it possessed the complete legal power to govern. And it is not surprising that, about that time, as a reaction to the temporary sovereignty of Parliament, there arose a demand for a written constitution prescribing inalienable rights and a subordinate legislature. We must remember that both these developments, later influential in Britain and America, were abandoned at the Restoration. They were breaks with traditional ideas. Neither succeeded in pushing aside that older vague interpretation of the constitution symbolized by the phrase, "the fundamental laws", until many years later.

This book, despite its merits, is rather disappointing. Its argument is sound; but that was summarized by Mr. Gough in a good article in *Political Studies* at least two years ago. It would be surprising if a work showing that the same general view of the constitution persisted for well over one hundred years were not burdened by repetition. Yet this might have been overcome somewhat if the author at all times had made it obvious that he was not chasing mere words, if the style were less monotonous and treacherously soporific, and if the parade of short summaries were interrupted by more passages of keen analysis. The annoyance caused by the teasing imprecision of many sentences and paragraphs is a serious obstacle to sympathetic attention. It is unfortunate that a book with the double advantage of an important thesis and solid proofs should be marred by these distracting defects.

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BOOK NOTES

It is rare to find a work on Marxism so penetrating in its exposition and so stimulating in its criticism as is Alfred G. Meyer's *Marxism, the Unity of Theory and Practice: A Critical Essay* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954; xx, 181 pp. $3.50; Harvard Russian Research Center Studies, 14). The author's point of departure is, in effect, to ask how far Marx was a "functionalist". This approach, consistently used, puts Mr. Meyer's work far ahead of eclectic critical treatments, and gives his exposition an unusual clarity. His main purpose is to demonstrate the "disintegration" of Marxism, yet (or perhaps because of this) his exposition is remarkable for its insight into Marx's humanism. His treatment of Marx's concepts of labor, consciousness, production and alienation, concise as it is, could scarcely be bettered for its purpose. As an exposition of Marxism for the serious student, this book takes its place in the front rank. Beyond that, Mr. Meyer's critical argument is of unusual interest. Marx, he finds, wove together into one majestic system of thought three "psychological strands"—radical criticism (of hitherto existing systems, for having dehumanized man), sober social science, and optimistic belief in the inevitability of progress. These three elements, he argues, were saved from logical contradiction only by the assumption of the unique rôle of the proletariat and its ability to unite theory and practice. For instance, there seems to be a contradiction between the conclusion of radical criticism (viz., that by the advance of capitalist society man had been finally dehumanized and made capable of only false consciousness of himself and society) and the faith in progress (since progress depended on men acting with true consciousness). But this was no contradiction if one postulated that the proletariat would, just because of its complete dehumanization, reach a true understanding of the causes of its degradation, and so move to end not only its own but all humanity's degradation. Mr. Meyer argues that this assumption about the proletariat was tenable when Marx formulated it, but that it soon became untenable (even, he suggests, as early as the failure of the 1848 revolutions)—hence the disintegration of Marxism. Disintegration, he points out, does not mean disappearance or even decay; rather, it has meant "a blossoming and flourishing of Marx's ideas into many different directions," particularly in fruitful work in the social sciences (p. 145). Two questions may occur to the reader. If the unity of the system was essential and has been destroyed, how can

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the fragments go on being fruitful? Secondly, how can we reconcile the view (which pervades the whole work) that Marxism has disintegrated beyond recall, with the observation that Marxism "is intimately related to the ebb and flow of revolutionary situations or mass movements of revolt. Whenever these have arisen . . . theory and practice, value judgments and sober analysis have come together, and Marxism has been re-integrated" (p. 107)? Such questions tempt one to reconsider the assumption, so often, as here, stated as self-evident or referred to Kant, that moral values cannot be derived scientifically. But that such questions should arise is evidence of the author's success in penetrating clearly to the roots of the problem.—C. B. MACPHERSON, University of Toronto.

One of the most arresting political phenomena in present-day Germany is the wide and bitter separation of the two so-called labor parties: the Social Democratic party and the Communist party. The situation is the more interesting when it is borne in mind that the two groups had a common origin in the old Social Democratic party of the German Empire. The purpose—and it is exceedingly well carried out—of *German Social Democracy, 1905–1917: The Development of the Great Schism*, by Carl E. Schorske (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1955; xvi, 358 pp. $5.50), is to trace the development of the growing split between reformism and revolutionism within the old party from 1905 to 1917. The terminal dates of the scholarly study are logical and historically sound: the Russian Revolution in 1905 encouraged the orthodox Marxists among the Social Democrats to join the issue with the rightist reformists in the party executive by challenging with vigor the traditional tactic of the party and by seeking with new zest to radicalize the labor movement; the exigencies of the First World War resulted in the final break-up of the old party through the founding in 1917 of the Independent Socialist party—at Gotha where, in 1875, the parent organization itself had come into being. The author shows, clearly and cogently, how, during the dozen years in question, the Social Democratic party was polarized by the growing differences between the right-wing or trade-unionist reformists and the left radicals—both originally minority elements. Where the former feared the revolutionism of the masses (whom they regarded as incapable of correctly visualizing their own best interests), the latter glorified the masses as "capable of everything". Again, while the reformists managed to build up an effective party machine to restrain the more radical elements, the latter came to feel that strong centralization within the party was incompatible with the aims of social revolution. (In essence, the party leaders preached democracy on the national scene but functioned in virtually autocratic manner within the fold, while the leftists advocated

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extreme party decentralization and national revolution.) Finally, whereas the executive had come to believe that the leaders of government and industry gradually were being persuaded of the need for "social justice", the Marxists wanted to place the "proletarian masses as a whole" in the saddle with the expectation that they would create a new and supposedly wonderful order. In the end, in the "turnip winter" of 1917, the radicals called the first actual conference of the opposition. Quickly thereafter the party executive declared that the dissidents, by the very act of holding such a conference, "had separated (themselves) from the party." And so, at Easter 1917, a month after the Russian March Revolution, the radicals formed the Independent Socialist party—forerunner of the German Communist party. Dr. Schorske's interesting contribution to our knowledge of modern German political development is made even more valuable by a splendid bibliographical essay. The index is adequate and the format of the book is attractive.—Walter C. Langsam, University of Cincinnati.

In *American Demagogues: Twentieth Century* (Boston, The Beacon Press, 1954; xv, 368 pp. $5.00), Reinhard H. Luthin writes in a style as lively as that of the New York journalists on whose writings he deftly draws. He gives us, in the convenient form of a book, what the newspapers have been giving us over the years—succinct portraits of what he calls "masters of the masses" who pandered "to the passions and prejudices, rather than the reason, of the populace." But Mr. Luthin is more than a journalist. His researches have been extensive, his judgments are carefully wrought, and his tales have the ring of authenticity. *American Demagogues* contains sketches of James M. Curley, William Hale Thompson, Theodore G. Bilbo, Eugene Talmadge, Huey Long, Joseph R. McCarthy, and six other politicians who fit the author's definition of demagogues. The book is "balanced"; it has as many city dwellers as country characters; as many Northerners as Southerners. Mr. Luthin lists as many demagogues of the Catholic faith as he does Baptists or Methodists. That he does not list a Jew or a Negro is not due to that sort of liberalism which finds those minority groups impeccable; it is because their leaders are not sufficiently enthroned in the hearts of the prejudiced masses to qualify as demagogues. Mr. Luthin has no ulterior motives. From him those who have not been reading newspapers for the past fifty years can learn much. He has made a contribution to scholarship. He and Professor Allan Nevins, who writes the introduction to this book, have the right to their opinion. It is that of civic moralists who hew to the "party line" of progressive American nationalists. They tritely and fervently proclaim their faith in democracy but not in dema-

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gogues. They quote Lincoln and Emerson. Demagogues are condemned by standards as old as those of the Muckrakers. The two historians are "constructive" in their criticisms. They believe that in the end the people are always right, that the remedy for the evils of democracy is more democracy. They are certain that the innate wholesomeness of the most virtuous country on earth will redeem the people from the demagogues in favor of the stereotypes of "right-thinking" Americans. Such redundancy reminds the reader of Woodrow Wilson and his unctious moralisms. I wish Mr. Luthin were not so standardized. I wish his otherwise sprightly and worthy book were infused with the tenderness and tolerance of William Faulkner and Robert Penn Warren. Then he would be possessed of a liberalism more profound than that which sees virtue only in the missionary imperialism of the country of Lincoln, Woodrow Wilson and the two Roosevelts.—FRANCIS B. SIMKINS, Longwood College, Farmville, Virginia.

Visitors to Paris with a sense of history should make at least one pilgrimage to the "*mûr des Fédérés*"—the wall running along the cemetery *Père la Chaise* where the Commune lost its being and gained its martyrs. Even a casual visitor cannot fail to be impressed by the attempt of the French Communists to link their resistance to the German occupation (after June 1941, that is) with the glorious story of the Workers' Commune. A large section of the cemetery nearest the hallowed wall has been appropriated by the French Communist party as a burial ground for many of its militants "shot by the Boche"—and who thus are made to serve the party in death as in life. Surely at least one important factor in the emergence of the Communist party as the most powerful single organization in post-war France was the myth of its leadership in the Resistance. It is precisely this period that occupies the attention of Angelo Rossi in his *La Guerre des Papillons: Quatre ans de politique communiste (1940–1944)* (Paris, Les Iles d'Or, 1954; 332, xlviii pp.)—the latest in his series of relentless analyses of French Communist policy. M. Rossi, with characteristic thoroughness, has carefully collected communist pamphlets and posters of the era. In 1939–40, communist broadsides denounced as "warmongers" all those in the West who wished to resist the onslaught of Nazism. He brings to light a Communist request to testify at the Riom trial concerning "the blind submission of our rulers to the wishes of British imperialism, which was uncontestably one of the causes of the war" (p. 32). In 1940–41, the French Communists, anxious to maintain the Nazi-Soviet partnership, condemned de Gaulle as "an agent of British capitalism", and loudly protested any use of French manpower or resources in "the war between Germany and

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England." But after June 1941 the party demanded the murder of as many German soldiers as possible, in spite of the terrible vengeance the Nazis could exact from an unarmed populace, because this might in some small way relieve the pressure on the Russian front. The basic theme of this book is the same expounded by the author in his *Les Communistes Français pendant la Drôle de Guerre* (1951) and the more comprehensive *Physiologie du Parti Communiste Français* (1948): the overriding consideration of the leaders of the French Communist party is to defend the interests of the U.S.S.R. as conceived and decided upon by Moscow, and to carry out these decisions automatically, without questioning, without hesitation, without appeal (p. 326). This conclusion comes as no surprise to those familiar with the "French Line"; yet it is always useful to have suitable documentation for the alleged "heroic period" of French communism.—BERNARD E. BROWN, Michigan State University.

Yearbook of International Organizations (*Annuaire des Organisations Internationales*), *1954–55* (Fifth Year) (Brussels, Union of International Associations, 1954; 1196 pp. $10.00 or equivalent in local currency), a new edition of the standard guide to international organizations, both inter-governmental and international non-governmental, is a model of clear organization of a reference book. The Union of International Associations in Brussels is responsible for it but the official coöperation of the Secretariat of the United Nations is acknowledged. Aside from the fact that this book offers the most convenient and authoritative source of information on the essential facts about the organizations operating in the international field, a mere scanning of the volume impresses one with the tremendous range of all these organized activities. In Part I, after a concise picture of the United Nations itself, one finds entries for the twenty-two Specialized Agencies and other United Nations Bodies. Part II contains a single entry under "Supra-National Organization"—the European Coal and Steel Community; it will be interesting to watch possible future expansion of this Part. Part III includes 119 other Inter-Governmental Organizations, while Part IV covers 1,131 Non-Governmental Organizations. These NGOs are grouped under substantive headings such as Agriculture, Economics and Finance, International Relations, Peace and Friendship, and so on. Forty-five of these NGOs have more than a million members while twenty-three are limited to less than one hundred. Key-word indexes in English and French enable one to locate readily any given organization. There is also an index of the initials as officially used both in English and in French so that the user, according to his linguistic preference, may look up "ILO" or "OIT" or the more familiar example of finding the United

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Nations under either "UN" or "ONU". A geographical index records by continents and countries the locations of the various headquarters. There are various other useful charts and tables. The body of the work is in English but the introductory and explanatory notes as well as indexes are also printed in French. The Union of International Associations is to be congratulated and thanked.—PHILIP C. JESSUP, Columbia University.

In anything shorter than a rambling essay it would be most difficult to suggest the scope and diversity of these nearly 3,000 pages of the Department of State's documentary record: *The American Republics, 1935, 1936*, and *1937*, Vols. IV, V, and V of *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1935, 1936*, and *1937* (Washington, U. S. Government Printing Office, 1953, 1954, and 1954. lxxxix, 988 pp. $4.00; xcv, 992 pp. $4.50; and v, 807 pp. $3.75). Little more than a rough classification can here be attempted. Among the more accustomed items are those relating to Latin America's perennial boundary disputes. In 1935–1937 one can follow the penultimate stages of the Chaco settlement between Bolivia and Paraguay, the conclusion of the Leticia dispute between Colombia and Peru, and controversies involving Ecuador and Peru, Haiti and the Dominican Republic, and several Central American countries. A second type of document illuminates internal political affairs of various countries. Sometimes, as with Ecuador, Bolivia and Paraguay, these conditions bespeak congenital turbulence. In other instances an entrenched *caudillo*, such as Honduras' Carías, El Salvador's Martínez, or Guatemala's Ubico, helps himself unchallenged to another term of office. Nicaragua's unrest was the legacy of American intervention, and Ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane complains impatiently, and with certain ingenuousness, of the Nicaraguans' refusal to believe that, after a quarter-century of meddling, the United States will not interfere in local elections (*1935*, p. 845). More clearly than the situations so far mentioned, the establishment of Brazil's "New State" in 1937 by the late Getúlio Vargas reflected world-wide political, economic and social currents, despite his emphatic disavowal of Nazi or Fascist influence (*1937*, p. 315). A third kind of document in these volumes recalls the depression years: dispatches concerning defaulted securities, irksome exchange-control regulations of many of the countries, and inroads made upon Latin-American foreign trade by the seductive commercial techniques of Nazi Germany. Sumner Welles's declaration of his "Government's belief and policy that artificial restrictions on exchange transactions are detrimental in the long run" (*1936*, p. 328) says little for the New Deal government's sophistication in economic

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matters or for its appreciation of the dilemmas facing Latin-American economies. Finally, there are many papers attesting the conscientious carrying out of the good-neighbor policy; one may cite the negotiations over the revision of the treaty with Panama, over the Inter-American Highway, over the Inter-American Peace Conference of 1936, and over reciprocal trade agreements. Exchanges with Mexico concerning such touchy issues as the agrarian, petroleum and religious questions are among the many that illustrate the American government's decision—earnest in motivation but sometimes agonizing in execution—to cease intervening in its neighbors' affairs. Occasionally a warning note of larger world crisis slips into these pages, as when the Brazilian ambassador at Tokyo relays "a rather alarming picture of Japanese preparations for eventual hostilities with the United States" (*1935*, p. 387).—RICHARD M. MORSE, Columbia University.

SPECIAL NOTICE

Because of developments in Washington at this time, it has proved impossible for the Academy to secure the type of a speaker it desired for its 75th Anniversary Meeting, and the Fall Meeting is thus cancelled.

The regular January Proceedings will be printed, covering the papers that would have been given at the daytime sessions.

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